Showing posts with label adaptation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label adaptation. Show all posts

Friday, January 27, 2017

Evolution as a pachinko history: what is 'random'?

We discussed a Japanese pachinko machine in an earlier post, a pinball machine, as an example of the difference between randomness and determinism, in an evolutionary context.   Here we want to use pachinko machine imagery in a different way.

The prevailing, often unstated but just-under-the-surface assumption is that every trait in life is here because of natural selection.  Of course, for a trait to be here at all, bearers of its ancestral states up to the present (or, at least, the recent past) were successful enough to have reproduced.  It would not be here if it were otherwise, unless, for example, it's itself harmful, or without function but connected to a much better, related trait since genes are usually used in many different bodily contexts and may be associated with both beneficial and harmful traits.  Most sensible evolutionary geneticists know that many or even most sites in genomes tolerate variation that has either no effect or effects so small that in realistic population sizes they change in frequency essentially by chance.





However, the widespread default assumption that there must be an adaptive explanation for every trait usually also tacitly assumes that probabilism doesn't make much difference.  Some alert evolutionary biologists will acknowledge that one version among contemporary but equivalent versions of a trait can evolve by chance relative to other versions.  But the insistence, tacit or expressed, is that natural selection, treated essentially as a force, is responsible.  The very typical view is that the trait arose because of selection 'for' it, and that's why it's here.  And speaking of 'here', here's where a pachinko analogy may be informative.

If a bevy of metal balls tumbles through the machine, each bouncing off the many pins, they will end up scattered across the bottom ledge of the machine (the gambling idea is to have them end up in a particular place, but that's not our point here).  So let's take a given ball and ask 'Why did it end up where it did?"





The obvious and clearly true answer is 'Gravity is responsible'.  That is the analogue of 'selection is responsible'.   But it is rather an empty answer.  One can always say that what's here must be here because it was favored (that is, not excluded) by fitness considerations: its ancestral bearers obviously reproduced!  We can define that as 'adaptation' and indeed in a sense that is what is done every day, almost thoughtlessly.

Gravity is, like the typical if tacit assumption about natural selection, a deterministic force for all practical purposes here.  But why did this ball end up in this particular place?  One obvious answer is that each starts out in a slightly different place at the top, and no two balls are absolutely identical. However, each ball makes a different path from the top to the bottom of the obstacle course it faces. Yes, it is gravity that determines that they go down (adapt), but not how they go down.

In fact, each ball takes a different path, zigging and zagging at each point based on what happens, essentially by chance, at that point.   This one might think of as local ecosystems on the evolutionary path of any organism, that are beyond its control.  So, in the end, even if the entire journey is deterministic, in the sense that every collision is, the result is not one that can, in practice, be understood except by following the path of each ball (each trait, in the biological analogy).  And this means that the trajectory cannot be predicted ahead of time. And in turn, this means that our interpretation of what a trait we see today was selected 'for' is often if not usually either basically just a guess or, more often, equates what the trait does today to what it was selected to be, expressed as if it were an express train from then to now.

And this doesn't consider another aspect of the chaotic and chance-affected nature of evolutionary adaptation: the interaction with the other balls bouncing around at the same time in such an obstacle course.  Collisions are in every meaningful sense in the game of life, if not pachinko, chance events that affect selective ones, even were we to assume that selection is simple, straightforward, and deterministic.

The famous argument by Gould and Lewontin that things useful for one purpose, such as 'spandrels' in cathedral roofs, are incidental traits that provide the options for future adaptations--life exploits today with what yesterday produced for whatever reason even if just by chance.  The analogy or metaphor has been questioned, but that is not important here.  What is important is that contingencies of this nature are chance events, relative to what builds on them.  Selectionism as a riposte to creationism is fine but hyper-selectionism becomes just another often thought-free dogma.  Darwin gave us inspiration and insight, but we should think for ourselves, not in 19th century terms.

A far humbler, and far less 'Darwinian' (but not anti-Darwinian!), explanation of life is called for if we really want to understand evolution as a subtle often noisy process, rather than as a faith.  Instead, even serious biologists freely invent--and that's an apt word for it--selective accounts, as if true explanations, for almost any trait one might mention. It's invented because some reason is imagined without any direct evidence other than present-day function, but then treated as if directly observed, which is rarely possible. Here is an interview that I just came across that in a different way makes some of the same points we are trying to make here.

Everything here today is 'adaptive' in the sense that it has worked up to now.  Everything here today is also a 4 billion year successful lineage, that all made its way through the pachinko pins.  But these are almost vacuous tautologies.  Understanding life requires understanding one's biases in trying to force simple solutions on complicated reality.

Thursday, October 27, 2016

Causal complexity in life

Evolution is the process that generates the relationships between genomes and traits in organisms.  Although we have written extensively and repeatedly about the issues raised by causal complexity,  we were led to write this post by a recent paper, in the 21 October 2016 issue of Science, which discusses molecular pathways to hemoglobin (Hb) gene function.  Although one might expect this to be rather simple and genomically direct, it is in fact complex and there are many different ways to achieve comparable function.

The authors, C Nataragan et al.,  looked at the genetic basis of adaptation to habitats at different altitude, focusing on genes coding for Hb molecules, that transport oxygen in the blood to provide the body's tissues with this vital fuel.  As a basic aspect of our atmosphere, oxygen concentrations differ at different altitudes, being low in mountainous regions compared to lowlands.  Species must somehow adapt to their localities, and at least one way to to this is for oxygen transport efficiency mechanisms to differ at different elevations.  Bird species have moved into and among these various environments on many independent occasions.

The affinity of Hb molecules for, that is, ability to bind oxygen, depends on their amino acid sequence, and the authors found that this varies by altitude.  The efficiency is similar among species at similar altitudes, even if due to independent population expansions. But when they looked at the Hb coding sequences in different species, they found a variety of species-specific changes.  That is, there are multiple ways to achieve similar function, so that parallel evolution at the functional level, which is what Nature detects, is achieved by many different mutational pathways.  In that sense, while an adaptation can be predicted, a specific genetic reason cannot be.

The authors looked only at coding regions, but of course evolution also involves regulatory sequences (among other functional regions in DNA), so there is every reason to expect that there is even more complexity to the adaptive paths taken.

Important specific documentation....but not conceptually new, though unappreciated
The authors also looked at what they call 'resurrected ancestral' proteins, by experimentally testing the efficacy of some specific Hb mutations, and they found that genomic background made a major difference in how, or whether, a specific change would affect oxygen binding.  This shows that evolution is contingent on local conditions, and that a given genomic change depends on the genomic background.  The ad hoc, locally contingent nature of evolution is (or should be) a central aspect of evolutionary world views, but there is a widespread tendency to think in classical Mendelian terms, of a gene for this and a gene for that, so that one would expect similar results in similar, if independent areas or contexts.  This is a common, if often tacit, view underlying much of genome mapping to find genes 'for' some human trait, like important diseases.  But it is quite misleading, or more accurately, is very wrong.

In 2008 we wrote about this in Genetics, as we've done before and since here on MT and in other papers.  In the 2008 article we used the following image to suggest metaphorically the nature of this complex causation, with its alternative pathways and the like, where the 'trait' is the amount of water passing New Orleans on the Mississippi River.  The figure suggests how difficult it would be to determine 'the' causal source of the water, how many different ways there are to get the same river level.

Drainage complexity as a metaphor for genomic causal complexity.  Map by Richard Weiss and ArcInfo
One can go even further, and note that this is exactly the kind of findings that are to be expected from and documented by the huge list of association studies done of human traits.  These typically find a great many genome regions whose variation contributes to the trait, usually each with a small individual effect, and mainly at low frequency in the population.  That means that individuals with similar trait values (say, diabetes, obesity, tall, or short stature, etc.) have different genotypes, that overlap in incomplete and individually unique ways.

We have written about aspects of this aspect of life, in what we called evolution by phenotype, in various places.  Nature screens on traits directly and only on genes very indirectly in most situations in complex organisms.  This means that many genotypes yield the same phenotype, and these will be equivalent in the face of natural selection and will experience genetic drift among them even in the fact of natural selection, again because selection screens the phenotype.  This is the process we called phenogenetic drift.  These papers were not 'discoveries' of ours but just statements of what is pretty obvious even if inconvenient for those seeking simple genetic causation.

The Science paper on altitude adaptation shows this by stereotypical sequences from one individual each from a variety of different species, rather than different individuals within each species, but that one can expect must also exist.  The point is that a priori prediction of how hemoglobin adaptation will occur is problematic, except that each species must have some adaptation to available oxygen.  Parallel phenotype evolution need not be matched by parallel genotypic evolution because selection 'sees' phenotypes and doesn't 'care' about how they are achieved.

The reason for this complexity is simple: it is that this is how evolution working via phenotypes rather than genotypes molds the genetic aspects of causation.

Wednesday, May 4, 2016

They were all my future specimens. And they died.

Without skeletal collections we'd struggle to do much evolutionary biology, especially when it comes to studying fossils.

We'd hate to let all those specimens go to waste, just languishing there in museum drawers. Sciencing them brings honor to their death. (Thanks for the new verb, Andy Weir.) But while we're learning from skeletons we can never forget that they're dead.

So although many of our samples are animals that were hunted by President Theodore Roosevelt (thanks Smithsonian!) or Major Powell-Cotton (thanks Powell-Cotton museum!), many of them, especially when it comes to human skeletons, are ones that died of "natural" causes.

You're thinking, well, duh. Well, yeah. Duh. But sometimes what's obvious still isn't so obviously important until someone goes to the trouble to very carefully consider it.

If the "osteological paradox" has already come to mind, that's probably because you're familiar with the classic paper "The Osteological Paradox" co-authored by a certain Mermaid and other former graduate school professors of mine.  Although the paper discusses issues that are more complicated and more specific than we need to hash out here, "osteological paradox" is a great term for the conundrum that scientists face when reconstructing things like health, fitness, and adaptation in past populations from the remains of the individuals who died.

Naturally, if you've been raised on "osteological paradox" thinking, it's one of the first things that comes to mind when you see a visually stunning study by my colleagues that analyzes pelvic morphology of dead individuals to reveal differing adaptive morphologies in the pelves of males vs. females.

Sexual dimorphism in the human pelvis has been known for quite some time, and it's already well-understood that the differences are largely located in the dimensions of a woman's birth canal. But this new study shows that differences are observable from birth and that women at post-reproductive ages do not retain the obstetrically-beneficial dimensions that younger women do during their fertile years. One of the arguments this new paper makes is that human female pelves are adapted to be most accommodating for childbirth during the child-bearing years. And that very well may be the case. However, these claims for adaptation, like most based on human skeletal samples, were based on women who were dead and, thus, not adapted.

In this context, the concluding paragraph of "The Osteological Paradox" is worth quoting:

"...choosing among competing interpretations of the osteological evidence requires tight control over cultural context as well as a deeper understanding of the biology of frailty and death. These problems deserve far more attention than they have received to date if we are to make sense of the biomedical consequences of the major social and environmental changes that have occurred during the course of cultural evolution."

And that could be extended to "biological evolution" as well. Maybe it has been in a later paper.

Anyway, when we're looking at dead humans with an evolutionary mindset, it's probably good to ask whether we can know if selective pressures were the same across the timespan covered by the sample. It's also probably good to ask whether environmental conditions were the same across the timespan covered by the sample. It's also probably good to sing this to ourselves as we design our evolutionary study of the human skeleton:



Tuesday, June 2, 2015

Imagine no mutation.

Imagine no mutation.
I wonder if you can.
No means for new variation.
A creationist's view of Man.
Imagine all the people
learning it this way.

Boo-hoo, ewww.

I found out this semester that although most of my students in "Human Origins" had learned about natural selection, that relatively few of them had learned about mutation. 

Huh? Are people still stuck on Darwin? Apparently. 

Mutation requires a little bit of genetics to understand, but c'mon! Natural selection makes no sense without it. None.

And what's more, natural selection cannot be the all-powerful force that popular culture might have us believe when mutation is accounted for. Evolution is so much more fascinating with even a basic understanding of mutation. In this molecular-clock, whole-genome-sequencing era, how can anyone teaching and learning evolution not have at least a basic understanding of chance, perpetual accumulation of mutations?

We've all, each and every one of us, got many de novo mutations. So our genomes are distinct from our parents' and siblings', not just because of genetic recombination of our grandparents' genomes when our parents' eggs and sperms were built, but because of unique mutations that occurred while making those germ cells or in the early stages after their union.

That this constant change in lineages is occurring with each reproductive event is proof that natural selection is a largely tolerant process, perpetually allowing perpetual evolution by mutation.

(And, maybe natural selection has much less, and mutation has much more, to do with speciation than many have assumed.)

What happens to each and every one of our unique mutations, whether or not they live on in our offspring, whether or not they play a role in adaptation, depends on quite a bit of luck, partly because of the "Law of Segregation":

A Mutation's Future
Click to enlarge. Email me for original file that you can modify: holly_dunsworth@uri.edu

For a description of evolution that incorporates perpetual mutation, check out "Evolution is the only natural explanation. And it's all we need."

Friday, December 20, 2013

"Every trait is due to natural selection!"....often said, but is it true?

It is often said by people who claim to understand evolution that every trait is due to natural selection.  This is belief in a form of very strong determinism that reduces, in essence, to genetic determinism.  It's closely akin to the confident defense of the pop-culture concept of the 'selfish' gene against all challenges.  Put another way,  in such a view, natural selection is not a scientific statement about evidence, but an axiom--an assumption--that is used to make inference from data, but not something to be tested in itself.

For reasons we'll go into, it's not entirely clear where this view comes from, but it's often justified as a form of materialism, as if Genesis According to Darwin is true and therefore selection is the proper riposte to Genesis According to God.  But it's highly misplaced in science, and the assumption obscures an actual discussion.  Let's agree that if we'll stay within the confines of materialism--that is, no mysticism and that the laws of physical nature must  not just be consistent with, but must also ultimately explain, everything biological--we can examine the nature of strongly determinstic Darwinism.

So let's consider the proposition that every trait is due to natural selection.  We'll use an example.  First we need a trait.  Ok, here's a picture of my thumb (not used out of vanity over its undoubted beauty!).  Is 'it' a 'trait'?  If it is, of course, we can speak about 'its' evolution.  If it's not a trait, then what is it and how can we understand it?

Thumbs up...or angles out....or....?

On second thought, maybe the whole thumb is not a 'trait'.   Maybe it's the angle,  θ, the measure of the bend where the second phalanx starts.  Or is the trait that my thumb has a second phalanx?  Or that I can make that angle?  Or is the trait the length, x, of the second phalanx?  Or the angle between the thumb and the first finger?  How do we decide?  All of these traits or parts of traits have in some way evolved together, so it's hard to say when one aspect begins and another one ends, that is, what is the 'trait'.

But let's say we make our decision on that question.  Then, if whatever we decide our trait must, by the usual assumption, have evolved by natural selection, we want to be able to say what it evolved 'for'.  And to do that, we must show that the trait we're assuming resulted from natural selection somehow had direct fitness (survival or fertility) effects, because, since to selectionistic explanations chance is not an option, differential fitness is the mechanism by which natural selection works.  If our trait is θ, that means that if my ancestors had had an intrapollectial angle (pollex means thumb in Latin, and therefore using the word makes it 'science') that was--what?--greater than my θ, or was it less than my θ, or was it enough that it wasn't exactly my θ?, then they didn't have any kids and I wouldn't be here!

But wait!  What if the trait was the length of the distal pollectial segment, x, that mattered.  Those ancestors with more stubby thumb-ends are fossils without issue (that means, by the way, that when paleontologists dig them up they can't interpret what they were adapted for, since the death was because they weren't adaptive).  Or maybe those with gross thumbs whose last digit was a tad too long (how much is too much--one millimeter, say?) died out.  The trouble of course is that even my adaptive distant ancestors are dead, and how can we say whether they were 'fully' adaptive and died after having many kids, or were just caught by a lion when they wandered carelessly away from the campfire to take a pee one night (we don't need to consider whether, perhaps gender-related, the thumb trait was involved in that latter process).

Now given my important pollectial triangle (here we consider θ and x to have jointly been the critical 'trait', though what justification there is for that is an open issue), our task is to understand what natural selection molded it for.

The obvious thing is to look at what we actually do with our thumbs (that requires a triangular configuration like mine).   Most anthropologists will argue that our thumbs are for tool use--at least, it says that in textbooks about thumbs, so it must be true.  But I know that my deep ancestors didn't have pens and pencils or space-bars to tap, so it must have been for throwing stones in annual sporting events where the winner impressed the girls and, well, you know....

What about holding a rake in the fall when I clear my yard of leaves---it couldn't have been for that because my ancestors evolved in Africa where you don't have to rake leaves in the fall because it's tropical and there is no fall!  No, I have to think of uses that aren't just modern exploitations of a trait that was strongly selected in the past for something they did in the past.  This is a bit now-centered, because in the past the use of the traits they had then might not have been for what they did then, but what their ancestors did in their distant past.

Anyway, I suppose since the trait must have had important fitness-related function, if it is assumed to have evolved by natural selection, it may have had a role in sexual stimulation of some sort.  One can let one's imagination run wild, but we needn't go that far.  As I was saying, other than for modern uses, what I use my pollectial angle for is for getting itchy specks of dust out and sleep-grains of the corner of my eye.  Without that angle, θ, I wouldn't easily be able to do it.  Now on the dusty African savannah, when sharp-eyed spotting of  prey and aiming of spears or hunting-stones was vital, the eye-clearing use of thumbs is an obvious explanation.

There is the annoying little question of why not everyone's thumbs have exactly the same triangle--side length or angle.  If this is an adaptive trait formed by natural selection long ago, which it must have been since humans around the world have pollectial triangles (and so did Neandertals and even Denisovans!), then why is it still so variable?

Well, I'm getting tired of all this speculation.  This is especially unnerving because I can think of other aspects of thumbs that might be considered as traits, or the trait may be a complex of traits with their own individual selective reasons.  Or, really disturbing, these assembled aspects may have had different functions (that affected reproductive success) during the million years in which the trait(s) were adaptively evolving.

Now selectionist axioms don't provide room for probability in reproductive success.  That's why earlier I said that if my ancestors' value of θ was even a bit different from mine, then they must not have reproduced; if some tolerance was allowed, then fitness would be probabilistic, and that means chance, which is not allowed: the trait has to be functionally deterministic. That's because once you admit probabilities (genetic drift), you open the door to all sorts of less satisfying, less simple, and less clear-cut explanations--and Nature and the Times will shun your papers.  Part of the fear is that if one says a trait's presence is for 'random' reasons, it opens the door to creationism or, worse, lack of some explanation that's simple enough for undergraduates to understand or the research to be reported in the NY Times. It raises the specter of a 747 arising randomly out of a pile of scrap metal.

This is a silly non sequitur, since nobody (not even neutralists, who somehow can conceive of aspects of traits that arose for no adaptive reason at all) denies the role of various sorts of constraint, including classical natural selection, even when invoking genetic drift.  But it's just as silly to think that every tiny aspect of every trait has to be here because of specific natural selection in the usual sense.  Darwin rationalized various aspects of traits, such as correlations among them, basically as having developmental-constraint reasons and so on.  We know of such things in better molecular terms today.

More importantly, it is the definition of what counts as a 'trait' that we should be thinking more seriously about.  Organisms evolve as organisms, not just as sets of traits, and to the extent that a trait is in the eye of the definer, speculations about what it's 'for'  may also be just-so stories in the mind of the definer.  So is the use of selection as an axiom: if something (whatever that be) is assumed  to be here because of selection, then to say that it's here because of selection is a tautology.  The care one must take to avoid such tautological thinking has been known for many decades.  There are serious questions about evolution's mechanism that usually are swept under the rug because they point out inconvenient complexity that does not lead to convenient publishable answers. Who decides where a 'trait' s/he can define is or was a unitary phenomenon during its evolution?  And who decides how precise the hypothesized adaptation was?   And who decides how much of its variation may have been tolerated or even itself adaptive?

Trait micro-definitions, arbitrary post-hoc trait definition, and so on show by example how hard it is to legitimately decide what to include.  And if, as most of the evidence both theoretical and observational suggests, typical selective advantages are on the order of about one per thousand (you have 10001 kids with a good thumb-angle vs 1000 without such an angle), that is almost meaningless besides being literally impossible to prove.  It certainly means that traits with socially sensitive implications when interpreted in strong selectionist terms are, evolutionarily, essentially meaningless, as is the very notion that selection like that is a determinative 'force'.  Many such traits probably exist, and most traits may be like that, if we could even decide how to define them.  They should be deprived of their societal implications or value judgments, or much of the scientific surety with which the explanations are too-often couched.  Even mate-choice criteria, that could be very close to fitness, if the trait is used only now and then because there really wasn't much choice in human ancestral populations or kinship rules specified who you mated with, may mean little locally even if over long term the scenario is true.

The point about thumbs may seem like a kind of reductio ad absurdam, but is it?  Viewed from some time or vantage points, structures whose adaptive origins may seem obvious might be as problematic as my thumb from some other frames of reference.  For thousands of generations it could be that, say, the angle or size of the iliac crest would seem as trivial a 'trait' as my thumb, while today it seems fundamental to upright posture.

Fatigue wins....
I must confess that my patience is running low (that's one of my traits!), so I am simply ignoring the wrinkles in the thumb.  They may actually be the trait that evolved adaptively, though 'for' what is beyond me.  Probably I'm just tiring.  You can provide the explanation without my help, I'm sure.

Thursday, June 6, 2013

Fairy stories and evolutionary medicine

Plausible does not mean probable
Nothing in medicine makes sense except in the light of evolution!  So goes a modification of the great 20th century evolutionary biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky's statement about biology; Dobzhansky was advocating the teaching of evolution in the schools, but his quip is now tailored as the dictum of the field of evolutionary medicine (EM).

EM is the idea that evolutionary theory can be used to explain why we get the diseases we do.  That is, when something goes wrong with the body, it's because our genome evolved long ago, in a very different ecological context, and thus we're not adapted to life in the modern world.  We're out of sync with our evolutionary history, and this is what leads to disease.  And should, as a consequence, inform clinical practice.

A very nicely argued paper by Michael Cournoyea in the latest Perspectives in Biology and Medicine ("Ancestral Assumptions and the Clinical Uncertainty of Evolutionary Medicine") questions the theoretical basis of this idea, as well as its clinical relevance.  He refers to two recent collections of writings on EM, noting that they include chapters on
...nutrition, type 2 diabetes, childbirth, menstruation, stress, altitude sickness, sleep, heart disease, obesity, addiction, delusions, and more. For example, contributors suggest that addiction is just the malfunctioning of ancestral wanting and seeking mechanisms in modern lifestyles; sleep problems reflect an ancestral tension between the need to remain vigilant and the need to rest; and the life of those with chronic heart failure may be prolonged by blocking ancient neurohormonal adaptations.
These kinds of arguments are not uncommon even in everyday analyses of modern society: it's often said, e.g., that severe anxiety disorder is common in today's stressful society, when we have to do things we did not evolve to do like public speaking or driving across bridges.  But anxiety evolved as a normal defensive response to fearful situations, and at the time was adaptive rather than debilitating.  Too little anxiety would have been selected against, because, well, it's obvious -- he who had no fear of lions was dinner. 

Cournoyea describes the classic example of the practical uses of EM.  Fever, it is thought, must have evolved for a reason.  Because it accompanies illness, it must somehow help the immune system combat infection.  Therefore, it's probably best to leave fever untreated.  But, as he says, while this idea might pinpoint a way for researchers to study fever, it isn't clear that this is relevant to clinical practice, and the conclusion warranted. 

Cournoyea stresses the difference between evolutionary explanations on the micro scale (antibiotic resistance, or the evolution of influenza viruses, e.g.) and the macro scale ("the origin and adaptive function of physiological processes" such as breast-feeding), noting that the application of evolutionary theory to the first is much more informative than the speculative kinds of applications that are considered in the longer time scale, and indeed the only kinds of applications that can be considered since these traits evolved so long ago.  Why did fever or menopause evolve?  These questions can't be answered other than speculatively.  Yet, much of evolutionary medicine is dedicated to answering such questions.  And, as Cournoyea points out, generally from a strong adaptationist perspective.
I conclude that faults in these fundamental assumptions undermine EM’s central objective of providing clinically relevant medical knowledge. I maintain that evolution’s place in the clinic is controversial at best, and that these conceptual blind spots lead to misguided conclusions about our supposed human nature.
As he also points out, many evolutionary theorists by now have questioned the assumption that all traits have been molded by natural selection to be highly adaptive, but EM is built on this assumption.  "Developmental constraints and the nonselective mechanisms of evolution are given a backseat to adaptive functionality..."  But, he writes, explanations of ultimate causation, the adaptive hypotheses put forward by EM, are not relevant to clinical practice. And we think it is defensible to assert that many who make evolutionary arguments of this sort have only a cartoon understanding of how evolution works.

And there's more
As regular readers of MT know, we harp on the problem of assuming adaptation and the all-encompassing role of natural selection in evolution, all the time, so we are in complete agreement with Cournoyea's critique of EM in this regard.  But there's another fundamental problem with EM that Cournoyea's spot-on paper doesn't address -- not that it should -- and that is the idea that we evolved in a given environment to be highly adapted to that environment, and that one alone.

Organisms that are highly adapted to a single environment, unable to adapt to change, are very vulnerable.  Or, put another way, extinct.  One of the most ubiquitous characteristics of life, so ubiquitous that we've called it a principle of life, is facultativeness, the ability to adapt to change.  The "paleo diet" craze is another 'philosophy' founded on the idea that we evolved to eat the raw foods that our ancestors ate as they were becoming modern, and thus that we only achieve optimal health following that diet.

But by this logic, we're in danger of going down Alfred Russel Wallace's slippery path to excepting humans from evolution.  And he was by no means alone in invoking human exceptionalism in such contexts (Darwin did it in his own way, too).  Indeed, we might even find ourselves attending seances as Wallace did late in life.  He thought that the human ability to do calculus was evidence that it was impossible for us to have evolved by natural selection alone, because the human brain didn't evolve doing calculus.  Similarly, because we didn't evolve eating Twinkies, they must be lethal.

But we can do calculus, because what evolved was our brain's ability to figure things out.  We didn't evolve knowing how to cross busy city streets either, but we can do that, too, and we can build rockets and go to the moon.  And, people eat a huge range of foods now, and have done as we evolved -- there are 7 billion of us on Earth, speaking thousands of languages and still eating varied diets, so clearly we're adaptable.  There's no one way to be human -- nor are there single pathways to disease.

Fairy stories can't always be refuted, but that doesn't make them true
Just because we can invoke -- or, basically, assume -- a principle of nature, like natural selection, this doesn't mean that the principle works without exception or is invoked in an empirically correct way.   But if a tale is being told that rests on that assumption, there is a very widespread tendency to let the assumption slip by without justification, and accept the fable and its moral.  Fairy stories can't be refuted if the existence of fairies is assumed, not something to prove before we judge the story itself.

Likewise, despite Darwin's venerable insights, natural selection is a possible aspect of evolution -- nobody can doubt that -- but it is an aspect, not a law of nature.  Other factors, notably chance and implications of organizational complexity, greatly modify what one can legitimately say about selection.  This is so widely understood by those who care to look at things carefully that there is no excuse for the widespread uncritical selectionism so widely assumed about Nature by so many, in evolutionary medicine but also in evolutionary psychology, too much of anthropology, genetics, and beyond.

If you assume that some trait is the result of natural selection, then you can make up stories as to how it worked to produce your particular trait.  If your first guess doesn't fit, then you feel justified to make up counter-adaptationist stories.  But if selection is assumed, it can't be refuted since it's not open to test.
Just because a tale is possible, or seems plausible, this does not in any way make it true, especially if its basic premise is not open to question, as is so often the case in biomedical research or EM.

And Dobzhansky's quip?
The co-opting of Dobzhanksy's quip is very telling.  As we also noted in our book MT, even in its original form with respect to biology, it is manifestly untrue. Did nothing in biological research make sense before Darwin?  While nothing in biology (or medicine, for that matter) is inconsistent with our understanding of evolution, it is just not true that nothing 'makes sense' except in that context.

The blatantly obvious truth of this is that much of biomedical research has nothing to do with evolution, as well as the fact that many if not most people in the field know very little about evolution beyond a caricature (and, of course, many creationists of various religions work in biology and medicine).  But the slogan can be routinely invoked without any critical assessment by almost anybody, even in biology, including a cult -- and that's the right way to characterize it -- of a few leaders of EM whose words seem rarely to be questioned, much less critiqued properly.  This fact shows that invoking the quote isn't that different from saying a rosary: a comfortable, feel-good reinforcement of what often amounts to little more than a mantra of an ideology.  That's not the same as science!

It's a shame people have to be this way, because the scientific challenges are serious, and there is much that we don't know about evolution; the subject deserves better for its own sake, and for the public that pays for results.

Thursday, September 13, 2012

Evolving...to stay the same?

Did you see the report (e.g., here on the BBC) of a 150 million year old fossil crab's last death walk?  The trail it followed until it finally expired, where it (and the trail) were fossilized have been discovered and are fascinating.  Here is the spoor it left in the sand (top is a photo of the fossil track, bottom the path of the track), poor thing:


This picture here shows the crab itself:


Now this is interesting for its own sake.  but look at this image:


This one is contemporary, and you can see them along the tidal beaches in many places in our country and elsewhere.

What's interesting is how the horesehoe crab hasn't changed over so long a time.  We are trained by textbooks, by Darwin himself (for those who actually read him), and of course by the media, to think of evolution as constantly happening in a relentless rat-race of competition, always needing to adapt to the changing environment or improved competitors.

But here is an organism that has been running the race by staying in place.  In fact, at the DNA level the currently available data are scant, but this group of arthropods has continued to evolve, so that its DNA sequences reflect very distant common ancestry--for some groups that look like horsehoe crabs and the horseshoes themselves, hundreds of millions of years.  That means that the accumulation of mutations in their DNA has continued to evolve more or less as would be expected.

Now much of the DNA that is used as a molecular clock to estimate species ancestral split times has little if any function and is chosen for study specifically for that reason, since it is more reliably clock-like than functional DNA that can be affected by quirky natural selection.

But if adaptation is so intense a pressure to change in response to one's surroundings, how is it that there has been essentially no evolution of functional aspects of the genome in 150 million years?  The simple answer is  "Well, no problem!  Their environment hasn't changed."  There's no easy way to refute that, though geological and paleoecological data might suggest otherwise.  Environment is not just the temperature and salinity of the ocean, it includes networks of plants and animals, each preying on the other and so on.  So it is perplexing that so little change has happened.

Perhaps horseshoe crab physiology is different enough to show selective pressures, and it's just the shell that hasn't changed. But the fossil anatomy is not just 'skin' (shell) deep, but is in so many of the details. Even just by chance one would expect that minor variations in the shape and shell structures etc. of these creatures would have arisen.  Really, one should expect more than trivial changes.

There should be many ways to modify shape and stay 'fit'.  Basic body plans are rather stable, but they do change, as we see by the variation among, say, fish and humans or wasps and butterflies.  One might say that the crabs' shape is determined by just one or two genes that controls so many of the conserved parts.  Then, any mutation might be harmful and removed.

But developmentally, such traits and complexity rarely, if ever, is so simple and usually involves many different genes' contributions.  So how such conservation has happened--and there are other examples such as flies or ants entombed in millions-years old amber etc., who look just like our friends and pests today--is rather mysterious, and very interesting to try to explain in terms of our current knowledge of developmental and population genetics.

So, eons later, we have the last walk of this poor doomed crab.  But although it was going somewhere as its spirit left its shell for the Other World, its lineage wasn't going anywhere at all.

Friday, August 31, 2012

Taking our (lovely lady) lumps

Of course I'm still talking about our PNAS paper. Wouldn't you, in my shoes?

Since getting the back story, the story, and the implications for your pregnancy out of the way, I can finally talk about some important cultural and philosophical implications of our paper.  

Aw. The poor girl's compromised. 

Are ladies' hips compromised?
Women aren't called broads for nothing. We have, on average, larger dimensions of the pelvis that comprise the birth canal (linked into broader hips) than men do and this is not just relatively but absolutely and this is not just in the U.S., this is species-wide (1).

There is no better explanation for this than it's due to selection for successful childbirth.

But somehow with the combination of classic biomechanical theory, plus obvious performance differences between the sexes, it has become ingrained in our thinking that wider hips make women athletically inferior to men. In this line of thinking, the  male pelvis is the human ideal because it's part of a superior athlete's body. The female pelvis, therefore, is second-rate--compromised for necessary reasons to do with childbirth.

But recent research by Anna Warrener--which she was so generous to contribute to our paper--shows that hip breadth fails to predict the biomechanical values that are used to calculate walking and running economy. There's support, too, from prior studies that used different or less complex models. So the notion that wide hips are worse at walking and running is not supported by current evidence.

He must be the fastest swimmer alive because of his man hips.
Not only does Anna's research call into question whether women's hips are to blame for our failure to dominate sports, but it also lends strength to any doubt that slightly wider hips that could better accommodate a neonate or that could birth a more developed neonate (i.e. one that is more precocial like all the other primates) are being selected against in favor of proper walking and running ability.

Of course, there could be alternative explanations. Selection could be keeping wide hips from getting wider because of some yet to be understood horrible side effect of too-wide hips. It could be that wider hips than we have now would increase the stress on the hips, knees and ankles to the point of immobility. It could mean that the soft tissues of the pelvic floor would be stressed beyond their mechanical properties and strained to failure. It's also possible that pregnancy itself requires a narrow-enough pelvis to carry the fetus above it, and that getting any wider down there in the swimsuit area would mean the fetus literally falls out before it's ready. But to my knowledge, we don't have good understandings of any of this, at least not in evolutionary terms.

Given research like Anna's, it's much harder to support this idea that we're at the perfect balance now in the ladies' pelvis: With pelvic width (despite all the variation) thanks to childbirth keeping it perfectly wide but bipedalism keeping it perfectly narrow.

But that's--as I'm finding more and more with this research--what many people support. There's this thinking that humans are presently at this perfect balance and that everything would fall to pieces if we weren't. From the childbirth side of the scale it's true: Gotta be big enough! (But that's true for all animals that give birth through a bony birth canal.) However, it's not clear why it's true from the bipedalism side of the balanced equation.

And if turns out to be true that narrow hips do not contribute to male domination in sports (assuming male sport domination is on mother nature's radar), then tell me what is ideal about the male pelvis? Maybe you never thought about it that way, but by assuming that the female is compromised, the "ideal" status for males is implied.

Neither the existence of sexual dimorphism in pelvic dimensions, nor anything else that I can think of supports a tradition of placing suboptimal value on the female form. The female births the babies so if (iff) there’s an "ideal" it’s female. Selection maintains its adequacy for locomotion and for childbirth. If it didn’t, humans would have gone extinct.

To some that may still mean the female pelvis is compromised. To me, it's a multi-tasker and a good one.

Always look on the bright side of life. But up to a limit, please. 
A popular reaction to our paper is, But why the tight fit at birth? It's impossible to ignore! Why should childbirth be so difficult?

Answers of "because the baby is big and the birth canal is not" or "it's a coincidence that might mean nothing because clearly we overcome it just fine" or "I like to think it's just a coincidence that my finger fits perfectly into my nostril" ... these sorts of replies rarely appease a protester.

We already discussed adaptationism in this context, but it's fun to consider it further in more Panglossian terms.

When I imagine what it was like to first hear about the obstetrical dilemma back in the 1950s and '60s when it was first suggested, here's what I think my reaction would have been:

Hooray! The pains of childbirth (2) and the curse of helpless babies (3) are no longer Eve's fault but Evolution's! This is great. Eve was framed! Point for evolution AND point for feminism. Woot!

And what I've been yapping away about for four posts is not refuting that evolution's the process behind all this. Of course it is. Everything in biology is either evolution or it's magic.

However, evolution isn't always unicorns and double rainbows. Sometimes life just sucks.

For example, I'm going to die. I could look on the bright side and say that my decomposing carcass will nourish myriad life forms in the complex web of life that lives beyond my death in amazing and beautiful ways. And I often like to think about my molecules living on in a narwhal or a mango tree. But c'mon. Death sucks.

That's an extreme example, but I sense a similar need to make lemonade out of painful and dangerous labor and needy babies.  There must be some good reason...

As if the simple observation ...that childbirth works warts and all... is insufficient reason.

With everyone who was born to a mom who was born to a mom who was born to a mom, etc..., with all the billions of us here today, why are we refusing to accept human reproduction as adequate?

We are nothing less than a raging evolutionary success, just like nearly everything else that is alive right now.

Instead, the downsides to reproduction mean to some that it's deficient, leading them to seek reasons or evolutionary upsides: It's okay ladies, childbirth sucks because humans have such big wonderful brains! It's okay ladies, childbirth sucks so we can walk and run properly! It's okay ladies, babies are so needy and helpless so they get out into the environment where there's proper stimulation for learning and development!

But why do we need any other reason or evolutionary upside than the cute little bundle of joy?

http://blogs.smithsonianmag.com/hominids/2012/08/timing-of-childbirth-evolved-to-match-womens-energy-limits/




References/Notes
1. Simpson SW, Quade J, Levin NE, Butler R, Dupont-Nivet G, et al. (2008) A female Homo erectus pelvis from Gona, Ethiopia. Science 322:1089–1092.

2. The Book of Genesis (See where it all goes wrong after Eve first ate fruit with the serpent then ate it with Adam.)

3. Influential fourth century orthodox Christian, Augustine bishop of Hippo, called upon the fact that infants are born helpless to support his description of the sinful, suffering, terrifyingly vulnerable natural state of the human species. In Pagels, Elaine (1988) Adam, Eve and the Serpent. New York: Vintage.


***

And for your Friday happiness...this never fails to crack me up into all kinds of stitches... Jeff Tweedy reads "My Humps" (the song that my title of this post riffs on) by the Black-Eyed Peas.

Monday, April 9, 2012

SuperSize me! Nothing in American can be small (except genetic risks?)

In evolutionary biology, perhaps especially human evolution and anthropology, and biomedical genetics the current working mythology....er, we mean 'model'....is of strong, rapid, definitive natural selection as 'the' mechanism by which traits we see today got here.  Since adaptation only works through what is inherited (environmental effects, so to speak, die with the individual), the same kind of simple-cause deterministic thinking has been applied to the genetic control of current traits.

There are all sorts of reasons to expect, or hope, that cause and effect will be simple.  Single-gene causation of adaptation means we can find 'the' gene that explains why you vote or mate as you do, have a particular  disease or physical trait, and so on.  Pharma doesn't want to invest in profit-less rare traits, or complex traits for which a single med will only help a small fraction of patients.  And, of course, simplicity lends itself to melodrama and hence to the visual and even the print news.

But what we see are a multiplicity of individually small effects, as last week's papers on autism (the subject of our post on Friday) show yet again.  This is disappointing, but why is nature that way?  There are several reasons to believe that the apparent complexity is, in fact, the truth.

This should surprise no one.  For example, mutations conferring simple strong effects on disease-susceptibility will be quickly eliminated by natural selection.  Genes fundamental to many other genes because of interactions, may be specifically vulnerable to such mutations--so we may not find many risk alleles in  those genes. 

If many genes contribute to a trait, their individual effects almost necessarily will be even smaller.  This clearly is the case for the kinds of traits that are the main targets of GWAS and similar approaches.

Most genes that confer high risk would be eliminated by selection unless, as some argue, recent environments make them harmful (e.g., causing diabetes or cancer), whereas they weren't harmful before.  If their effects were slight or of late onset, they would not impair reproductive success, and would stay around in the population.  This doesn't seem to be the case.  In most GWAS'ed traits, risk has risen rapidly and greatly during the past century.  Yet the evidence is not that a few genes with major response to these environmental changes are responsible for the disease: indeed, the GWAS problem is precisely that this is not what we find!

Note also that traits not present at birth, meaning most GWAS'ed traits, take decades to manifest themselves.  The risk difference between variants at the 'risk' genes is usually very small, meaning that they change the risk at any given age by trivial amounts.  We may not want to get such diseases, but from a biological point of view they are really miniscule effects.  This also easily and non-suprisingly accounts for the findings of the recent paper of  low concordance of age and cause of death relative to genotypes in identical twins.

The very same arguments apply to the ability of natural selection to detect these differences, and that in turn clearly explains why it is so difficult to find 'signatures' of natural selection in genomic data, and why again in turn most selective arguments that refer to specific genes are without strong support beyond neat stories one tells about them (as we see in the news almost daily, and report here on MT).

When a gene has a true, but tiny, affect on risk (or on evolutionary fitness), there are so many competing causes of death or disease, or bad luck, that the odds on that gene's effect actually being manifest (as disease, or fitness) are simply very very small.

These are not complicated ideas to understand!  They are not our own private theory.  They're plainly visible in the mountain of facts we already have available to us (without huge, costly biobanks and promises of personalized medicine or strong adaptive arguments).

Traits like disease or adaptation may be major--nobody wants cancer, but in trying to find 'the' gene or few genes that are responsible, we're making mountains out of biological molehills.

Monday, March 12, 2012

An apt description of how life works: slop! Part III

Is life sloppy or not?  Our last two posts discussed reasons to think it is, that it's orderly in many ways, but not so precise as to be characterized by laws like those of physical sciences.  Yet, if we're just molecules interacting, how can life not be just as law-like?  And isn't its law, or at least one of its laws, that evolution works by making every trait tightly adapted to its circumstances, just as Darwin argued and as many if not most life scientists (including those with scant real evolutionary training who plow the seas of biomedical genetics) routinely say it is?

Many years ago, I was doing some epidemiological research in Panama.  During a break in data collection, I took a stroll along a path that wound up into the rain-forested hills out of the small town where we were working.  I was watching parrots flying across the searing tropical sun overhead, and the lush tropical vegetation, which I'd never seen before, when I stopped to look at a butterfly sitting on a nearby leaf.  Admiring its black eye and curvy antenna, I moved to get a closer look, which made the butterfly dart off....backwards!

Well, it didn't really fly backwards, and in fact it was I who was thinking backwards.  I'd been tricked by a 'false' eye spot on its hind wing, thinking that was the head end.  It was a remarkable example of the effect of protective coloration, and I felt like the predatory bird that such eye spots had evolved to trick, so that the butterfly could live to mate another time.  At the time, I did not question the explanation, so impressed was I by my gullibility.  Evolution in action!

Then, a few years ago, I had a somewhat kindred experience.  Walking a long a path on the south rim of the Grand Canyon, I noticed a butterfly that landed on the sandy path.  Its coloration was remarkably like that of the stones and sand.  I could hardly see it, til it then flew off.  Again, I mused, this is just what the textbooks say about one of the most clear-cut examples of adaptation.

But I've thought about these experiences since, and wondered how accurately they reflect the dogma of evolution as it is so often held, explicitly or implicitly.  For example, while I did see the effectiveness of protective coloration in these two instances, I also did, after all, see the butterflies.  I wasn't completely fooled.  For the moment let's assume that the standard argument for protective adaptation is correct, even though it's based on our human abilities to recognize patterns, not those of the actual predators the butterflies have to deal with.

In the first case, had I been a predator, I'd have missed that butterfly.  But I'd not have been tricked a second time!  Likewise, while I marveled at the mottled butterfly largely hidden on the sunlit sandy path, I did after all, see it.  Had I been hungry, I'd have had my meal.

Sill, one can see the potential that protective coloration gives the prey so that at least sometimes it will escape being eaten and live to reproduce.  Even if it's not perfect protection, if it raises fitness just a tad, over the long haul it could represent a force-like, systematic genetic advantage that would work as Darwin said and as any biologist with physics-envy could want.

But then I wondered why most species in my surrounds did not have protective coloration.  If it's so force-like and obvious, why are most birds and beasts easily seen?  Why hasn't protective coloration worked so perfectly, as in a sense a Darwinian point of view would hold, that the ecosystem breaks down because predators can't find anything to eat?  Or, put another way, why is each species' adaptations, whatever they be, different?  Why isn't an ecosystem just one huge mottled pattern of camouflage?

Well, the Darwinian fundamentalist argument would say that each species has its own adaptations or it wouldn't be here.  That is not much different from saying "God made it that way", except that an adaptationist (that is, one who assumes that every trait must be the result of systematic natural selection) says that there is a physical reason for the traits that relates to its having out-competed other variants in its past. Our job in science is just to find out what the reason was.

So some species, the story goes, fly irregularly in a way that distracts the pursuing bat or bird, or makes it hard to catch.  Some have protective coloration.  Some only come out at night.  Some herd together so predators have a hard time finding which one to pursue and end up missing all of them, except maybe the elderly who are past reproduction anyway (and don't cost the prey species any fitness).  Some species taste bad so birds avoid them while others taste good but mimic their bitter contemporaries.  Some run fast or fly or climb to escape predators, while others freeze and appear dead to avoid detection.  And so on.

Or, because species move around and environments change, some non-camouflaged butterflies might do well to become so, but are recent immigrants from a zone where they didn't need camouflage or perhaps had it in that environment.  Of course, they'll now have to undergo adaptation in their new environment if they're to survive and persist there.  

Why are there so many kinds of sparrows, or grasshoppers, or grass just in my back yard?  The idea that each has its own specific 'niche' sounds good, but is often hard to accept, even just on the face of it.

Now, within each of these stories would be sub-stories of how the individual aspects of the traits mentioned evolved, piece-meal, over long time periods.  Think how many changes it makes to make a bird out of a non-flying reptile.  Or just to mold and color a butterfly's wing to give it the right sort of eyespot and antenna-like tail shape.  And similar ad hoc, or perhaps better described as post hoc, stories need to be told about how the predator hones its detection and pursuit skills so it doesn't just starve into extinction first.

The gist of the point here is that each story is so different that it becomes in a way self-fulfilling in terms of overall adaptation arguments.  One can, literally, always concoct some adaptationistic story about every trait in every species in every environment.  That is the sense in which evolution is either essentially tautological or so ad hoc as not to reflect the kind of law-like rigor we see in physics.

The strange fact is that at some level these stories seem to be true!  

Even if each story is in essential ways completely true--and many of them seem so plausible that one needn't doubt their truth--living nature is much more pixillated and less unitary in its evolution: each story is of the here and now, the factors and forces changing over time and place.  Each story is different and indeed is changing all the time.  That is an essence of an evolutionary principle.  It is, in a sense, the common basis of evolutionary theory.  It isn't controversial at all.  But it is very far from the kinds of forces we see in physics and chemistry, or the precision of mathematics.

The problem is that most of these stories cannot directly be confirmed. Among other reasons, whether you're eaten, or catch prey, is highly probabilistic--has a high level, even a fundamental, component of chance.  Since the difference at any given time between most genetic variants related to some aspect of the evolutionary race are usually very slight, having their purported effect over thousands of generations, the difference at the gene level can be essentially undocumentable:  we could not, perhaps even in principle, detect the differences with samples that we could actually obtain.

For the same reason, the outcomes themselves are also unpredictable even in principle.  This is so even if one assumes, as many biologists explicitly or implicitly do, that nothing in our makeup or genomes is without function, and natural selection detects all functional variation (a key point in Darwin's own thinking).  But that is an assumption and it makes adaptation explanations often unfalsifiable and to a great extent just stories empty of scientific content.

In fact, referring back to our series on whether probability exists, it is impossible in such a probabilistic world to show that something in life has exactly zero effect, or indeed to show that small effects are different from zero.  That means that much of our supposedly force-like story can't be confirmed except by using subjective judgments about statistical results in our studies--and that directly implies that Nature isn't doing what we say it's doing either.

Even if every aspect of the stories were true, and even if demonstrably so, it means that much in life is unique and that any law that applies is itself going to have to be ad hoc, different for each pixel at every time.  Indeed, and perhaps strangely, this is the essence of life, and is squarely within evolutionary theory if we but think carefully about it.  But that's very different from laws like gravity or the ideal gas law.  The foundations of modern science include repeatability and the similarity of observations underlying a law of nature.  But life is all about local, contingent, accumulating dissimilarity.

Causation in life is a kind of spectrum, with some causes so systematic and obvious that classical theory applies very well to anybody's satisfaction, and that fact is indeed the addictive hook that makes us think it will apply everywhere.  But they are the relatively rare exceptions to the general, more pixillated story, where the story seems to fit but really isn't nearly so clearly observed.

In that latter sense, the laws of life are about difference and things not being exactly repeatable.  That's why I can spot a camouflaged butterfly....but only sometimes.

Thursday, December 1, 2011

Nature's wierdos. The oil beetle!

The European Oil Beetle
God may have made little green apples, but why on earth would He have made Meloe proscarabaeus, the European oil beetle, or its cousins elsewhere in the world?   He must have been downing a bit too much ambrosia before going into the workshop.  If you don't believe us, here from Wikipedia is one example, of an adult.

The European oil beetle was the honoree on the BBC radio program, The Living World, the other day.  The county of Devon is home to the 4 species of oil beetle found in Britain.  There were once at least 9 species in Britain, but 5 have become extinct as the acreage still in meadow has shrunk.  (Does that mean we've passed peak oil?)  The remaining four species are now found only in southwest England.  Large -- centimeters long -- and oily black with a violet sheen, they are still easy to find if you know where to look.

"It looks like the sort of creature invented by Roald Dahl, really," said the radio presenter.



These guys are called oil beetles because, bizarrely, they produce an oily substance from their joints.  It's a toxic substance and, at least in American species of oil beetle, it is strong enough to blister the skin.  Why?

Larvae on a celandine flower; photo by John Walters

These beetles have a complex position in their ecological niche.  And their life history is interesting.  They're a 'phoretic' insect, that is, their way of getting around is to hitch a lift on other insects. In the autumn, the female lays her eggs in the ground.  Come spring, the larvae hatch and wander around until they find a flower, often celandines, at lest in southwest England, which they then swarm around on, waiting for insects to come along.

When the unsuspecting stand-in helicopter lands on the flower, the larvae jump on and grab hold with their well-developed claws.  They'll grab on to any insect, but the larvae that survive are the ones that find their way onto solitary female bees, because the larva then gets a ride back to the bee's nest where it feeds on the bee's eggs.  Once the larva has destroyed the eggs, it then has the nest and all the nectar and pollen to itself.

These beetles have two pupal stages, the pre-pupa and actual pupa.  They emerge from the pupal stage in autumn, but stay underground until spring, when they start the cycle all over again.  The radio program suggests that different species live exclusively on particular host insects or flowers, but there is a range of variation in all of these oily-critters' habits, each species with somewhat different habits.

Why?
Of course, the standard explanation for all of these exotic features is natural selection--what else?  The fact that each member has its own distinct niche, its own distinct life-cycle stages, specific host, and so on, will not damper such explanations.  But natural selection means that only those who landed on the right bee species or flower, or whatever, survived to reproduce.  Yet, such specificity seems not to have been that important, because the species are so diverse--why would selection  refine each species in such narrow ways? And why such weird traits -- their non-functional wings, their wing-cases, their oily knees, and the fact that they are entirely dependent on chance meetings with the right insects, and so on -- as discussed in the BBC program?

One answer might be that the specificity of natural selection is far less than is usually supposed.  Some insects may have just been on this particular flower, visited by this particular host, and so on, and that's where they found their mates (as their neighbors on Flower Lane, so to speak).  Others had similar kinds of experiences on Flower St, Beehive Avenue, and so on.  They diverged genetically and so on, but perhaps there was no major element of differential reproduction.

What about non-functional wings and short wing-cases?  Are they adaptive specifically for something?  Are they on their way out?  Since there are insects with fully functional wings and others with lost wings, Darwin himself would probably have said they were on their way to loss.  That's how he viewed various barnacle traits, but it's a kind of teleological view--that Nature was heading them towards some specific endpoint, and that in turn is both pure speculation and contrary to fundamental aspects of the modern theory of evolution (based on random mutation and local screening for fitness).  The latter would seem unlikely because the trait seems conserved among these slippery-kneed beetles, and not particularly variable as one would expect for a dysfunctional trait (mutations don't harm it).  Similarly, evolving functional differences are always assumed to be due to selection, selfish genes and all that; but this is also contrary to the standard adaptationist doctrine. 

There are other explanations, of course, including the possibility of fine-tuning natural selection.  But in that case, it must have been very local and variable and it shows in a sense that all the beetle lineages needed was some host, transport, etc. environments, whatever happened to be available in each local place and time, rather than very specific functionally critical requirements. Each species needed its own street, taxi service, and the like.  But in a sense any street or taxi would do.

This more flexible view of evolution may be more realistic than classical views, which may require rather stringent and consistent kinds of nearly deterministic selection.  Something to think about, at least, because Nature's Weirdos are widespread among animals, plants, and even single-celled species.  And if weirdness is the rule, each instance doesn't require a specific fine-tuning adaptive explanation, or such applications even if factually correct (almost impossible to prove) will be rather trivial.

Friday, July 3, 2009

Natural selection and the human genome -- the last 10,000 years

Many researchers have been interested in combing the human genome for evidence that natural selection shaped modern humans. The idea is that selection would have favored those of our ancestors who were best able to adapt to changing environments over the past 100,000 or even 10,000 years, as they began to wend their way into the entire diversity of the world's environments, most of them very different from our African savanna homeland. How could we not have faced selective environments? And, look at us--at how different peoples native to different continents appear! How else but by natural selection?

And what about the effects of dense, settled populations after the invention of agriculture, including the strong selective force of disease, which could more easily spread with people living close together? Not only that, but in terms of hundreds of thousands of sequence variants across the genome that were chosen for genotyping for their variation rather than function (most probably functionless or without effect on fitness), it should be easy to identify genome regions that show evidence of selection, by virtue of manifesting greater than average difference among world regions.

The availability of large sets of data on variation in the genome, from populations across the globe, as well as methods for doing large-scale analysis of these data has meant a field day for people interested in this question. They have developed and applied a number of methods for the purpose, to distinguish the statistical chaff from the selective grain: when one does many thousands of tests across the genome one is bound to find 'signals' that arise just by the chance aspects of population sampling. A number of reports have come from these studies, some finding that human evolution is speeding up, and others finding evidence of strong selection at a few sites in the genome. Some claim many positive findings, others that the overall amount of such evidence, given the expectation, is rather small.

A paper in the June issue of PLoS Genetics by Jonathan Pritchard at the University of Chicago and collaborators, reports that selection has not been nearly as strong as many people expected. These results are not a total surprise given that most traits are affected by many genes, that environments change rapidly enough that one era's successful adaptation may be another's maladaption, and that a fundamental survival tactic of all organisms is the ability to adapt behaviorally to changing environments as they happen. Humans above all organisms have the added benefit of culture, which can buffer ecological changes. We make fire, and clothes, to protect against the cold, we invent weapons to substitute for weak teeth in hunting prey, and we have language to organize group responses to threats, the need for food and shelter, and so on.

That doesn't remove humans from the effects of selection, and crowded, permanent agricultural settlement might be particularly vulnerable to new forces, such as infectious pathogens.

But even then, and even if selection is particularly strong (and a 1% selective advantage, often literally too small to be detectable from samples at any given time, is considered strong), it may be difficult to detect selection at the gene level. If many genes affect a trait, and given the clear fact that in a population there are many sequence variants at any gene (and the nearby parts of DNA that regulate its cellular usage), the impact of selection is distributed across these many possibly advantageous variants.

What is favored or disfavored are combinations of variants at many genes. Individually, they have rather trivial effect. And most selection is weak, at least in this sense, as we've written before. When the net advantage of a variant is very small, its frequency changes largely by chance (genetic drift). As a result, when regions of the world are compared, there is usually no difference between the pattern of random markers and genes that have been affected by selection.

Occasionally, a variant has a strong effect in its current environments, and can be quickly advanced in frequency (sickle cell as protection against malaria is one of only a handful of truly convincing examples). But such variants are usually very rare, and won't be seen in the kinds of the small population samples that have been used for geographic studies of human variation. A rare variant that is quickly favored will rise to high frequency and then its effect on the favored trait will become close to average. But at least the pattern of variation in the gene and its nearby chromosome region will show less variation within its source population, and greater differences between populations, than is typical of the rest of the genome. That is the kind of signal people hope to find, but that seem for reasons just described, to be rare in humans.

So, even from a strongly darwinian point of view, 'signatures' of selection will be expected to be weak, as the authors of this paper found. Darwin's work was about phenotypes (traits) not genotypes. The focus on genes may be showing that that is the correct viewpoint in which to understand evolution, whether selection is strong or weak, persistent or occasional.

Friday, April 17, 2009

Darwin and Malthus, evolution in good times and bad

Yesterday, again in the NY Times, Nicholas Kristof reported on studies of the genetic basis of IQ. This has long been a sensitive subject because, of course, the measurers come from the upper social strata, and they design the tests to measure things they feel are important (e.g, in defining what IQ even is). It's a middle-class way of ranking middle-class people who are competing for middle-class resources. Naturally, the lower social strata do worse. Whether or not that class-based aspect is societally OK is a separate question and a matter of one's social politics: Kristof says no, and so do we, but clearly not everyone has that view and there are still those who want to attribute more mental agility to some races than to others.

By most if not all measurements, IQ (and 'intelligence', whatever it is, like almost anything else) has substantial 'heritability'. What that means is that the IQ scores of close relatives are more similar than the scores of random pairs of individuals. As everyone who talks about heritability knows (or should know), it's a measure of the relative contribution of shared ancestry to score similarities. It is relative to the contribution of other factors that are referred to as 'environmental.'

Kristof's column points out that IQ is suppressed in deprived circumstances of lower socioeconomic strata. And so is the heritability--the apparent relative contribution of genes. That makes sense, because no matter what your 'genetic' IQ, if you have no books in your house etc., your abilities have little chance of becoming realized. How you do relative to others who are deprived is largely a matter of chance, hardly correlated with your genotype. Correspondingly, there is evidence that scores and heritability rise when conditions, including educational investment, are improved. The point is that when conditions are bad, everyone suffers. When conditions are good, all can gain, and there are opportunities for inherited talent to shine.

Can we relate this to one of the pillars of evolutionary biology? That is the idea, due to both Darwin and Wallace, that natural selection works because in times of overpopulation (which they argued, following Thomas Malthus, was basically all times), those with advantageous genotypes would proliferate at the relative expense of others in the population. That fits the dogma that evolution is an endless brutal struggle for survival, often caricatured as 'survival of the fittest'.

Such an idea is certainly possible in principle. But, hard times might actually be less likely to support innovation evolutionarily. When there is a food shortage, it could be that everyone suffers more comparably, so that even what would otherwise be 'better' genotypes simply struggle along or don't make it at all. By contrast, good times might be good for all on average, but might provide the wiggle room for superior phenotypes, and their underlying genotypes, to excel.

This is not at all strange or out in left field. Natural selection can only select among genetically based fitness differences. If hard times mean there is little correlation between genotype and phenotype, selective differences have little if any evolutionary effect, and survival is mostly luck.

In this sense, from Malthus to the present, this central tenet of evolutionary theory may have been wrong, or at least inaccurate. Adaptive evolution may actually have occurred most in plentiful times, not under severe overpopulation. In most environments, competition is clearly not all that severe--if it were, most organisms would be gaunt and on the very thin edge of survival, which manifestly is not generally true.

The IQ story only reflects some here-and-now findings, not evolutionary ones per se. But it may suggest reasons to think about similar issues more broadly.