Showing posts with label predictability. Show all posts
Showing posts with label predictability. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

Locality: life's Newtonian equivalent of 'universality'

In, 1687, in his groundbreaking Principia, Isaac Newton made a fundamental assertion--a fundamental assumption--about reality.  It is that whatever you observe in some location, such as your lab, will apply everywhere else in the cosmos.  He was talking about the nature of the physical universe, following similar views of Galileo, who quipped that the laws of nature were written in the language of mathematics.

Paperback Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica Book

If the universe was God's creation, its vastness would be of a kind, similar everywhere.  That notion is what stands behind the idea of universal 'laws' of Nature.  The 'laws' were not passed by an Angelic Congress, but are simply God's way of organizing physical existence--all of it!

These laws, discovered by classical physics, are deterministic and universal, not probabilistic, not haphazard.  I don't recall anything about what Newton thought of probabilities other than a debate with Pepys about gambling, but that was not central to his cosmic worldview, which was essentially deterministic--which is what you might expect from an all-knowing God.

But subsequent science has revealed at least two key additions.  First, some of Nature seems inherently probabilistic.  Here we are not restricted to measurement issues, because probabilities seem inherent in quantum-level phenomena.   Secondly,  probabilism means that conditions are at least to some extent contingent on what did happen, relative to what might have happened.  This means that predictions can only be probabilistic at some scale; whether that means the cosmos' states and future are unknowable or not is not for someone like me to opine about!  Whether the probability values are, somehow, fixed, and if so how that is, are interesting and, I think, important questions.

Life is part of the universe, but its fundamental laws are of locality, not universality
Life is a chemical and hence physical phenomenon.  But life in the deeper sense is about how these molecules are organized, and this seems fundamentally different from the kind of molecular evolution seen in stars.  Each star seems, from what one reads, to be similar at the chemical or atomic/subatomic level.

But life evolves by local conditions.  Mutations arise locally and are filtered by selection and chance locally.  Successful mutations and genotypes spread by migration from their source, but are then always subject to genetic and environmental conditions in their new localities.

Locality also is the central fact or organismal organ and system diversity.  In this case, it is local conditions determining gene activation and expression.

But, in a sense prisoners of 19th century physics success, the long shadow of Newton and Galileo, we seem to hunger for laws of life that apply, as the slogan goes, to 'All of us' and that leads to genomic medicine that we are told can be known with some kind of presumably universal 'precision'.  These are, to me, irresponsible misrepresentations made by Francis Collins and NIH, perhaps as their strategy to pry mega-bucks from Congress--because they are naive relative to the biology they promise to understand.

But if we overlook the truth and live in slogans, does this undermine the very science we want to nurture?  The assumption of universality, to me, is fundamentally misleading about how life works and how our genotypes got here.  Whether or how we can use this understanding to develop appropriate medications and so on, is a separate set of very important questions, about which I'm not capable of making judgments....

Sunday, October 15, 2017

Understanding Obesity? Fat Chance!

Obesity is one of our more widespread and serious health-threatening traits.  Many large-scale mapping as well as extensive environmental/behavioral epidemiological studies of obesity have been done over recent decades.  But if anything, the obesity epidemic seems to be getting worse.

There's deep meaning in that last sentence: the prevalence of obesity is changing rapidly.  This is being documented globally, and happening rapidly before our eyes.  Perhaps the most obvious implication is that this serious problem is not due to genetics!  That is, it is not due to genotypes that in themselves make you obese.  Although everyone's genotype is different, the changes are happening during lifetimes, so we can't attribute it to the different details of each generation's genotypes or their evolution over time. Instead, the trend is clearly due to lifestyle changes during lifetimes.

Of course, if you see everything through gene-colored lenses, you might argue (as people have) that sure, it's lifestyles, but only some key nutrient-responding genes are responsible for the surge in obesity.  These are the 'druggable' targets that we ought to be finding, and it should be rather easy since the change is so rapid that the genes must be few, so that even if we can't rein in McD and KFC toxicity, or passive TV-addiction, we can at least medicate the result.  That was always, at best, wishful thinking, and at worst, rationalization for funding Big Data studies.  Such a simple explanation would be good for KFC, and an income flood for BigPharma, the GWAS industry, DNA sequencer makers, and more.....except not so good for  those paying the medical price, and those who are trying to think about the problem in a disinterested scientific way.  Unfortunately, even when it is entirely sincere, that convenient hope for a simple genetic cause is being shown to be false.

A serious parody?
Year by year, more factors are identified that, by statistical association at least and sometimes by experimental testing, contribute to obesity.  A very fine review of this subject has appeared in the mid-October 201 Nature Reviews Genetics, by Ghosh and Bouchard, which takes seriously not just genetics but all the plausible causes of obesity, including behavior and environment, and their relationships as best we know them, and outlines the current state of knowledge.

Ghosh and Bouchard provide a well-caveated assessment of these various threads of evidence now in hand, and though they do end up with the pro forma plea for yet more funding to identify yet more details, they provide a clear picture that a serious reader can take seriously on its own merits.  However, we think that the proper message is not the usual one.  It is that we need to rethink what we've been investing so heavily on.

To their great credit, the authors melded behavioral, environmental, and genetic causation in their analysis. This is shown in this figure, from their summary; it is probably the best current causal map of obesity based on the studies the authors included in their analysis:



If this diagram were being discussed by John Cleese on Monty Python, we'd roar with laughter at what was an obvious parody of science.  But nobody's laughing and this isn't a parody!   And it is by no means of unusual shape and complexity.  Diagrams like this (but with little if any environmental component) have been produced by analyzing gene expression patterns even just of the early development of the simple sea urchin.  But we seem not to be laughing, which is understandable because they're serious diagrams.  On the other hand, we don't seem to be reacting other than by saying we need more of the same.  I think that is rather weird, for scientists, whose job it is to understand, not just list, the nature of Nature.

We said at the outset of this post that 'the obesity epidemic seems to be getting worse'.  There's a deep message there, but one essentially missing even from this careful obesity paper: it is that many of the causal factors, including genetic variants, are changing before our eyes. The frequency of genetic variants changes from population to population and generation to generation, so that all samples will look different.  And, mutations happen in every meiosis, adding new variants to a population every time a baby is born.   The results of many studies, as reflected in the current summary by Ghosh and Bouchard, show the many gene regions that contribute to obesity, their total net contribution is still minor.  It is possible, though perhaps very difficult to demonstrate, that an individual site might account more than minimally for some individual carriers in ways GWAS results can't really identify.  And the authors do cite published opinions that claim a higher efficacy of GWAS relative to obesity than we think is seriously defensible; but even if we're wrong, causation is very complex as the figure shows.

The individual genomic variants will vary in their presence or absence or frequency or average effect among studies, not to mention populations.  In addition, most contributing genetic variants are too rare or weak to be detected by the methods used in mapping studies, because of the constraints on statistical significance criteria, which is why so much of the trait's heritability in GWAS is typically unaccounted for by mapping.  These aspects and their details will differ greatly among samples and studies.

Relevant risk factors will come or go or change in exposure levels in the future--but these cannot be predicted, not even in principle.  Their interactions and contributions are also manifestly context-specific, as secular trends clearly show.  Even with the set of known genetic variants and other contributing factors, there are essentially an unmanageable number of possible combinations, so that each person is genetically and environmentally unique, and the complex combinations of future individuals are not predictable.

Risk assessment is essentially based on replicability, which in a sense is why statistical testing can be used (on which these sorts of results heavily rely).  However, because these risk factor combinations are each unique they're not replicable.  At best, as some advocate, the individual effects are additive so that if we just measure each in some individual add up each factor's effect, and predict the person's obesity (if the effects are not additive, this won't work).  We can probably predict, if perhaps not control, at least some of the major risk factors (people will still down pizzas or fried chicken while sitting in front of a TV). But even the known genetic factors in total only account for a small percentage of the trait's variance (the authors' Table 2), though the paper cites more optimistic authors.

The result of these indisputable facts is that as long as our eyes are focused, for research strategic reasons or lack of better ideas, on the litter of countless minor factors, even those we can identify, we have a fat chance of really addressing the problem this way.

If you pick any of the arrows (links) in this diagram, you can ask how strong or necessary that link is, how much it may vary among samples or depend on the European nature of the data used here, or to what extent even its identification could be a sampling or statistical artifact.  Links like 'smoking' or 'medication', not to mention specific genes, even if they're wholly correct, surely have quantitative effects that vary among people even within the sample, and the effect sizes probably often have very large variance. Many exposures are notoriously inaccurately reported or measured, or change in unmeasured ways.   Some are quite vague, like 'lifestyle', 'eating behavior', and many others--both hard to define and hard to assess with knowable precision, much less predictability.  Whether their various many effects are additive or have more complex interaction is another issue, and the connectivity diagram may be tentative in many places.  Maybe--probably?--in such traits simple behavioral changes would over-ride most of these behavioral factors, leaving those persons for whom obesity really is due to their genotype, which would then be amenable to gene-focused approaches.

If this is a friable diagram, that is, if the items, strengths, connections and so on are highly changeable, even if through no fault of the authors whatever, we can ask when and where and how this complex map is actually useful, no matter how carefully it was assembled.  Indeed, even if this is a rigidly accurate diagram for the samples used, how applicable is it to other samples or to the future?Or how useful is it in predicting not just group patterns, but individual risk?

Our personal view is that the rather ritual plea for more and more and bigger and bigger statistical association studies is misplaced, and, in truth, a way of maintaining funding and the status quo, something we've written much about--the sociopolitical economics of science today.  With obesity rising at a continuing rate and about a third of the US population recently reported as obese, we know that the future health care costs for the consequences will dwarf even the mega-scale genome mapping on which so much is currently being spent, if not largely wasted.  We know how to prevent much or most obesity in behavioral terms, and we think it is entirely fair to ask why we still pour resources into genetic mapping of this particular problem.

There are many papers on other complex traits that might seem to be simple like stature and blood pressure, not to mention more mysterious ones like schizophrenia or intelligence, in which hundreds of genomewide sites are implicated, strewn across the genome.  Different studies find different sites, and in most cases most of the heritability is not accounted for, meaning that many more sites are at work (and this doesn't include environmental effects).  In many instances, even the trait's definition itself may be comparably vague, or may change over time.  This is a landscape 'shape' in which every detail is different, within and between traits, but is found in common with complex traits.  That in itself is a tipoff that there is something consistent about these landscapes but we've not yet really awakened to it or learned how to approach it.

Rather than being skeptical about these Ghosh and Bouchard's' careful analysis or their underlying findings, I think we should accept their general nature, even if the details in any given study or analysis may not individually be so rigid and replicable, and ask: OK, this is the landscape--what do we do now?

Is there a different way to think about biological causation?  If not, what is the use or point of this kind of complexity enumeration, in which every person is different and the risks for the future may not be those estimated from past data to produce figures like the one above?  The rapid change in prevalence shows how unreliable these factors must be, at prediction--they are retrospective of the particular patterns of the study subjects.  Since we cannot predict the strengths or even presence of these or other new factors, what should we do?  How can we rethink the problem?

These are the harder question, much harder than analyzing the data; but they are in our view the real scientific questions that need to be asked.

Monday, January 25, 2016

"The Blizzard of 2016" and predictability: Part I--the value of prediction

Mark Twain famously quipped, "Everybody talks about the weather but nobody does anything about it." But these days, that's far from accurate.  At least, an army of specialists try to predict the weather so that we can be prepared for it.  The various media, as well as governmental agencies, publicize forecasts.  But how good are those forecasts?

As a former meteorologist myself (back--way back--when I was an Air Force weather officer), I take an interest, partly professional but also conceptual, in how accurate forecasting has become in our computer and satellite era.

Last week, a storm developed over the southwest, and combined with atmospheric disturbance barreling down from the Canadian arctic, to cause huge rain and wind damage across the south and then veered north where it turned into "The Blizzard of 2016", dubbed by the exaggeration-hungry media.  How well was it forecast and did that do any societal good?

Here is a past-few-days summary page of mapped conditions at upper air (upper left), surface (upper right) and other levels.  On a web page called eWall ( http://mp1.met.psu.edu/~fxg1/ewall.html ) you can scroll these for the prior 5 days.  The double Low pressure (red L's) on the right panel represent the center of the storm, steered in part by the winds aloft (other panels).



If you followed the forecasting over the week leading to the storm's storming up the east coast to wreak havoc there, you would say it was exceedingly well forecast, and many days in advance. Was it worth the cost?  One has to say that probably many lives were saved, huge damage avoided, and disruption minimized: people emptied grocery store shelves and hunkered down to watch the Weather Channel (and State College's own Accuweather).  Urgent things, including shopping for supplies in case of being house-bound, were done in advance and probably many medical and other similar procedures were done or rescheduled and the like.  Despite the very heavy snowfall, as predicted, the forecast was accurate enough to have been life-saving.

Lots of people still don't do anything about it!
And yet....
Despite a lot of people talking about the weather, on all sorts of public media, masses of people, acting like Mark Twain, don't do anything about it, even with the information in hand.  At least 12 people died in this storm in accidents, and others from coronaries while shoveling, and this is just what I've seen in a quick check of the online news outlets.  Thousands upon thousands were stranded for many hours in freezing cold on snow-sodden highways.  There were things like 25-mile-long stationary lines of vehicles on interstates and thousands of car and truck accidents.  That's a lot of people paying the price for their own stubbornness or ignorance.  This is what such a jam looks like:

A typical snowstorm traffic jam (www.breakingnews.com)
People were warned in the clearest terms for days in advance.  Our fine National Weather Service, in collaboration with complementary services in other countries, scoped out the situation and let everyone know about it, as is their very important job.  Some states, like New York,  properly closed their roads to all but necessary traffic. Their governments did their jobs.  Other states, like Kentucky, failed to do that.  So then, how is it that there was so much of what seems like avoidable damage?

Let's put the issue another way: My auto insurance rates will reflect the thousands of costly claims that will be filed because of those who failed to heed the warnings and were out on the highways anyway. So I paid for the forecasts first through my taxes, and then through the purchase prices of goods whose makers pay to advertise on weather channels, but then I also have to pay for those whose foolhardiness led to the many accidents they'll make claims for.  That's similar to people knowingly enjoying an unhealthy lifestyle, and then expecting health insurance to cover their medical bills--that insurance, too, is amortized over the population of insured including those who watch their lifestyles conscientiously.  That's the nature of insurance.

Some people, of course, simply can't stay home.  But many just won't.  Countless truckers were stranded on the roads.  They surely knew of the coming storm.  Did commercial pressure keep them on the road?  Then shame on their companies!  They surely could have pulled over or into Walmart parking lots to wait out the snowfall and its clearance--a day or so, say.  Maybe there aren't enough parking lots for that, but surely, surely they should not have been on the Interstates!  And while some people probably had strong legitimate reasons for being out, and a few may not have seen the strong, repeated forecasts over the many preceding days, most and I would say by far the most, just decided to take their trips anyway.

Nobody can say they aren't aware of pileups, crashes, and hours-long stalls that happen on Interstates during snowstorms.  It is not a new phenomenon!  Yet, again, we all will have to pay for their foolhardiness.  Maybe insurance should refuse to cover those on the road for unnecessary trips. Maybe those who clog the roads in this way should be taxed to cover the costs of, say, increased insurance rates on everyone else or emergencies that couldn't be dealt with because service vehicles couldn't get to the scene.

The National Weather Service, and companies who use their data, did a terrific job of alerting people of the coming storm, and surely saved many lives and prevented damage as a result.  Just as they do when they forecast hurricanes and warn of tornadoes.  Still, there are always people who ignore the warnings, at their own cost, and at cost to society, but that's not the fault of the NWS.

But what about predictability? Did they get it right?  What is 'right'?
It is a fair and important question to ask how closely the actual outcome of the storm was predicted.   The focus is on the accuracy in detail, not the overall result, and that leads one to examine the nature of the science and--of course in our case here on this blog--to compare it with the state of the art of epidemiological, including genetic, predictions.  Not all forecasts are as dramatic and in a sense clear-cut as a major storm like this one.

I have been in the 'prediction' business for decades, first as a meteorologist and subsequently in trying to understand the causal relationships, genetic and evolutionary, that explain our individual traits.  Tomorrow, we'll discuss aspects of the Big Storm's forecasts that weren't so accurate and compare that with the situation in these biological areas.

Monday, June 1, 2015

Through a glass, very darkly: a comparison with genomics

One of our favorite BBC Radio4 programs is called In Our Time (available as downloadable podcast or to play on line).  Every week, host Melvyn Bragg and 3 academic guests discuss some topic of interest, be it from science, philosophy, history, the arts or whatever, for about 40 minutes, explaining the topic and making it understandable and very interesting.  This program is like a college education, except that it is free, eclectic, digestible.....and without grades or exams!

The May 28 episode is about glass. What is glass?  How is it made?  What is its molecular structure?  A key point of this discussion is that glass is a complex molecular structure, composed variously of sand or polymers with other added elements heated, shaped, and then cooled.  The key fact is that the molecules are irregularly arranged: what gives glass its properties is that it is not a crystal, despite what it may seem.  For a given chemical composition and heating/cooling process, the properties of a piece of glass are predictable and repeatable, but not in the sense of a crystal.  Glass goes through a 'phase transition' from liquid to solid when it cools, but it's not an orderly transition such as is seen in water and many other substances, and in crystal formation.




In a crystal, all the molecules are precisely arranged in spatial order relative to each other.  The arrangement is generally predictable (understandable theoretically) and repeatable.  It has specifiable mathematical relationships.  But what makes glass glass is that it is not arranged in that way.  Instead, a piece of glass's molecules are uniquely or randomly arranged; this means that the structure of any piece of glass can't be predicted, although it can be determined post hoc.  What that disorderly transition means is that no two vases or windows are identical at the molecular level, even if they have the same macro-properties.  The 'impurities' that are added affect the arrangement of the molecules in ways that provide different strength, melting or cooling temperatures, color, or refraction of light passing through.

There are unlimited ways to make glass; adding different materials in different relative amounts, heated according to their properties and the desired result.  The molecules in each of a set of dinner glasses are basically the same in relative proportions, but entirely unrelated in their arrangement.  But how then can a factory turn out countless drinking glasses, jelly jars, or optical lenses that seem identical?

The reproducible randomness of glass
The answer essentially has to do with large numbers.  It is much like, say, the ideal gas law which says that the pressure or temperature of a gas in a container depends on the size of the container, and the amount of molecules of (any) gas that is inside it.  Each molecule is careering around banging into other molecules of the gas or of the wall, and caroming off like billiard balls.  It isn't possible to measure each encounter as there are typically gazzilions of them.  But statistically, the number of collisions is roughly the same for a given set of conditions, so the net result is statistically highly predictable, without having to examine any individual molecule.

Similar properties apply to gas, according to this BBC discussion.  Each piece of glass has uncountable numbers of molecules, more or less randomly arranged.  But there are so many of them that their net macro-scale properties are highly predictable, without having to examine any individual molecule.  But that's no longer true at the molecular level.

Thinking about the nature of glass provides an illustrative way to think about another kind of assemblage, but one that has very different properties.

The irreproducible randomness of genomes
Genomes are molecules that interact with other molecules.  This interaction has been designed by evolutionary history to lead to development of fertilized seed or egg into an adult, and to respond to environmental conditions of various sorts.  So the action or 'use' of genomes leads to changes in the organism.  Some are gradual and 'normal', others are sudden and 'abnormal', that is, we call the change 'disease' or 'puberty' and so on.  Whether these could usefully be viewed as phase transitions I don't know.  The changes are, in terms of genes, only partly defined, often even if we know there are risk alleles that alter the timing of such transitions.

Like glass, the complex of any genotype's relationship to the organism's traits is empirical rather than wholly predictable from the 'molecules' (genotypic elements).  Similarly, enumerating the causal elements is not that different from the situation in glass.  Some properties of glass, like strength and color, can be predicted by knowing its constituents,  but these are collective properties and not predictable from enumerations of the individual atoms.  Genomics may be a bit more predictive, but not all that different in most cases.

Overall, the analogy seems at best imperfect in specifics, but very useful as a way of thinking about the power, or limits of power, of enumerative prediction, and an indicator of collective, if individually unique, prediction.

Thursday, May 24, 2012

Magical science: now you see it, now you don't. Part I: What we mean by 'risk'

The  life, social, and evolutionary sciences have a problem.  We posted about the issue of their non-replicability last Friday but that is only part of the problem.  They also have non-predictability (see a recent Times commentary), but both replicability and predictability are key elements of science as we know it. 

It is difficult to make rigorous assertions that have the kind of predictive power we have come (rightly or wrongly) to expect of science, on the typical if often unstated assumption that our world is law-like, the way it seems that the physical and chemical universe are.

A clear manifestation of the problem is the way that findings in epidemiology and genetic risk say yes factor X is risky, then a few years later no, then yes again, and so on.   Can't we ever know if factor X is a cause of some outcome Y?  In particular, is X a risk factor?  X could be a reason for natural selection, a component of some disease, and so on.

Often, we think of this as a probability.  As we've posted before, that means that exposure to that factor yields some probability that the outcome will be observed.  If you have two copies of a gene, there is usually a 50% risk or probability that a given one of your children (or parents, or sibs) will also have it.

So, in a strange turn of phrase, coffee or a given HDL cholesterol level is said to be a risk factor for heart disease, or a given genetic variant is a risk factor for cancer.  And we try to estimate the level of that risk--the probability that if that factor is present, you will manifest the outcome.  Among various possible risk factors, the modern concept of science has it that you are at some net or overall risk of the outcome, like having a heart attack, depending on your exposure to those risk factors.

In evolutionary terms, having a particular genetic variant can have some probability  (or some similar measure) of reproducing, or surviving to a particular age.  Among various possible genetic risk factors, what you have puts you at some net risk of such outcome, which is your evolutionary fitness in the face of natural selection, for example. 

If we assume that enumerated causes of this sort, and that they really are causes, are responsible for a trait then your exposure level can be specified.  The causes might truly be deterministic, in the way gravity determines the rate an object will fall--here or anywhere in the universe--but that our incomplete level of knowledge is such that we can only express its effect in terms of probability.

Still, we assume that probabilistic causation is real.  When things are the result of probabilities, we can know the causes but can't predict the specific outcome of any given instance.  This is the sense in which we know a fair coin will come up Heads 50% of the time, but can't predict the result of a given flip.  Actually, and we've posted about this before but the issue of probability is so central to much of science that we keep repeating it, the coin may be perfectly deterministic but we just don't know enough, so that for all practical purposes the result is probabilistic.

In such cases, which are clearly at the foundation of evolutionary inference and of genetic and other biomedical problems, we must estimate the risk associated with a given cause by choosing a sample from all those at risk, and seeing what happened to them.  Then, we assume we know the causal structure and can then do what we must be able to do, if this is actual science: predict the outcome.  This must be so if the world is causal, even if our predictions are expressed in terms of probabilities: given your genotype you have xx probability of getting yy disease.

So, with our huge and munificently funded science establishment, why is it that day after day the media tout the latest Dramatic Finding....that is just as noisily touted the next day when the previous assertion is overturned?

Why is it that we don't know if coffee is a risk factor for disease?  Or isn't?  Or isn't for the moment until some new study comes along?  Or maybe until some environmental factor changes, like the type of filter paper McDonald's uses in its coffee maker, say--but how would we ever know whether that explains the flip-flopping findings?

Why indeed do we have to continue doing studies of the same purported risk factor to see if they are really, truly risks?  These are fundamental questions not about the individual studies, but about the current practice of science itself.

If we look at the reasons, which is tomorrow's post, we'll see how shaky our knowledge really is in these areas, and we can ask whether it is even 'science'.