Holly has a new piece up over at The Winnower in which she describes the difficulty of getting students to understand the nuances of what's known about Neanderthals. Fine piece, very much worth a look.
The Winnower is a new open access online journal, with post publication peer review, also very much worth a look.
Friday, June 20, 2014
Thursday, June 19, 2014
Correlation, cause and how can you tell?
By
Ken Weiss
A very good BBC radio program called More or Less tries to point out uses and, mainly, misuses of statistics and data analysis, especially where policy or political claims and the like are involved. A recent program (June 9) addressed the problem of confusing correlation with causation. This is something everyone should know about, even if you're not a scientist. Just because two things can be seen together does not mean that one causes the other.
The program mentioned an entertaining web site, Spurious Correlations, that you can find here. It's run by Tyler Vigen, a Harvard law student, and it makes the correlation/causation problem glaringly obvious. There is even a feature for finding your own spurious correlation.
How to tell if a correlation is spurious is no easy matter. If many things are woven together in nature, or society, they can change together because of some over-arching shared factor. But just because they are found together does not mean that in any practical sense they are causally related. Statistical significance of the correlation, meaning that it is unlikely to arise by chance, is a subjective judgment about what you count as 'unlikely.' After all, very unlikely events do occur!
Causation can be indirect and in a sense it is not always easy to understand just what it means for one thing to 'cause' another. If wealth leads to buying racy cars and racy cars are less safe, is it the driving or the car, or the wealth that 'causes' accidents? If AIDS can be a result of HIV infection, but you can get some symptoms of aids without HIV, or have HIV without the symptoms, does HIV cause AIDS? If the virus is indeed responsible, but only drug users or hookers get or transmit it, is the virus, the drug-use, or prostitution, or using prostitutes the 'cause'?
Another problem, besides just the way of thinking of causation, and the judgment about when a correlation is 'significant', relates to what you measure and how you search for shared patterns. If you look through enough randomly generated patterns, eventually you'll find ones that are similar, with absolutely no causal connection between them.
Looking at the examples on the above web site should be a sobering lesson in how to recognize bad, or overstated, or over-reported science. It won't by itself answer the question about how to determine when a correlation means causation. Nobody has really solved that one, if indeed it has any sort of single answer. And there are some curious things to think about.
Just what is causation?
In a purely Newtonian, deterministic universe, in a sense everything is causally connected to everything else, and was determined by the Big Bang. For example, with universal gravity everything literally affects everything else and through a totally deterministic causal process.
In that sense nothing at all is truly probabilistic. But quantum mechanics and various related principles of physical science hold that some things may really be truly probabilisitic rather than deterministic. If that is right, then the idea of a 'cause' becomes rather unclear. How can some outcome truly occur only with some probability? It verges on an effect without an actual cause. For example, if the probability of something happening is, say, 15%, what establishes that value--what causes it? A systematic or random process with a truly random cause, that is not just our inability to measure it precisely, in a sense redefines the very notion of cause. Such things, some of them seemingly true of the quantum world, really do violate common sense. So the whole idea of correlation vs causation takes on many different, subtle colors.
The program mentioned an entertaining web site, Spurious Correlations, that you can find here. It's run by Tyler Vigen, a Harvard law student, and it makes the correlation/causation problem glaringly obvious. There is even a feature for finding your own spurious correlation.
![]() |
| Number of people who died by becoming tangled in their bedsheets correlates with Total revenue generated by skiing facilities (US); Source: Spurious Correlations |
How to tell if a correlation is spurious is no easy matter. If many things are woven together in nature, or society, they can change together because of some over-arching shared factor. But just because they are found together does not mean that in any practical sense they are causally related. Statistical significance of the correlation, meaning that it is unlikely to arise by chance, is a subjective judgment about what you count as 'unlikely.' After all, very unlikely events do occur!
Causation can be indirect and in a sense it is not always easy to understand just what it means for one thing to 'cause' another. If wealth leads to buying racy cars and racy cars are less safe, is it the driving or the car, or the wealth that 'causes' accidents? If AIDS can be a result of HIV infection, but you can get some symptoms of aids without HIV, or have HIV without the symptoms, does HIV cause AIDS? If the virus is indeed responsible, but only drug users or hookers get or transmit it, is the virus, the drug-use, or prostitution, or using prostitutes the 'cause'?
Another problem, besides just the way of thinking of causation, and the judgment about when a correlation is 'significant', relates to what you measure and how you search for shared patterns. If you look through enough randomly generated patterns, eventually you'll find ones that are similar, with absolutely no causal connection between them.
Looking at the examples on the above web site should be a sobering lesson in how to recognize bad, or overstated, or over-reported science. It won't by itself answer the question about how to determine when a correlation means causation. Nobody has really solved that one, if indeed it has any sort of single answer. And there are some curious things to think about.
Just what is causation?
In a purely Newtonian, deterministic universe, in a sense everything is causally connected to everything else, and was determined by the Big Bang. For example, with universal gravity everything literally affects everything else and through a totally deterministic causal process.
In that sense nothing at all is truly probabilistic. But quantum mechanics and various related principles of physical science hold that some things may really be truly probabilisitic rather than deterministic. If that is right, then the idea of a 'cause' becomes rather unclear. How can some outcome truly occur only with some probability? It verges on an effect without an actual cause. For example, if the probability of something happening is, say, 15%, what establishes that value--what causes it? A systematic or random process with a truly random cause, that is not just our inability to measure it precisely, in a sense redefines the very notion of cause. Such things, some of them seemingly true of the quantum world, really do violate common sense. So the whole idea of correlation vs causation takes on many different, subtle colors.
Wednesday, June 18, 2014
Republican presidents are bad for our health?
Infant mortality in the US fluctuates with the political party of the President. A paper published in the June 4 issue of the widely respected International Journal of Epidemiology ("Us Infant Morality and the President's Party," Rodriguez et al.) reports that between 1965-2010, infant mortality rates were 3% higher when a Republican was president than when the president was a Democrat.
Rodriguez et al. write that previous "political epidemiology" has been cross-national, and has attempted to determine the effect of policy on public health; welfare states, national health systems vs not, higher social expenditures or medical expenditures per capita vs lower, etc. Income inequality was found to be correlated with public health until the data were re-analyzed and additional variables controlled (Avendano, 2012), leading Avendano to question whether income inequality was in fact causal, as opposed to either spurious or real but only correlation with some unmeasured variable(s). Further studies have attempted to determine which social factors are actually causal; some have suggested social expenditure and the generosity of family policies may be. In this way, political policies may affect public health, but actual causality, rather than just correlation, is difficult to determine.
Rodriguez et al. posed the question, ‘Is the political party of the president of the USA associated with an important, objective and sensitive measure of population health, infant mortality?’ The idea is that the party in power drives macroeconomic policy, and macroeconomic policy influences the socioeconomic milieu, affecting variables that affect health and mortality.
Infant mortality has fallen dramatically since 1965, from a total of 24.7 per 1000 births to 6.1 in 2010. In the graph below, the authors have removed the trend, and show total infant mortality, neonatal and post-neonatal mortality, by president, for blacks and whites. During Democratic administrations, all rates are lower, across the board, on average 3% lower.
The statistical effects are essentially the same for Blacks and Whites, but infant mortality among Black infants is about two times higher than it is among Whites, so the absolute effect is larger. The percentages may be small -- very small, in fact -- but their consistency does lend them credibility.
Several things stand out about these results. First, as the authors point out, the implementation of policies that might have had a direct effect on infant mortality -- Johnson's Great Society and Medicaid in the 1960's, or expansion of Medicaid eligibility between 1979 and 1992 don't correlate with these periodic dips in IMRs. That would be the easy explanation. But this means that the correlation with political party may have little or nothing to do with policy differences.
Or, Rodriguez et al. suggest, the correlation could reflect real, cyclical changes in socioeconomic conditions for mothers and infants, depending on national policy. Or, differential availability of abortion, since high risk fetuses may be more likely to be aborted than fetuses at lower risk. Or, it might reflect differing attitudes toward health disparities, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to use government to address them -- but what actual governmental policy is implemented, or eliminated, and thus responsible for the fluctuations is anybody's guess.
But there's something curious about these findings. Neonatal mortality, death before 28 days of life, is generally considered to be due to conditions of pregnancy or congenital abnormalities, while post-neonatal infant mortality, death between 29 days and 1 year, includes sudden infant death syndrome, which isn't correlated with socioeconomic status, but PMR is also considered to be a reflection of socioeconomic conditions. If that's so, then neonatal mortality should look quite different from post-neonatal mortality in this study, but it doesn't. It shouldn't be fluctuating with policy differences or income inequality or whatever political or economic factors, if any, might be responsible for the trend reported here. And, one would expect there to be a more marked difference between Black neonatal and post-neonatal mortality, since health disparities are most reflected in Black infant deaths.
Equally problematic is that one might expect that presidential terms are short relative to the lag time between implementing a new policy and its effects. The study did allow for a one year lag time, but still, most health policies don't have immediate impact. So the incumbent's party may be irrelevant to what happens during his term, or it would at least be the successor's (sometimes the same sometimes different) party. Do people's expectations, based on the current President's outlook, change their behavior in subtle ways? Sounds plausible, and would have nothing to do with the policy change itself, but so many people are uninvolved, uninterested in, or skeptical of the political system that this might not be much of an explanation. And the pattern goes back before CNN and FOX imitation news organizations had much intentionally motivating influence on what people thought or were aware of.
Still, social and political epidemiology are interesting approaches to understanding the underlying causes of ill health and mortality. The fields look at risk factors several steps removed from those generally considered as causes of disease, so that AIDS, or malaria, e.g., might be attributed to poverty rather than HIV infection or being bitten by a parsite-carrying mosquito, and legitimately so. That is, the idea is that poverty increases one's risk of exposure to diseases, and if you eliminate poverty you eliminate risk. The difficulty, of course, is that enacting public health policy that calls for eliminating poverty is a lot more difficult than distributing bed nets or clean needles.
And, the problem of identifying cause from correlation is huge with such metadata. It can be pretty much pure guess work to pull causal factors from the social or political hat, as this paper suggests -- in fact, if something like, to make something up, differences in completeness of registration of vital statistics in Republican and Democratic years were responsible for this cyclical dip, it would look just the same as if the cause were changing policy. The point is, that we just don't know. In addition, it's hard to avoid interpreting results from one's particular political point of view -- maybe there's something interesting in this paper, maybe there's not, but it's very hard to know.
Rodriguez et al. write that previous "political epidemiology" has been cross-national, and has attempted to determine the effect of policy on public health; welfare states, national health systems vs not, higher social expenditures or medical expenditures per capita vs lower, etc. Income inequality was found to be correlated with public health until the data were re-analyzed and additional variables controlled (Avendano, 2012), leading Avendano to question whether income inequality was in fact causal, as opposed to either spurious or real but only correlation with some unmeasured variable(s). Further studies have attempted to determine which social factors are actually causal; some have suggested social expenditure and the generosity of family policies may be. In this way, political policies may affect public health, but actual causality, rather than just correlation, is difficult to determine.
Rodriguez et al. posed the question, ‘Is the political party of the president of the USA associated with an important, objective and sensitive measure of population health, infant mortality?’ The idea is that the party in power drives macroeconomic policy, and macroeconomic policy influences the socioeconomic milieu, affecting variables that affect health and mortality.
Infant mortality has fallen dramatically since 1965, from a total of 24.7 per 1000 births to 6.1 in 2010. In the graph below, the authors have removed the trend, and show total infant mortality, neonatal and post-neonatal mortality, by president, for blacks and whites. During Democratic administrations, all rates are lower, across the board, on average 3% lower.
![]() Logged IMR, NMR, and PMR residual trends and presidential partisan regimes, 1965–2010; Source, Rodriguez et al., 2014 |
Several things stand out about these results. First, as the authors point out, the implementation of policies that might have had a direct effect on infant mortality -- Johnson's Great Society and Medicaid in the 1960's, or expansion of Medicaid eligibility between 1979 and 1992 don't correlate with these periodic dips in IMRs. That would be the easy explanation. But this means that the correlation with political party may have little or nothing to do with policy differences.
Or, Rodriguez et al. suggest, the correlation could reflect real, cyclical changes in socioeconomic conditions for mothers and infants, depending on national policy. Or, differential availability of abortion, since high risk fetuses may be more likely to be aborted than fetuses at lower risk. Or, it might reflect differing attitudes toward health disparities, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to use government to address them -- but what actual governmental policy is implemented, or eliminated, and thus responsible for the fluctuations is anybody's guess.
But there's something curious about these findings. Neonatal mortality, death before 28 days of life, is generally considered to be due to conditions of pregnancy or congenital abnormalities, while post-neonatal infant mortality, death between 29 days and 1 year, includes sudden infant death syndrome, which isn't correlated with socioeconomic status, but PMR is also considered to be a reflection of socioeconomic conditions. If that's so, then neonatal mortality should look quite different from post-neonatal mortality in this study, but it doesn't. It shouldn't be fluctuating with policy differences or income inequality or whatever political or economic factors, if any, might be responsible for the trend reported here. And, one would expect there to be a more marked difference between Black neonatal and post-neonatal mortality, since health disparities are most reflected in Black infant deaths.
Equally problematic is that one might expect that presidential terms are short relative to the lag time between implementing a new policy and its effects. The study did allow for a one year lag time, but still, most health policies don't have immediate impact. So the incumbent's party may be irrelevant to what happens during his term, or it would at least be the successor's (sometimes the same sometimes different) party. Do people's expectations, based on the current President's outlook, change their behavior in subtle ways? Sounds plausible, and would have nothing to do with the policy change itself, but so many people are uninvolved, uninterested in, or skeptical of the political system that this might not be much of an explanation. And the pattern goes back before CNN and FOX imitation news organizations had much intentionally motivating influence on what people thought or were aware of.
Still, social and political epidemiology are interesting approaches to understanding the underlying causes of ill health and mortality. The fields look at risk factors several steps removed from those generally considered as causes of disease, so that AIDS, or malaria, e.g., might be attributed to poverty rather than HIV infection or being bitten by a parsite-carrying mosquito, and legitimately so. That is, the idea is that poverty increases one's risk of exposure to diseases, and if you eliminate poverty you eliminate risk. The difficulty, of course, is that enacting public health policy that calls for eliminating poverty is a lot more difficult than distributing bed nets or clean needles.
And, the problem of identifying cause from correlation is huge with such metadata. It can be pretty much pure guess work to pull causal factors from the social or political hat, as this paper suggests -- in fact, if something like, to make something up, differences in completeness of registration of vital statistics in Republican and Democratic years were responsible for this cyclical dip, it would look just the same as if the cause were changing policy. The point is, that we just don't know. In addition, it's hard to avoid interpreting results from one's particular political point of view -- maybe there's something interesting in this paper, maybe there's not, but it's very hard to know.
Tuesday, June 17, 2014
Are bees intelligent?
The other day, Ken and I had coffee with a couple of philosophers who spend their time thinking about philosophy of the mind. What is consciousness? Do non-human organisms have consciousness? What is intelligence? How do we make decisions? What about ants? These are hard questions to answer, perhaps even unanswerable, but they are fascinating to think about.
Our meeting was occasioned by the recent paper in PNAS about the mental map of bees ("Way-finding in displaced clock-shifted bees proves bees use a cognitive map", Cheeseman et al.). Cognitive maps are mental representations of physical places, which mammals use to navigate their surroundings. Insects clearly have ways to do the same; whether or not they do it with cognitive maps is the question.
The "computational theory of mind" is the predominant theory of how mammals think -- the brain is posited to be an information processing system, and thinking is the brain computing, or processing information (though, whether this is 'truth' or primarily a reflection of the computer age isn't clear, at least to us). In vertebrates some at least of this takes place in the section called the hippocampus, or in non-vertebrates in some neurological homologs. But, what do insects do?
Previous work has shown that captured insects, once released, often fly off in the compass direction in which they were headed when they were caught, even if they were moved during capture and the direction is no longer appropriate. But, they then can correct themselves, and then have no problem locating their hives. That indicates that they've got some kind of an "integrated metric map" of their environment.
Some theories have held that they mark the location of the sun relative to the direction they take and then later calculate 'home' based on a computation of time and the motion of the sun. This by itself would be a lot of sophisticated computing, or thinking....and why not 'intelligence'?
Cheeseman et al. asked whether instead what they are relying on is a series of snapshots of their environment, which enables them to recognize different landmarks, one after the other as they come into view, rather than a completely integrated mental map. They experimented with anesthetizing bees and shifting their sense of time, so that they couldn't rely on the sun to get them home. It took some flying for the bees to recognize that they were off-course, but they always were able to re-orient themselves and get back to the hive.
Cheeseman et al. conclude that that because bees don't rely entirely on a sun-compass for their sense of direction, they must have the apian equivalent of a cognitive map. That is, they collect relevant spatial information from the environment with which they navigate, and use it to make decisions about how to get where they are going. That is, they take and file away snapshots; remember that insect eyes are complex, including two compound eyes and in most species three forehead-located small, simpler ocelli so this is synthesizing a many-camera pixellation and differently sensitive integration of the light-world. Then, they use a sequence of these frames, later, from a different position from that at which the photos were taken so not all landmarks might even be visible, and at a different time, which can affect shadows, colors, and so on. Then, tiling these lined up in reverse order in mirror left-right flipped order somehow, and adjusting their angles of perspective and so on, also perhaps sound, wind direction, and even perhaps monitoring the olfactory trail (also in reverse relative position) like Hansel and Gretel's bread crumbs, they head home for dinner.
To us, this is a remarkable feat for their small brains! For some of us, even with a human brain, finding one's way home without a GPS is no easy task, and deserves a nice cold drink when done successfully. However, the philosophers we were chatting about this with did not think what Cheeseman et al. believe they discovered about bees should be called a cognitive map because, and we think we've got this right, they haven't got a mental image of the entire lay of the land. Instead it's as though they are connecting the dots; they recognize landmarks and go from one mental snapshot with a familiar landmark to the next. So what kind of 'intelligence' this is becomes a definitional question perhaps. Call it mechanical or whatever you want, we would call this 'intelligent' behavior.
We don't know enough about philosophy (or the biology) of the mind to know how significantly these two models differ, or whether 'consciousness' is subtly underlying how these judgments about cognition are made, but in any case, that's not what interested us about the bee story. What is the experience of being a bee? Whichever kind of imaging and processing they do to navigate, how do they turn the locational information into action? It's one thing to know that your hive is east (or the apian equivalent) of the pine tree, but getting there requires "knowing" that after you've collected the nectar, you then want to bring it home, and that means you have to find your way there. Your mental map, whatever it consists of, must be made operational. How does that happen, in a brain the size of a bee's? Or an ant's?
Or bird brains? Crows, corvids, are considered among the smartest of birds. Their problem solving skills have been documented by a number of researchers, but crows have fascinated many non-scientists as well, including our son, who sent this observation from Lake Thun in Switzerland.
One view of intelligence is that it's what's measured by IQ tests. Or, at least, what humans think 'thinking' is all about. But this is perhaps a very parochial view. We tend to dismiss the kind of intricate brainwork that is required by nonverbal activities, or by athletes, or artists, or artisans. We tend to equate intelligence with verbal kinds of skills measured on tests devised by the literate segments of society who are using the results to screen for various kinds of western-culture activities, suitability for school, and the like. There's no reason to suggest that those aspects of brainware are not relevant to society, but it is our culturally chosen sort of definition.
Philosophers and perhaps most psychologists might not want to credit the crow with 'intelligence', or they may use the word but exclude concepts of perceptual consciousness--though whether there are adequate grounds for that that are not entirely based on our own experience as the defining one, isn't clear (to us, at least). In any case, wiring and behavior are empirically observable, but experience much less so, and consciousness as a component of brain activity, and perhaps of intelligence, remains elusive because it's a subjective experience while science is a method for exploring the empirical, and in that sense objective world.
If bees and, indeed, very tiny insects can navigate around searching the environment, having ideas about 'home', finding mates, recognizing food and dangers, and they can do it with thousands rather than billions of neurons, at present we haven't enough understanding of what 'thinking' is, much less 'intelligence', to know what goes through a bee's or a crow's mind when they're exploring their world....
Our meeting was occasioned by the recent paper in PNAS about the mental map of bees ("Way-finding in displaced clock-shifted bees proves bees use a cognitive map", Cheeseman et al.). Cognitive maps are mental representations of physical places, which mammals use to navigate their surroundings. Insects clearly have ways to do the same; whether or not they do it with cognitive maps is the question.
![]() |
| Honeybee: Wikipedia |
The "computational theory of mind" is the predominant theory of how mammals think -- the brain is posited to be an information processing system, and thinking is the brain computing, or processing information (though, whether this is 'truth' or primarily a reflection of the computer age isn't clear, at least to us). In vertebrates some at least of this takes place in the section called the hippocampus, or in non-vertebrates in some neurological homologs. But, what do insects do?
Previous work has shown that captured insects, once released, often fly off in the compass direction in which they were headed when they were caught, even if they were moved during capture and the direction is no longer appropriate. But, they then can correct themselves, and then have no problem locating their hives. That indicates that they've got some kind of an "integrated metric map" of their environment.
Some theories have held that they mark the location of the sun relative to the direction they take and then later calculate 'home' based on a computation of time and the motion of the sun. This by itself would be a lot of sophisticated computing, or thinking....and why not 'intelligence'?
Cheeseman et al. asked whether instead what they are relying on is a series of snapshots of their environment, which enables them to recognize different landmarks, one after the other as they come into view, rather than a completely integrated mental map. They experimented with anesthetizing bees and shifting their sense of time, so that they couldn't rely on the sun to get them home. It took some flying for the bees to recognize that they were off-course, but they always were able to re-orient themselves and get back to the hive.
Cheeseman et al. conclude that that because bees don't rely entirely on a sun-compass for their sense of direction, they must have the apian equivalent of a cognitive map. That is, they collect relevant spatial information from the environment with which they navigate, and use it to make decisions about how to get where they are going. That is, they take and file away snapshots; remember that insect eyes are complex, including two compound eyes and in most species three forehead-located small, simpler ocelli so this is synthesizing a many-camera pixellation and differently sensitive integration of the light-world. Then, they use a sequence of these frames, later, from a different position from that at which the photos were taken so not all landmarks might even be visible, and at a different time, which can affect shadows, colors, and so on. Then, tiling these lined up in reverse order in mirror left-right flipped order somehow, and adjusting their angles of perspective and so on, also perhaps sound, wind direction, and even perhaps monitoring the olfactory trail (also in reverse relative position) like Hansel and Gretel's bread crumbs, they head home for dinner.
![]() |
| Two big compound eyes, and 3 simpler central ocelli. From http://169.237.77.3/news/valleycarpenterbees.html |
To us, this is a remarkable feat for their small brains! For some of us, even with a human brain, finding one's way home without a GPS is no easy task, and deserves a nice cold drink when done successfully. However, the philosophers we were chatting about this with did not think what Cheeseman et al. believe they discovered about bees should be called a cognitive map because, and we think we've got this right, they haven't got a mental image of the entire lay of the land. Instead it's as though they are connecting the dots; they recognize landmarks and go from one mental snapshot with a familiar landmark to the next. So what kind of 'intelligence' this is becomes a definitional question perhaps. Call it mechanical or whatever you want, we would call this 'intelligent' behavior.
We don't know enough about philosophy (or the biology) of the mind to know how significantly these two models differ, or whether 'consciousness' is subtly underlying how these judgments about cognition are made, but in any case, that's not what interested us about the bee story. What is the experience of being a bee? Whichever kind of imaging and processing they do to navigate, how do they turn the locational information into action? It's one thing to know that your hive is east (or the apian equivalent) of the pine tree, but getting there requires "knowing" that after you've collected the nectar, you then want to bring it home, and that means you have to find your way there. Your mental map, whatever it consists of, must be made operational. How does that happen, in a brain the size of a bee's? Or an ant's?
Or bird brains? Crows, corvids, are considered among the smartest of birds. Their problem solving skills have been documented by a number of researchers, but crows have fascinated many non-scientists as well, including our son, who sent this observation from Lake Thun in Switzerland.
Crow found a little paper cup with some dried out dregs of leftover ketchup in the bottom. This is the sort of little paper condiment cup that would come with some french fries. We watched the crow try a couple of times to scrape some ketchup out with his beak, holding the cup down with his foot. It apparently wasn't working enough to his satisfaction, so he flew with the cup to the edge of the water (we were at the lake). He wanted to get the ketchup wet to "hydrate" it, to make it easier to scoop out. That was impressive enough, but what he did next was even more. There were little waves lapping on the "shore" (this was actually in a harbour and the shore was concrete) and each time threatening to carry away his cup. So he picked up the cup and carried it along up and down the shore until he found a little crevasse in the concrete that he could secure the cup, and let the water wash over it without taking it away. Clever.If that's not intelligence, it's hard to know what it is, then.
One view of intelligence is that it's what's measured by IQ tests. Or, at least, what humans think 'thinking' is all about. But this is perhaps a very parochial view. We tend to dismiss the kind of intricate brainwork that is required by nonverbal activities, or by athletes, or artists, or artisans. We tend to equate intelligence with verbal kinds of skills measured on tests devised by the literate segments of society who are using the results to screen for various kinds of western-culture activities, suitability for school, and the like. There's no reason to suggest that those aspects of brainware are not relevant to society, but it is our culturally chosen sort of definition.
Philosophers and perhaps most psychologists might not want to credit the crow with 'intelligence', or they may use the word but exclude concepts of perceptual consciousness--though whether there are adequate grounds for that that are not entirely based on our own experience as the defining one, isn't clear (to us, at least). In any case, wiring and behavior are empirically observable, but experience much less so, and consciousness as a component of brain activity, and perhaps of intelligence, remains elusive because it's a subjective experience while science is a method for exploring the empirical, and in that sense objective world.
If bees and, indeed, very tiny insects can navigate around searching the environment, having ideas about 'home', finding mates, recognizing food and dangers, and they can do it with thousands rather than billions of neurons, at present we haven't enough understanding of what 'thinking' is, much less 'intelligence', to know what goes through a bee's or a crow's mind when they're exploring their world....
Monday, June 16, 2014
The misappropriation of human diversity
By
Ken Weiss
We somewhat cautiously decided to chime in on the issues driving the widespread internet and media exchanges about the publication of what we and many others who think about these issues for a living know presents a rather simplistic and overtly and gratuitously racist treatment of human genetic variation. We wanted to point out, from our view at least, why the underlying issues are complex and don't yield to simple answers. In addition, we don't think it's at all irrelevant that history shows the societal traumas that can result from the arrogantly casual, careless, categorical, and value-laden treatment of one group of people by another. This has been called scientific racism in the past, and it's scientific racism now.
We tried to avoid personal attacks or polemics, and just lay out the issues as we see them. However, and not surprisingly given the nature of the current 'discussion', this opened the floodgates. Let's just say that the number of ways that people can find to tell strangers, under cover of anonymity and with such glee, that they are the scum of the earth is impressive. This whole subject merits measured discussion, based on evidence -- and many people have treated it as such, and we have appreciated what they've had to say, and the thoughtful, knowledgeable way they've said it.
But then there's the rest. The internet can be an ugly place. We have chosen not to contribute to that by posting comments that, let's just say, don't move the discussion forward. At present, it's impossible to have a wide-ranging discussion of human variation in any scientific way because the subject has been appropriated by ideologues with either a superficial understanding of the science, or a willingness to pick and choose the evidence that suits their purposes. There are plenty of places to find their rants. But not here.
We tried to avoid personal attacks or polemics, and just lay out the issues as we see them. However, and not surprisingly given the nature of the current 'discussion', this opened the floodgates. Let's just say that the number of ways that people can find to tell strangers, under cover of anonymity and with such glee, that they are the scum of the earth is impressive. This whole subject merits measured discussion, based on evidence -- and many people have treated it as such, and we have appreciated what they've had to say, and the thoughtful, knowledgeable way they've said it.
But then there's the rest. The internet can be an ugly place. We have chosen not to contribute to that by posting comments that, let's just say, don't move the discussion forward. At present, it's impossible to have a wide-ranging discussion of human variation in any scientific way because the subject has been appropriated by ideologues with either a superficial understanding of the science, or a willingness to pick and choose the evidence that suits their purposes. There are plenty of places to find their rants. But not here.
Friday, June 13, 2014
The pseudo-science of race claims
By
Ken Weiss
For more than a century there have been debates about how many human 'races' there are, that is, categories of people, the assumption being that these are natural categories, or types, of people. Charles Darwin addressed this question in The Descent of Man (Darwin (1871), vol. 1, p. 226), but he was far from the first:
The killing parade: equal opportunity
Few if any group of any size or historical duration has avoided the temptation of energized hate-filled oppression of others. There is usually a piously expressed reason why the victims are categorically guilty of some offense that makes them inherently unworthy.
In the course of a resurgence of categorical racism and genetic destiny-worship, expressed in feigned dispassionate discussion about "why can't we revel in human genomic diversity?", what quickly appears is the claim that modern genomic science 'really' shows us truth (uncomfortable though it may be to you). We immediately started seeing internet hate traffic saying that those who suggest that environment has something to do with racial traits are [fill-in-the-blank], meaning stupid and ignorant and worse. Invoking environment as a cause of human variation, those chatterati say, willfully and in the name of political correctness, ignores the underlying genomic truth, and one quickly sees that that means those guys really are inferior to these guys (usually meaning the speaker's clan), the inferiority is inherent to their category--and especial attention is usually paid to behaviorally sensitive traits, like intelligence.
We have seen it alleged that those who deny the existence of races as genetic categories will be the cause of many deaths in minority populations, because by denying that there are traits that may be distinguished by asking people to identify their 'race', they will be deprived of needed genomic health care. Instead, the opposite is true: people would be better off if treated as individuals with their unique genomic and cultural context, than as categories within which we know there is considerable variation (a topic we've also recently discussed). And of course this accusation ignores the facts that it's going to be a long time 1) before genomic medicine is a major part of health care, 2) that many pushing race-specific medical treatment are gaming the patent system for drugs they sell, and 3) that it will be even longer before it's available to anyone but the rich who don't proportionately represent all the 'races' in the population.
The idea that race exists as a genetic but not a social construct is advocated, despite such obvious facts as that people with 'race'-mixed parents are assigned to one or the other parental 'race'. Even more, the accusation is made that reality deniers object to genetic classification of races because they deny the existence of race at all. This is an awful, and often awfully intentional, misperception. A person's identity involves far more, and far stronger, cultural than genetic factors, and thus 'race' is very and truly meaningful to many people. Social standing, opportunities, legal rights, and discrimination are manifest aspects of what most people mean by 'race'.
This aspect of race is clearly a sociocultural fact, a fact of the world worthy of scientific study--even if it does not imply or is caused by race as a genomic category of nature. People have been gassed and lynched and denied opportunity or basic rights in large numbers not because of their genomes, but because of their cultural category; you can't get more real than that. One need not pretend that race categories don't exist, but can insist that by and large they are culturally based constructs that are only partly, and even inconsistently, determined by physical (or genetic) traits. The consequences are an undeniable aspect of the factual reality of 'race'; in that sense race, as categories, certainly exist.
We have also seen, in the gurgling internet hate traffic, assertions that some Jewish critics of 'human biodiversity' oppose racial determinism because they are Jewish (and, incidentally, liberals), while the authors of a lot of the hate discussion are not themselves Jewish. This is rather far off the wall. The current batch of race authors, though not Jewish, actually claim that Jews are genomically superior to other races when it comes to intelligence (because they were selected for money-lending). From that point of view, Jews should be eagerly embracing the new racism bestowed upon them by non-Jewish authors! Indeed, we have several times had Jewish colleagues sidle up, quietly, and ask sotto voce whether we don't think, as geneticists, that though one can't say it out loud, Jews really are genetically smarter. Or whether we'd have to agree, though we couldn't say that out loud either, that there was something genetically wrong with Arabs.
The images we show above are intended to remind readers that the treatment of others as being inferior or unworthy, as a group, which justifies doing the most awful things to them, is rather widespread, with a wide range of ideological rationales, including 'science'. It's humans ganging up on other humans for a whole panoply of emotionally self-reinforcing reasons. Since Darwin, it has often been asserted that the inherent value differences of groups are Evolution's will rather than God's, but the commonality is that the judgment is always credited to some external and hence objective force relative to the denigrating speaker, and applies to purported group characteristics.
There is misunderstanding galore about how human genomic variation is distributed around the world, how it got that way, and how an individuals' genomes, cultural and physical environmental circumstances affect their traits. There is a culpable willingness to ignore the complexities as well as the human sensitivities about all of this. Some traits are more clearly 'genetic' and others more 'environmental', a topic we've recently discussed. But the recent delving into complex traits, especially behavioral ones with societal and emotional content, has gone right off the deep end, after which serious, measured scientific discussion no longer takes place and, sadly, otherwise sub rosa racism and policy objectives quickly float to the surface (justified in the name of objective truth).
The facts of human variation are sometimes uncomfortable, sometimes deal with things that can't easily be changed (like skin color or cystic fibrosis), as well as things that change so fast that clearly the cultural environment is largely responsible. The facts do not need artificial categories when more accurate, more quantitative analysis can be carried out without doing what is often hateful violation to reality. But people like the emotional side of hatred.
Thinking about the facts of the world is very difficult and there are often no easy answers to scientific questions. It's a whole lot easier to jump on a bandwagon that offers you thought-free reinforcement of your own personal value 'category', and whips up tribal animus towards others of a different view. 'They' become objects, things to which you can do whatever with impunity, because they are inherently inferior....just like animals.
Hating is more fun, more energizing, and a lot easier than thinking.
Man has been studied more carefully than any other organic being, and yet there is the greatest possible diversity amongst capable judges whether he should be classified as a single species or race, or as two (Virey), as three (Jacquinot), as four (Kant), five (Blumenbach), six (Buffon), seven (Hunter), eight (Agassiz), eleven (Pickering), fifteen (Bory St. Vincent), sixteen (Desmoulins), twenty-two (Morton), sixty (Crawford), or as sixty-three, according to Burke.In numerous recent posts, we have tried to examine the nature of the genetic arguments, showing why people don't in fact fall into such categories and that there can be much more scientifically accurate and politically less loaded ways to view human variation. We have pointed out the obvious fact that 'race' is a concept defined by people, and in that sense is a sociocultural construct. But we have also pointed out that humans do vary geographically for evolutionary genomic as well as cultural and historical reasons, and to deny those elements of difference is equally wrong. The subtleties and nuances of the facts that we actually know are harder to deal with. Categorizing is easy, it can have emotional satisfaction ('us' vs 'them'). And its much easier than actual thinking. But history shows its toll.
The killing parade: equal opportunity
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| Equal opportunity haters: Brownshirts, Crusaders, Kulaks, Jihadis, Southern gentlemen, Kristallnacht, Mao's bourgeois enemies, Palestinian life, Rwanda (as best I can identify using Google images). |
Few if any group of any size or historical duration has avoided the temptation of energized hate-filled oppression of others. There is usually a piously expressed reason why the victims are categorically guilty of some offense that makes them inherently unworthy.
In the course of a resurgence of categorical racism and genetic destiny-worship, expressed in feigned dispassionate discussion about "why can't we revel in human genomic diversity?", what quickly appears is the claim that modern genomic science 'really' shows us truth (uncomfortable though it may be to you). We immediately started seeing internet hate traffic saying that those who suggest that environment has something to do with racial traits are [fill-in-the-blank], meaning stupid and ignorant and worse. Invoking environment as a cause of human variation, those chatterati say, willfully and in the name of political correctness, ignores the underlying genomic truth, and one quickly sees that that means those guys really are inferior to these guys (usually meaning the speaker's clan), the inferiority is inherent to their category--and especial attention is usually paid to behaviorally sensitive traits, like intelligence.
We have seen it alleged that those who deny the existence of races as genetic categories will be the cause of many deaths in minority populations, because by denying that there are traits that may be distinguished by asking people to identify their 'race', they will be deprived of needed genomic health care. Instead, the opposite is true: people would be better off if treated as individuals with their unique genomic and cultural context, than as categories within which we know there is considerable variation (a topic we've also recently discussed). And of course this accusation ignores the facts that it's going to be a long time 1) before genomic medicine is a major part of health care, 2) that many pushing race-specific medical treatment are gaming the patent system for drugs they sell, and 3) that it will be even longer before it's available to anyone but the rich who don't proportionately represent all the 'races' in the population.
The idea that race exists as a genetic but not a social construct is advocated, despite such obvious facts as that people with 'race'-mixed parents are assigned to one or the other parental 'race'. Even more, the accusation is made that reality deniers object to genetic classification of races because they deny the existence of race at all. This is an awful, and often awfully intentional, misperception. A person's identity involves far more, and far stronger, cultural than genetic factors, and thus 'race' is very and truly meaningful to many people. Social standing, opportunities, legal rights, and discrimination are manifest aspects of what most people mean by 'race'.
This aspect of race is clearly a sociocultural fact, a fact of the world worthy of scientific study--even if it does not imply or is caused by race as a genomic category of nature. People have been gassed and lynched and denied opportunity or basic rights in large numbers not because of their genomes, but because of their cultural category; you can't get more real than that. One need not pretend that race categories don't exist, but can insist that by and large they are culturally based constructs that are only partly, and even inconsistently, determined by physical (or genetic) traits. The consequences are an undeniable aspect of the factual reality of 'race'; in that sense race, as categories, certainly exist.
We have also seen, in the gurgling internet hate traffic, assertions that some Jewish critics of 'human biodiversity' oppose racial determinism because they are Jewish (and, incidentally, liberals), while the authors of a lot of the hate discussion are not themselves Jewish. This is rather far off the wall. The current batch of race authors, though not Jewish, actually claim that Jews are genomically superior to other races when it comes to intelligence (because they were selected for money-lending). From that point of view, Jews should be eagerly embracing the new racism bestowed upon them by non-Jewish authors! Indeed, we have several times had Jewish colleagues sidle up, quietly, and ask sotto voce whether we don't think, as geneticists, that though one can't say it out loud, Jews really are genetically smarter. Or whether we'd have to agree, though we couldn't say that out loud either, that there was something genetically wrong with Arabs.
The images we show above are intended to remind readers that the treatment of others as being inferior or unworthy, as a group, which justifies doing the most awful things to them, is rather widespread, with a wide range of ideological rationales, including 'science'. It's humans ganging up on other humans for a whole panoply of emotionally self-reinforcing reasons. Since Darwin, it has often been asserted that the inherent value differences of groups are Evolution's will rather than God's, but the commonality is that the judgment is always credited to some external and hence objective force relative to the denigrating speaker, and applies to purported group characteristics.
There is misunderstanding galore about how human genomic variation is distributed around the world, how it got that way, and how an individuals' genomes, cultural and physical environmental circumstances affect their traits. There is a culpable willingness to ignore the complexities as well as the human sensitivities about all of this. Some traits are more clearly 'genetic' and others more 'environmental', a topic we've recently discussed. But the recent delving into complex traits, especially behavioral ones with societal and emotional content, has gone right off the deep end, after which serious, measured scientific discussion no longer takes place and, sadly, otherwise sub rosa racism and policy objectives quickly float to the surface (justified in the name of objective truth).
The facts of human variation are sometimes uncomfortable, sometimes deal with things that can't easily be changed (like skin color or cystic fibrosis), as well as things that change so fast that clearly the cultural environment is largely responsible. The facts do not need artificial categories when more accurate, more quantitative analysis can be carried out without doing what is often hateful violation to reality. But people like the emotional side of hatred.
Thinking about the facts of the world is very difficult and there are often no easy answers to scientific questions. It's a whole lot easier to jump on a bandwagon that offers you thought-free reinforcement of your own personal value 'category', and whips up tribal animus towards others of a different view. 'They' become objects, things to which you can do whatever with impunity, because they are inherently inferior....just like animals.
Hating is more fun, more energizing, and a lot easier than thinking.
Thursday, June 12, 2014
The Big Bu(r)st! Cosmic Microwave Inflation....deflates
By
Ken Weiss
If a WorldView commentary by Paul Steinhardt, a Princeton physicist, in the June 5 issue of Nature is more reliable than much of what we find in Nature, the Big Story of the Big Bang was a Big Bust. Remember the piece in the March 17 issue reporting that "Astronomers have peered back to nearly the dawn of time and found what seems to be the long-sought ‘smoking gun’ for the theory that the Universe underwent a spurt of wrenching, exponential growth called inflation during the first tiny fraction of a second of its existence"? Well, it turns out that this may not be true after all. Or at least it's still being debated, as another Nature commentary in the same issue describes. The announced result, which Steinhardt writes influenced academic appointments and decisions on paper publications, funding, and the like, was apparently, he says, just a misinterpretation of the data, but forthcoming papers will carry on the discussion.
We personally know as little about cosmological physics as some people think we know about genetics, but even so we venture to say that (as the Commentary author pointed out) the treatment of the original report by the news media, and hence also by the reporting scientists, shows a lot about the (sorry) state of an important aspect of science today: it is too much about advertising and too little about science.
In essence, if we look in all directions at the cosmic radiation we can detect reaching our area of space, it is very even--not very clumpy. In a generic big bang theory, the space splatter that happened at the very beginning will eventually be brought by gravity back to its origin, with lots of clumps of matter (galaxies and the like) in the process. But while there are on the order of 100 billion galaxies with about 100 billion stars each, plus lots of other rocks and matter and energy out there, and lots more dark matter and energy, everything is distributed far more uniformly throughout space than one might have expected.
But if, as Alan Guth suggested in the 1980s with his cosmic inflation theory, there was a burst of very rapid expansion way back just after the Big Bang itself, then this 'inflation' should have generated ripples in space-time, which we should detect as irregularities in what is now the cosmic microwave radiation reaching the earth which was reported to reflect, as we understand it, ripples in gravity due to this initial inflation 14 billion years ago.
The report of this finding of cosmic microwave ripples lent support to various aspects of cosmological theory and when breathlessly announced and picked up equally breathlessly by the media, talk of Nobel prizes, astounding discovery about the nature of everything, and so on were trumpeted from the media-tops. Only a little skepticism or reserve was expressed by pundits and other cosmologists, who gushed with praise over this long-awaited report.
The problem is, apparently, that other sources of twisty microwave radiation exist that are unrelated to any early expansion and are more likely to account for the ripples that were reported. There may be nothing inflationary there after all, or if there is something that survives scrutiny it may only be slightly more likely to be due to inflation than to other things.
Forgiving any errors in our above account, which aren't important to our objective, this is how things stand today. We note yet again the role that the media and hype-machinery are playing in today's science. The more important the claim, the more rigorous and extensive should be the evidence for the claim. In this case, the inflation-finding study was not even published when it was announced and picked up with great melodrama by the media.
Suppose one claimed that, after millennia of searching for more than just faith as evidence, s/he had definitive proof of God's existence. For example, claiming that God had five fingers on each of two hands (we are, after all, said to be in his likeness and image) was proved because of how He enumerated the ten commandments. For this claim to be accepted and reported as real, the evidence should be overwhelming, because if true the claim would fundamentally change how many of us view existence itself, and our place in it. Such a truth would merit the most serious reception, as it would replace the less than satisfying "sure and certain hope" with something a bit more reassuring! That someone reports some sort of evidence should not be given a splash, or even much if any mention, in public media. It should be reported in a technical science journal, leading to focused and deliberate consideration, confirmation or elaboration, and so on, before it is accepted and reported as fact that fundamentally changes our worldview.
That might happen had we a more responsibly run, less self-promoting, environment. The inflation-evidence claim would have properly appeared, quietly, in a technical cosmology journal, peer-reviewed, where it could be scrutinized and built into more elaborate theoretical and empirical understanding. It should be given measured acceptance that leads to focused attempts to test, refute, or elaborate it. No big-splash press headlines, no drooling over obvious Nobel prizes, no advertising are merited at this stage. Indeed, the author of the Nature commentary notes the role of hype in the premature inflation announcement, and that, in his view, at least the theory that was supposedly confirmed by the gravitational ripples is untestable, even in principle, whether or not it's consistent with any kind of data one could collect. Nonetheless, the cosmology industry will not tuck its tail between its legs and go on to more effective, even if less expensive, questions that can actually yield believable answers, quietly, and not give them public blare until they are solidly established and really deserve the attention.
Large amounts of funding are manipulated by the current way of doing science. It is hard not to believe that this is intentional on the part of all parties--the proverbial mutual reinforcement society. We know from personal experience that it is this way, quite consciously, in genomics and other biomedical sciences. Grand claims trump quiet, focused research on problems that might help peoples' lives but are not cosmic in scale--there are many such genetic problems that should be solvable. As it is now, rather than careful guardians of the public purse, the funders themselves are part of the hype game, to make sure their portfolios stay full (or are subject to inflation!), an attitude which should not be tolerated. Investigators hungry for funds to support their work sing the song that will get them their supper. Claims and papers are put out, structured, and timed so they can be cited as justification for further funds. We all know we are doing this--'all' except, perhaps, the public who's paying for it. But science should avoid this sort of secret hypocrisy.
A million multiverses don't exist, nor does a cure for cancer, just because some hasty press release says so. Major findings, when really real, deserve all the praise one can give them. Science, actual real results rather than advertising, is interesting enough in itself without needing hype and can be made so to the public, without all the candy wrappers it comes in these days. The world can wait until the evidence is really sufficient. It isn't exactly urgent that we know whether there was cosmic inflation 14 billion years ago. We don't urgently need to identify all genes contributing a fraction of a percent to diabetes risk (far less than the risk reduction by eating better).
Not even the Republican budget-cutters have yet caught on, but if we're lucky, the public will demand it. Funding agencies should be threatened with deep cuts if they don't do their jobs properly, and that would at least possibly frighten scientists into doing more work and less boasting, even if it takes time and major results are more elusive. A more modest way of doing, and reporting, science would be more responsible, and would make our careers more satisfying, especially for new entrants to look forward to. As things are done now, we've built a system in which too many glittering Big Bursts turn into the ashes of Big Busts.
We personally know as little about cosmological physics as some people think we know about genetics, but even so we venture to say that (as the Commentary author pointed out) the treatment of the original report by the news media, and hence also by the reporting scientists, shows a lot about the (sorry) state of an important aspect of science today: it is too much about advertising and too little about science.
In essence, if we look in all directions at the cosmic radiation we can detect reaching our area of space, it is very even--not very clumpy. In a generic big bang theory, the space splatter that happened at the very beginning will eventually be brought by gravity back to its origin, with lots of clumps of matter (galaxies and the like) in the process. But while there are on the order of 100 billion galaxies with about 100 billion stars each, plus lots of other rocks and matter and energy out there, and lots more dark matter and energy, everything is distributed far more uniformly throughout space than one might have expected.
But if, as Alan Guth suggested in the 1980s with his cosmic inflation theory, there was a burst of very rapid expansion way back just after the Big Bang itself, then this 'inflation' should have generated ripples in space-time, which we should detect as irregularities in what is now the cosmic microwave radiation reaching the earth which was reported to reflect, as we understand it, ripples in gravity due to this initial inflation 14 billion years ago.
![]() |
| History of the Universe - gravitational waves are hypothesized to arise from cosmic inflation, a faster-than-lightexpansion just after the Big Bang (17 March 2014). Wikipedia |
The report of this finding of cosmic microwave ripples lent support to various aspects of cosmological theory and when breathlessly announced and picked up equally breathlessly by the media, talk of Nobel prizes, astounding discovery about the nature of everything, and so on were trumpeted from the media-tops. Only a little skepticism or reserve was expressed by pundits and other cosmologists, who gushed with praise over this long-awaited report.
The problem is, apparently, that other sources of twisty microwave radiation exist that are unrelated to any early expansion and are more likely to account for the ripples that were reported. There may be nothing inflationary there after all, or if there is something that survives scrutiny it may only be slightly more likely to be due to inflation than to other things.
Forgiving any errors in our above account, which aren't important to our objective, this is how things stand today. We note yet again the role that the media and hype-machinery are playing in today's science. The more important the claim, the more rigorous and extensive should be the evidence for the claim. In this case, the inflation-finding study was not even published when it was announced and picked up with great melodrama by the media.
Suppose one claimed that, after millennia of searching for more than just faith as evidence, s/he had definitive proof of God's existence. For example, claiming that God had five fingers on each of two hands (we are, after all, said to be in his likeness and image) was proved because of how He enumerated the ten commandments. For this claim to be accepted and reported as real, the evidence should be overwhelming, because if true the claim would fundamentally change how many of us view existence itself, and our place in it. Such a truth would merit the most serious reception, as it would replace the less than satisfying "sure and certain hope" with something a bit more reassuring! That someone reports some sort of evidence should not be given a splash, or even much if any mention, in public media. It should be reported in a technical science journal, leading to focused and deliberate consideration, confirmation or elaboration, and so on, before it is accepted and reported as fact that fundamentally changes our worldview.
That might happen had we a more responsibly run, less self-promoting, environment. The inflation-evidence claim would have properly appeared, quietly, in a technical cosmology journal, peer-reviewed, where it could be scrutinized and built into more elaborate theoretical and empirical understanding. It should be given measured acceptance that leads to focused attempts to test, refute, or elaborate it. No big-splash press headlines, no drooling over obvious Nobel prizes, no advertising are merited at this stage. Indeed, the author of the Nature commentary notes the role of hype in the premature inflation announcement, and that, in his view, at least the theory that was supposedly confirmed by the gravitational ripples is untestable, even in principle, whether or not it's consistent with any kind of data one could collect. Nonetheless, the cosmology industry will not tuck its tail between its legs and go on to more effective, even if less expensive, questions that can actually yield believable answers, quietly, and not give them public blare until they are solidly established and really deserve the attention.
Large amounts of funding are manipulated by the current way of doing science. It is hard not to believe that this is intentional on the part of all parties--the proverbial mutual reinforcement society. We know from personal experience that it is this way, quite consciously, in genomics and other biomedical sciences. Grand claims trump quiet, focused research on problems that might help peoples' lives but are not cosmic in scale--there are many such genetic problems that should be solvable. As it is now, rather than careful guardians of the public purse, the funders themselves are part of the hype game, to make sure their portfolios stay full (or are subject to inflation!), an attitude which should not be tolerated. Investigators hungry for funds to support their work sing the song that will get them their supper. Claims and papers are put out, structured, and timed so they can be cited as justification for further funds. We all know we are doing this--'all' except, perhaps, the public who's paying for it. But science should avoid this sort of secret hypocrisy.
A million multiverses don't exist, nor does a cure for cancer, just because some hasty press release says so. Major findings, when really real, deserve all the praise one can give them. Science, actual real results rather than advertising, is interesting enough in itself without needing hype and can be made so to the public, without all the candy wrappers it comes in these days. The world can wait until the evidence is really sufficient. It isn't exactly urgent that we know whether there was cosmic inflation 14 billion years ago. We don't urgently need to identify all genes contributing a fraction of a percent to diabetes risk (far less than the risk reduction by eating better).
Not even the Republican budget-cutters have yet caught on, but if we're lucky, the public will demand it. Funding agencies should be threatened with deep cuts if they don't do their jobs properly, and that would at least possibly frighten scientists into doing more work and less boasting, even if it takes time and major results are more elusive. A more modest way of doing, and reporting, science would be more responsible, and would make our careers more satisfying, especially for new entrants to look forward to. As things are done now, we've built a system in which too many glittering Big Bursts turn into the ashes of Big Busts.
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