Showing posts with label normal science. Show all posts
Showing posts with label normal science. Show all posts

Saturday, October 6, 2018

And yet it moves....our GWAScopes and Galileo's lesson on reality

In 1633, Galileo Galilei was forced to recant before the Pope his ideas about the movement of the Earth, or else to face the most awful penalty.  As I understand the story, he did recant....but after leaving the Cathedral, he stomped his foot on the ground, and declared "And yet it moves!"  For various reasons, usually reflecting their own selfish vested interests, the powers that be in human society frequently stifle unwelcome truths, truths that would threaten their privileged well-being.  It was nothing new in Galileo's time--and it's still prevalent today.


Galileo: see Wikipedia "And yet it moves"
All human endeavors are in some ways captives of current modes of thinking--world-views, beliefs,  power and economic structures, levels of knowledge, and explanatory frameworks.  Religions and social systems often, or perhaps typically, constrain thinking. They provide comforting answers and explanations, and people feel threatened by those not adhering, not like us in their views.  The rejection of heresy applies far beyond formal religion.  Dissenters or non-believers are part of 'them' rather than 'us', a potential threat, and it is thus common if not natural to distrust, exclude, or even persecute them.

At the same time, the world is as the world really is, especially when it comes to the physical Nature.  And that is the subject of science and scientific knowledge.  We are always limited by current knowledge, of course, and history has shown how deeply that can depend on technology, as Galileo's experience with the telescope exemplifies.

When you look through a telescope . . . . 
In Galileo's time, it was generally thought or perhaps believed is a better word, that the cosmos was God's creation as known by biblical authority.  It was created in the proverbial Genesis way, and the earth--with we humans on it--was the special center of that creation.  The crystal spheres bearing the stars and planets, circled around and ennobled us with their divine light.  In the west, at least, this was not just the view, it was what had (with few exceptions) seemed right since the ancients.

But knowledge is often, if not perhaps always, limited by our senses, and they in turn are limited by our sensory technology.  Here, the classical example is the invention of the telescope, and eventually, what that cranky thinker Galileo saw through it.  Before his time, we had we had our naked eyes to see the sun move, and the stars seemed quite plausibly to be crystal spheres bearing twinkles of light, rotating around us.

If you don't know the story, Wikipedia or many other sources can be consulted. But it was dramatic!  Galileo's experience taught science a revolutionary lesson about reality vs myth and, very directly, about the importance of technology in our understanding of the world we live in.

The lesson from Galileo was that when you look through a telescope you are supposed to change your mind about what is out there in Nature.  The telescope lets you see what's really there--even if it's not what you wanted to see, or thought you'd see, or would be most convenient for you to see.


Galileo's telescope (imagined).  source: news.nationalgeographic.com
From Mendel's eyes to ours
Ever since antiquity, plant and animal breeders empirically knew about inheritance, that is, about the physical similarities between parents and offspring.  Choose parents with the most desirable traits, and their offspring will have those traits, at least, so to speak, on average.  But how does that work?

Mendel heard lectures in Vienna that gave him some notion of the particulate nature of matter.  When, in trying to improve agricultural yields, he noticed discrete differences, he decided do test their nature in pea plants which he knew about and were manageable subjects of experiments to understand the Molecular Laws of Life (my phrase, not his).

Analogies are never perfect, but we might say that Mendel's picking discrete, manageable traits was like pre-Newtonians looking at stars but not at what controlled their motion.  Mendel got an idea of how parents and offspring could resemble each other in distinct traits.   In a similar way that a telescope was the instrument that allowed Galileo to see the cosmos better, and do more observing than guessing, geneticists got their Galilean equivalent, in genomewide mapping (GWAS), which allowed us to do less guessing about inheritance and to see it better.  We got our GWAScope!

But what have we done with our new toy?   We have been mesmerized by gene-gazing.  Like Galileo's contemporaries who, finally accepting that what he saw really was there and not just an artifact of the new instrument, gazed through their telescopes and listed off this and that finding, we are on a grand scale just enumerating, enumerating, and enumerating.  We even boast about it.  We build our careers on it.

That me-too effort is not surprising nor unprecedented.  But it is also become what Kuhn called 'normal science'.  It is butting our heads upon a wall.  It is doing more and more of the same, without realizing that what we see is what's there, but we're not explaining it.  From early in the 20th century we had quantitative genetics theory--the theory that agricultural breeders have used in formal ways for that century, making traditional breeding that had been around since the discovery of agriculture, more formalized and empirically rigorous.  But we didn't have the direct genetic 'proof' that the theory was correct.  Now we do, and we have it in spades.

We are spinning wheels and spending wealth on simple gene-gazing.  It's time, it's high time, for some new insight to take us beyond what our GWAScopes can see, digesting and understanding what our gene-gazing has clearly shown.

Unfortunately, at present we have an 'omics Establishment that is as entrenched, for reasons we've often discussed here on MT, as the Church was for explanations of Truth in Galileo's time.  It is now time for us to go beyond gene-gazing.  GWAScopes have given us the insight--but who will have the insight to lead the way?

Monday, August 1, 2016

FAS - Fishy Association Studies

           
                                  On Saturday, July 19, 1879, the brilliant opera 
                                  composer, Richard Wagner, "had a bad night; 
                                  he thinks that...he ate too much trout."  
                                             Quoted from Cosima Wagner's Diary, Vol. II, 1878-83.

As I was reading Cosima Wagner's doting diary of life with her famous husband, I chanced across the above quote that seemed an appropriate, if snarky, way to frame today's post. The incident she related exemplifies how we routinely assign causation even to one-off events in daily life. Science, on the other hand, purports to be about causation of a deeper sort, with some sufficient form of regularity or replicability.

Cause and effect can be elusive concepts, especially difficult to winnow out from observations in the complex living world.  We've hammered on about this on MT over the years.  The best science at least tries to collect adequate evidence in order to infer causation in credible rather than casual ways. There are, for example, likely to be lots of reasons, other than eating trout, that could explain why a cranky genius like Wagner had a bad night.  It is all too easy to over-interpret associations in causal terms.










By such thinking, the above figures (from Wikimedia commons) might be interpreted as having the following predictive power:
     One fish = bad night
     Two fish = total insomnia
     Many fish = hours of nightmarish dissonance called Tristan und Isolde!

Too often, we salivate over GWAS (genomewide association studies) results as if they justify ever-bigger and longer studies.  But equally too often, these are FAS, fishy association studies.  That is what we get when the science community doesn't pay heed to the serious and often fundamental difficulties in determining causation that may well undermine their findings and the advice so blithely proffered to the public.

We are not the only ones who have been writing that the current enumerative, 'Big Data', approach to biomedical and even behavior genetic causation leaves, to say the least, much to be desired.  Among other issues, there's too much asserting conclusions on inadequate evidence, and not enough recognition of when assertions are effectively not that much more robust than saying one 'ate too much trout'.  Weak statistical associations, so typically the result of these association studies, are not the same as demonstrations of causation.

The idea of mapping complex traits by huge genomewide case-control or population sample studies is a captivating one for biomedical researchers.  It's mechanical, perfectly designed to be done by huge computer database analysis by people who may never have seen the inside of a wet lab (e.g., programmers and 'informatics' or statistical specialists who have little serious critical understanding of the underlying biology).  It's often largely thought-free, because that makes the results safe to publish, safe for getting more grants, and so on; but more than being 'captivating' it is 'capturing'.... a hog-trough's share of research resources.

The promise, not even always carefully hedged with escape-words lest it be shown to be wrong, is that from your genome your future biomedical (and behavioral) traits can be known.  A recent article in the July 28 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Joyner et al. describes the stubborn persistence of under-performing but costly research that becomes entrenched, a perpetuation that NIH's misnomered 'precision based genomic medicine' continues or even expands upon. Below is our riff on the article, but it's open-source so you can read the points they make and judge for yourself if we have the right 'take' on what they say.  It is one of many articles that have been making similar points....in case anyone is listening.

The problem is complex causation
The underlying basic problem is the complex nature of causation of 'complex' traits, like many if not most behavioral or chronic or late-onset diseases. The word complex, long-used for such traits, refers not to identified causes but to the fact that the outcomes clearly did not have simple, identified causes.  It seemed clear that their causation was due mainly to countless combinations of many individually small causal factors, some of which were inherited; but the specifics were usually unknown. Computer and various DNA technologies made it possible, in principle, to identify and sort through huge numbers of possible causes or at least statistically associated factors, including DNA sequence variants.  But underlying this source for this approach has been the idea, always a myth really, that identifying some enumerated set of causes in a statistical sample would allow accurate prediction of outcomes.  This has proven not to be the case nearly as generally as has been promised.

To me, the push to do large-scale huge-sample, survey-based genomewide risk analysis was at least partly justified, at least in principle, years ago when there might have been some doubt about the nature of the causal biology underlying complex traits, including the increasingly common chronic disease problems that our aging population faces.  But the results are in, and in fact have been in for quite a long time.  Moreover, and a credit to the validity of the science, is that the results support what we had good reason to know for a long time.  The results show that this approach is not, or at least clearly no longer the optimal way to do science in this area or contribute to improving public health (and much of the same applies to evolutionary biology as well).

I think it fair to say that I was making these points, in print, in prominent places, starting as long ago as nearly 30 years, in books and journal articles (and more recently here on MT), that is, ever since the relevant actual data were beginning to appear.  But neither I nor my collaborators were the original discoverers of this insight: instead, the basic truth has been known in principle and in many empirical experimental (such as agricultural breeding) and observational contexts, for nearly a century! Struggling with the inheritance of causal elements ('genes' as they were generically known), the 1930s' 'modern synthesis' of evolutionary biology reconciled (1) Darwin's idea of gradual evolution, mainly of quantitative traits, with the experimental evidence of the quantitative nature of their inheritance, and (2) the discrete nature of inheritance of discrete causal elements first systematically demonstrated by Mendel for selected 2-state traits.  That was a powerful understanding but in too many ways it has thoughtlessly been taken to imply that all traits, not just genes, are usefully 'Mendelian', due to substantial, enumerable, strongly causal genetic agents.  That has always been the exception, not the rule.

A view is possible that is not wholly cynical 
We have been outspoken about the sociocultural aspect of modern research, which can be understood by what one might call the FTM (Follow the Money) approach, in some ways a better way to understand where we are than looking at the science itself.  Who has what to gain by the current approaches?  Our understanding is aided by realizing that the science is presented to us by scientists and journalists, supplier industries and bureaucrats, who have vested interests that are served by promoting that way of doing business.

FTM isn't the only useful perspective, however.  A less cynical, and yet still appropriate way to look at this is in terms of diminishing returns.  The investment in the current way of doing science in this (and other areas) is part of our culture.  From a scientific point of view, the first forays into a new way or approach, or a theoretical idea, yield quick and, by definition, new results.  Eventually, it becomes more routine and the per-study yield diminishes. We asymptotically approach what we can glean from the approach.  Eventually some chance insight will yield some forms of better and more powerful approaches, whatever they'll be.

If current approaches were just yielding low-cost incremental gain, or were being done in well-off investigators' basement labs, it would be a normal course of scientific-history, and nobody would have reason to complain.  But that isn't how it works these days.  These days understanding via FTM is important: the science establishment's hands are in all our pockets, and we should expect more in return than the satisfaction that the trough has been feeding many very nice careers (including mine), in universities, journalism, and so on.  How, when, and where a properly increased expectation of science for societal benefits will be fulfilled is not predictable, because facts are elusive and Nature often opaque.  However, simply more-of-the-same, at its current costs, with continuing entrenched justification, isn't the best way for public resources to be used.

There will always be a place for 'big data' resources.  A unified system of online biomedical records would save a lot of excess repeat-testing and other clinical costs, if every doctor you consult could access those records.  The records could potentially be used for research purposes, to the (limited) extent that they could be informative.  For a variety of conditions that would be very useful and cost-effective indeed; but most of those would be relatively rare.

Continuing to pour research funds into the idea that ever more 'data' will lead to dramatic improvements of 'precision' medicine is far more about the health of entrenched university labs and investigators than that of the general citizenry. Focused laboratory work that is more rigorously supported by theory or definitive experiment, with some accountability (but no expectations nor promises of miracles) is in order, given what the GWAS etc. era, plus a century of evolutionary genetics, has shown. There are countless areas, especially many serious early onset diseases, for which we have a focused, persuasive, meaningful understanding of causation and where resources should now be invested more heavily.

Intentionally open-ended beetle collecting ventures joined at the hip to promises of 'precision' without those promising even knowing what that word means (but hinting that it means 'perfection'), or glorifying the occasional seriously good findings as if they are typical or as though more focussed, less open-ended research wouldn't be a better investment, is not a legitimate approach.  Yet that is largely what is going on today.  The scientists, at least the smart ones, know this very well and say so (in confidence, of course).

Understanding complex causation is complex, and we have to face up to that.  We can't demand inexpensive or instant or even predictable answers.  These are inconvenient facts few want to face up to.  But we and others have said this ad nauseam before, so here we wanted to point out the current JAMA paper as yet another formal and prominently published realization of the costly inertia in which we are embedded, and by highly capable authors. In any aspect of society, not just science, prying resources loose from the hands of a small elite is never easy, even when there are other ways to use those resources that might have better payoff for all of us.

Usually, such resource reallocation seems to require some major new and imminent external threat, or some unpredicted discovery, which I think is far more likely to come from some smaller operation where thinking was more important than cranking out yet another mass-scale statistical survey of Big Data sausage.  Still, every push against wasteful inertia, like the Joyner et al. JAMA paper,  helps. Indeed, those many whose careers are entrapped by that part of the System have the skills and neuronal power to do something better if circumstances enabled it to happen more readily.  To encourage that, perhaps we should stop paying so much attention to Fishy stories.

Wednesday, September 24, 2014

What are scientific 'revolutions'? Part II: Qualitative paradigm adjustments

As we described yesterday, when scientists are doing what Thomas Kuhn referred to as 'normal' science, we are working within a given theoretical framework--or 'paradigm' as he called it--and using new technologies, data, and approaches to refine our understanding of Nature in terms of that framework. In biology now, normal science is couched within the evolutionary framework, the acceptance of descent with modification from a common ancestor.  We might tweak our views about the importance of natural selection vs drift, say, but that doesn't change the paradigm.

But there are energetic, and sometimes fierce discussions about just how we should go about doing our work. These discussions often involve the basic statistical methods on which our inferences lie.  We've talked about the statistical aspects of life science in numerous past posts. Today, I want to write about an aspect that relates to notions of 'revolution' in science, or what Kuhn called paradigm shifts.  What follows is my own view, not necessarily that of anybody else (including the late Kuhn).

xkcd

For many if not most aspects of modern science, we express basic truths mathematically in terms of some parameters.  These include values such as Newton's gravitational constant and any number of basically fixed values for atomic properties and interactions.  Such parameters of Nature are not known with perfect precision, but they are assumed to have some universally fixed value, which is estimated by various methods.  The better the method or data, the closer the estimate is held to be, relative to the true value.  Good science is assumed to approach such values asymptotically, even if we can never reach that value without any error or misestimation.

This is not the same as showing that the value is 'true', or that the underlying theory that asserts there is such a value is true.  Most statistical tests evaluate data relative to some assumed truth or property of truth, or some optimizing criterion given our assumptions about what's going on, but many scientists think that viewing results this way is a conceptual mistake.  They argue that our knowledge leads only to some degree of confidence, a subjective feeling, about an interpretation of Nature. Using approaches generally referred to as 'Bayesian', it's argued that all we can really do is refine our choice of properties of nature that we have most confidence in.  They rarely use the terms 'belief' or 'faith' in the preferred explanation, because 'confidence' carries a stronger sense of an acceptance that can be systematically changed.  The difference between Bayesian approaches and purely subjective hunches about Nature is that Bayesian approaches have a rigorous and in that sense highly objective format.

This comes from a famous rearrangement of a basic fact of probabilities, credited to Thomas Bayes. It is a rearrangement of basic laws of probability, and it goes like this:

     p(Hypothesis|Evidence) = p(Evidence|Hypothesis) p(Hypothesis) / p(Evidence)

This says that the probability of some Hypothesis we may be interested in is equal to the probability of that evidence E if the Hypothesis were truly true, times the probability that we have in mind for the Hypothesis, all divided by the overall probability of the Evidence; that is, there must be a lot of ways that the Evidence might arise (or we'd already know our Hypothesis was true!), so you sum up the probaiblity of the data if H is true (weighted by your prior probability that it is, and separately the probability of the data if an alternative to H is true weighted by the probability of its not being true. It's somewhat elusive, but here's an oversimplified example:

Suppose we believe that a coin is fair. But there's a chance that it isn't.  In advance of doing any coin-flipping, we might express our lack of knowledge by saying the chance that the coin is fair is, say, 50%, since we have no way to actually know if it is or isn't.  But now we flip the coin some number of times.  If it's fair, the probability of it coming up Heads equals 50%, or p(H) = 0.5 per flip.  But suppose we observe 60% Heads.  A fair coin could yield such results and we can calculate the probability of that happening.  But an unfair coin could also generate such a result.

For simplicity, let's say we observe HHHTT.  For a fair coin, with p(H) = 1/2, the probability of this result is (1/2)(1/2)(1/2)(1/2)(1/2)(1/2) = 0.0312, but if the coin is unfair in a way that yields 60% Heads, the probability of this result is (0.6)(0.6)(0.6)(0.4)(0.4) = 0.035.  Using the formula above, the probability that the coin is fair actually drops from 50% to about 31%: we're less confident about the coin's fairness. If we kept flipping and getting such results, that value would continue dropping, as we became less confident that it's fair and increasingly confident that its true probability of Heads was 0.6 instead of 0.5.  We might also ask if the probability of it being fair is, say, zero, or 1/8, or 0.122467--that is, we can test any value between zero (no chance it's fair) to 1.0 (completely sure it's fair).

The basic idea is that we have some prior reason, or probability (p(H)) that the Hypothesis is true and we gather some new Evidence to evaluate that probability, and we adjust it in light of the new Evidence.  The adjusted value is called the posterior (to the new data) probability of the Hypothesis, and Bayes' theorem provides a way to make that adjustment.  Since we assume that something must be true, Bayes' formula provides a systematic way to change what we believe about competing explanations.  That is, our prior probability is less than 1.0 (certainty of our Hypothesis) which implies that there are other hypotheses that might be true instead.  The use of Bayes' theorem adjusts our confidence in our specified Hypothesis, but doesn't say or show that it is true.  Advocates of a Bayesian approach argue that this is the reality we must accept, and that Bayesian approaches tell us how to get a best estimate based on current knowledge.  It's always possible that we're not approaching truth in any absolute sense.  

A key aspect of the Bayesian view of knowledge is that the explanation is about the probability of the data arising if our preferred explanation is true, accepting that it might or might not be.  It assigns quantitative criteria for alternative explanations whose relative probability can be expressed--that is, the set of possible hypotheses each have a probability (a value between zero and 1),  and their sum exhausts all possibilities (just as Heads and Tails exhaust the possible flip outcomes, or a coin must either be fair or not-fair).

OK, OK so what does this have to do with scientific 'revolutions'?
The basic idea of Bayesian analysis is that it provides a technically rigorous way to express subjective confidence in a scientific context.  It provides a means to use increasing amounts of data to adjust the level of confidence we assign to competing hypotheses, and identify the Hypothesis that we prefer.

This is a good way to express confidence rather than a yes-no illusion of ultimate truth, and has found widespread use.  However, its use does depend on whether the various aspects of experiments and hypothesis can adequately be expressed in probabilistic terms that accurately reflect how the real world is--and, for example, important causal components may be missing, or the range of possibilities may not be expressible in terms of probability distributions.

I am by no means an expert, but a leading proponent of Bayesian approaches, the late ET Jaynes, said this in his classical text on the subject (Probability Theory, Cambridge Press, 2003):
Before Bayesian methods can be used, a problem must be developed beyond the 'exploratory phase' to the point where he it has enough structure to determine all the needed apparatus (a model, sample space, hypothesis space prior probabilities, sampling distribution).
This captures the relevant point for me here, in the context of the idea of scientific revolutions or paradigm shifts.  I acknowledge that in my personal view, and this is about philosophy of inference, such terms should be used only for what is perhaps their original reference, the major and stunning changes like the Darwinian revolution, and not the more pedestrian applications of everyday scientific life that are nonetheless casually referred to as revolutions.

These issues are (hotly) debated, but I feel we should make a distinction between scientific refinement and scientific revolutions.  To me, Bayesian analysis is a systematic way to refine a numerical estimate of the relative probability of an idea about Nature compared to other ideas that could be correct.  The prior probability of the best of these alternatives should asymptotically with increased amounts of data (as schematically shown in the figure below), unless something's wrong with the  conceptualization of the problem.  I think this is conceptually very different from having a given scientific 'paradigm' replace another with which it is incommensurable.   



Where it's useful, Bayesian analysis is about altered ideas among what are clearly commensurable hypotheses--based on different values of the same parameters. Usually, the alternative hypotheses are not very different, in fact, so that for example, a coin has some bias in its probability of Heads, ranging from no-chance to fair (50%) to inevitable; but assuming such things as that the flips are all done the same way and the results generated by flipping are probabilistic by nature.

In my view, Bayesian analysis is a good way to work through issues within a given theoretical framework, or paradigm, and it has many strong and persuasive advocates.  But is not a way to achieve a scientific revolution nor does it reflect one.  Sometimes the idea is used rather casually, as if formal Bayesian analysis can adjudicate between truly incomparable ideas; there, to me, we simply must rely on our subjective evaluations. One can't, of course, predict when or even whether a truly revolutionary change--a paradigm shift, if you will--will occur, or even if such is needed.

Ptolemaic epicycles added accuracy to the predictions of planetary motion, at the price of being cumbersome.  One could have applied Bayesian analysis to the problem at the time, had the method been available.  The Copernican revolution changed the basic structure of the underlying notion of what was going on.  One might perhaps construct Bayesian analysis that would evaluate the differences by somehow expressing planetary positions in probabilistic terms in both systems and allow one to pick a preference, but I think this would be rather forced--and, most importantly, a post hoc way to evaluate things (that is, only after we have both models to compare).  In fact, in this case one wouldn't really say one view was true and the other not--they are different ways of describing the same motions of bodies moving around in space relative to each other, and the decision of how to model that is essentially one of mathematical convenience.

I think the situation is much clearer in biology.  Creationist ideas about when and where species were created or how they related to each other in terms of what was called the Great Chain of Being, could have been adjusted by Bayesian approaches as, for example, the dates of fossils being discovered could refine estimates of when God created the species involved.  But Bayesian analysis is inappropriate for deciding whether creationism or evolution is the best hypothesis for accounting for life's diversity in the first place.  The choice in both approaches would be a subjective one, but without artificial contortions the two hypotheses are not probabilistic alternatives in a very meaningful sense. That's what incommensurability, which applies in this case I think, implies.  You can't very meaningfully assign a 'probability' to whether creationism or evolution is true, even if the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the latter.

Current approaches
These posts express my view of the subject of scientific theory, after decades of working in science during periods of huge changes in knowledge and technology.  I don't think that scientific revolutions are changes in prior probabilities, even if they may reflect them, but are more and different from that.  From this viewpoint, advocates for Bayesian analysis in genomics are refining, but not challenging the basic explanatory framework at all.  One often hears talk of paradigm shifts and use of similar 'revolution' rhetoric, but basically what is happening is just scaling up our current "normal science", because we know how to do that, not necessarily because it's a satisfactory paradigm about life.  And there are many reasons why that is what people normally do, more or less as Kuhn described.  I don't think our basic understanding of the logic of evolution or genetics has changed since I was a graduate student decades ago, even if our definition of a gene, or modes of gene frequency change, or our understanding of mechanisms have been augmented in major ways.

It is of course possible that our current theory of, say genomic causes of disease, is truly true, and what we need to do is refine its precision.  This is, after all, what the great Big Data advocacy asserts: we are on the right track and if you just give us more and more DNA sequence data we'll get there, at least asymptotically.  Some advocate Bayesian approaches to this task, while others use a variety of different statistical criteria for making inferences.

Is this attitude right for what we know of genomics and evolution?  Or is there reason to think that current "normal science" is pushing up against a limit and only a true conceptual revolution, one essentially incommensurate with, or not expressible in the terms of, our current models? In past posts, we've suggested numerous reasons why we think current modes of thought are inadequate.

It's all too easy to speak of scientific revolutions (or to claim, with excitement, that one is in the midst of creating one if only s/he can have bigger grants, which is in fact how this is usually expressed).  It's much harder to find the path to a real conceptual revolution.

Friday, December 13, 2013

Hippocrates knew it. Galen knew it. EVERYBODY knows it! (So why are we still paying for research on it?)

It is totally fair to say that everybody knows that exercise is good for you, and overindulgence isn't.  Not all the details are known and they probably change over time and place, because there are various ways to exercise and various ways to eat, drink, and be merry.

But around 400 BC Hippocrates (whoever he/they was/were) clearly observed, knew, and stated that moderation in all things is good for health and longevity, and that exercise is part of that.  500 years later (yet still 2000 years ago), Galen was also very clear about the same points, and this from his own very extensive observation.  Yes!  "Evidence-based medicine" isn't new!

Hippocrates; Rubens engraving; Wikipedia

If we could give every individual the right amount of nourishment and exercise, not too little and not too much, we would have found the safest way to health. 
Eating alone will not keep a man well; he must also take exercise.                   -Hippocrates

And, Galen's view, as described by Jack Berryman in "Motion and rest: Galen on exercise and health" (The Lancet, vol 380:9838, pp 210-11):
Galen (c 129—210 AD), who borrowed much from Hippocrates, structured his medical “theory” upon the “naturals” (of, or with nature—physiology), the “non-naturals” (things not innate—health), and the “contra-naturals” (against nature—pathology). Central to Galen's theory was hygiene (named after the goddess of health Hygieia) and the uses and abuses of Galen's “six things non-natural”. Galen's theory was underpinned by six factors external to the body over which a person had some control: air and environment; food (diet) and drink; sleep and wake; motion (exercise) and rest; retention and evacuation; and passions of the mind (emotions). Galen proposed that these factors should be used in moderation since too much or too little would put the body in imbalance and lead to disease or illness.
Galen; Wikipedia
So, if we all already know this, and have known it for millennia, why are we as societies still paying for researchers to design even more studies so they could show this yet again, and again, and again, and...?  The latest instance is covered in a recent NY Times story reporting a study published in the British Medical Journal in October ("Comparative effectiveness of exercise and drug interventions on mortality outcomes: metaepidemiological study", Naci and Ioannidis, BMJ 2013:347).

The authors looked at studies of the effect of exercise on mortality from heart disease, chronic heart failure, stroke or diabetes and found that exercise was either as good as the standard drug treatment or better, except in the case of chronic heart failure.  The results show that exercise can be very effective, although medicine is the usual treatment prescribed (naturally).   
The results also underscore how infrequently exercise is considered or studied as a medical intervention, Dr. Ioannidis said. “Only 5 percent” of the available and relevant experiments in his new analysis involved exercise. “We need far more information” about how exercise compares, head to head, with drugs in the treatment of many conditions, he said, as well as what types and amounts of exercise confer the most benefit and whether there are side effects, such as injuries. Ideally, he said, pharmaceutical companies would set aside a tiny fraction of their profits for such studies.
But he is not optimistic that such funding will materialize, without widespread public pressure.
The bottom line is that we already know exercise is good for you, don't we?**  It is problematic that we yet need 'far more information', the usual researcher's plaint.  How many details do we need to know about, already knowing that they are largely ephemeral, when there are actual serious unanswered disease questions that we might study?  If half or more of diseases are in a sense treatable, preventable, or delayable with exercise rather than drugs, MRIs and CAT scans, surgery or other approaches, then why do we still allow doctors to meddle as much as they do?  Why do we still have to spend public funds, essentially to feed schools of public health, to keep on doing what are essentially retreads of the same old studies (with fancier and costlier statistical packages and other exciting technologies to make us seem wise and innovatively insightful)--when there are real, devastating disease problems with real unknowns that could be addressed more intensely? 

This is not to mention how much disease would be reduced if we had the societal guts to address poverty.  Real unsolved disease problems may be harder to design studies to understand, actually requiring new thinking rather than just designing some new sampling and questionnaires and the like.  But at least it would be a more real kind of 'research'.

One answer is that this is how the system, and what is basically its rote means of self-perpetuation works.  Science is a social phenomenon not just an objective one.  An institutionalized system doesn't insist on moving beyond essentially safe problems that we have a sufficient knowledge of, to face up to ones we don't yet understand.  That's riskier for professors needing salaries and publications, and administrators needing the overhead funding.  It's part of the fat in the system.

And fat, as we've known since Hippocrates, isn't good for you!


** Actually, despite this post, no, we don't really know this that quite as clearly as you might think!  We do certainly have lots of good mechanistic and physiological reasons why exercise is good, but some fraction of the association of exercise with health may be due to confounding: those who exercise are already healthier than average, or know or care more bout health, or they wouldn't do it (e.g., if they were too overweight, or had troublesome joints, etc.).  So those who exercise are not a random sample. Is it the exercise itself that does them good?   In any case, Galen thought so: he went to the gym regularly because he knew it was good for him!

Wednesday, October 30, 2013

Are we there yet or do strange things about life require new thinking?

Yesterday we wrote about the state of things in genomics. The idea of genetics as essentially a reductionistic one gene, one trait approach to understanding causation and prediction is still a live one, despite decades of evidence to the contrary.  Indeed, despite the fact that we've known for 100 years that life is far more complex than that.  Yet still today the prevailing paradigm is to collect more data, enumerate more genes and gene variants associated with disease, and other sorts of 'omics' Big Data, and we'll finally understand causation and be able to predict disease.  It is largely raw induction--the data will speak for themselves by the patterns computers can find in them.  But in many ways, the closer we look, the stranger things seem, not clearer.

In his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962, Thomas Kuhn described what scientists do as 'normal science' interrupted by rare, transformative changes of fundamental viewpoint.  He called these moments 'paradigm shifts', now a terribly over-worked phrase.  People are very reluctant to give up a worldview they know and have worked with, and are either oblivious to contrary facts or problems that seem insoluble.  Until someone comes along with a fundamentally better idea that accounts for those contrary facts, and then people wonder, as Huxley did about Darwin's theory, why they hadn't seen it all along.

We have seen over the last few years that there are important areas in which the proverbial emperor of genomics has been shown to have less than adequate clothes, or more accurately, that there is not very much emperor in the huge cloak of modern 'omics'. We're awash in data, with new sorts appearing regularly (e.g., ever-growing lists of SNPs, copy number variation, microbiomes, epigenetic modifications, genes in pathways, etc.).  This has added potentially causal elements to efforts to relate genomic data to the traits of organisms, like disease or adaptations, and to a withering amount of complexity about which there is much angst about how it can be parsed.  Some findings have been quite important, but most have been minor at best, and often totally ephemeral.

But what we get and what most are seeking are just lists, in some ways that only a computer can love (or have the patience to look through), and lists don't account for the many, many spatial and temporal entanglements, of diverse form, between the multitude of factors we know are involved in making organisms what they are, in 4-dimensional space and time.

It is tempting to think that some  revolutionary theory is just around the corner if only someone makes the profound discovery--the next Newton or Einstein (or Darwin).  Darwin's insight was as profound as these others, but what he saw was that life, unlike atoms, seems imprecise by nature--based as it is not on replication but on divergence by random variation weakly screened by experience.  And despite widespread but uncritical views to the contrary, Darwin's very Newtonian simple causal determinism was patently imprecise or incomplete.  Is there something fundamental about causation in life and genomes that is yet to be discovered?

In a sense, the evolutionary and functional genomics professions are clinging to conventional notions much the way early 20th century physicists clung to 'ether' in the face of relativity theory:  if we just have better technology, bigger samples and enumerate more and more things, and build statistical models to infer patterns we attribute to causation, we'll understand everything and answer riddles like 'hidden heritability' or enable 'personalized genomic medicine' ... finally!  So, defenders of the faith say to skeptics: patience, please--let us carry on!

But is this right?  What if we ask whether there might be something more involved in life than relentless 'omic'-scale beetle-collecting?

Do strange things about life require new concepts?
Here is another list, this time of a few discoveries or realizations that don't easily fit into the prevailing view, suggesting that simple ramping up of enumeration may not be our salvation:
1.  The linear view of genetic causation (cis effects of gene function, for the cognoscenti) is clearly inaccurate.  Gene regulation and usage are largely, if not mainly, not just local to a given chromosome region (they are trans);
2.  Chromosomal usage is 4-dimensional within the nucleus, not even 3-dimensional, because arrangements are changing with circumstances, that is, with time;
3.  There is a large amount of inter-genic and inter-chromosomal communication leading to selective expression and non-expression at individual locations and across the genome (e.g., monoallelic expression).  Thousands of local areas of chromosomes wrap and unwrap dynamically depending on species, cell type,  environmental conditions, and the state of other parts of the genome at a given time;
4.  There is all sorts of post-transcription modification (e.g., RNA editing, chaperoning) that is a further part of 4-D causation;
5.  There is environmental feedback in terms of gene usage, some of which is inherited (epigenetic marking) that can be inherited and borders on being 'lamarckian';
6.  There are dynamic symbioses as a fundamental and pervasive rather than just incidental and occasional part of life (e.g., microbes in humans);
7.  There is no such thing as 'the' human genome from which deviations are measured.  Likewise, there is no evolution of 'the' human and chimpanzee genome from 'the' genome of a common ancestor.  Instead, perhaps conceptually like event cones in physics, where the speed of light constrains what has happened or can happen, there are descent cones of genomic variation descending from individual sequences--time-dependent spreading of variation, with time-dependent limitations.  They intertwine among individuals though each individual's is unique.  There is a past cone leading of ancestry to each current instance of a genome sequence, from an ever-widening set of ancestors (as one goes back in time) and a future cone of descendants and their variation that's affected by mutations.  There are descent cones in the genomes among organisms, and among organisms in a species, and between species. This is of course just a heuristic, not an attempt at a literal simile or to steal ideas from physics!
Light cone: Wikipedia

8.  Descent cones exist among the cells and tissues within each organism, because of somatic mutation, but the metaphor breaks down because they have strange singular rather than complex ancestry because in individuals the go back to a point, a single fertilized egg, and of individuals to life's Big Bang;
9.  For the previous reasons, all genomes represent 'point' variations (instances) around a non-existent core  that we conceptually refer to as 'species' or 'organs', etc.('the' human genome, 'the' giraffe, etc.);
10.  Enumerating causation by statistical sampling methods is often impossible (literally) because rare variants don't have enough copies to generate 'significance', significance criteria are subjective, and/or because many variants have effects too small to generate significance;
11.  Natural selection, that generates current variation along with chance (drift) is usually so weak that it cannot be demonstrated, often in principle, for similar statistical reasons:  if cause of a trait is too weak to show, cause of fitness is too weak to show; there is not just one way to be 'adapted'.
12.  Alleles and genotypes have effects that are inherently relativistic.  They depend upon context, and each organism's context is different;
13.  Perhaps analogously with the ideal gas law and its like, phenotypes seem to have coherence.  We each have a height or blood pressure, despite all the variation noted above.  In populations of people, or organs, we find ordinary (e.g., 'bell-shaped') distributions, that may be the result of a 'law' of large numbers: just as human genomes are variation around a 'platonic' core, so blood pressure is the net result of individual action of many cells.  And biological traits are typically always changing;
14. 'Environment' (itself a vague catch-all term) has very unclear effects on traits.  Genomic-based risks are retrospectively assessed but future environments cannot, in principle, be known, so that genomic-based prediction is an illusion of unclear precision;
15.  The typical picture is of many-to-many genomic (and other) causation for which many causes can lead to the same result (polygenic equivalence), and many results can be due to the same cause (pleiotropy);
16. Our reductionist models, even those that deal with networks, badly under-include interactions and complementarity.  We are prisoners of single-cause thinking, which is only reinforced by strongly adaptationist Darwinism that, to this day, makes us think deterministically and in terms of competition, even though life is manifestly a phenomenon of molecular cooperation (interaction).  We have no theory for the form of these interactions (simple multiplicative? geometric?).
17.  In a sense all molecular reactions are about entropy, energy, and interaction among different molecules or whatever.  But while ordinary nonliving molecular reactions converge on some result, life is generally about increasing difference, because life is an evolutionary phenomenon.
18. DNA is itself a quasi-random, inert sequence. Its properties come entirely from spatial, temporal, combinatorial ('Boolean'-like) relationships. This context works only because of what else is in (and on the immediate outside) of the cell at the given time, a regress back to the origin of life.
. . .  . you can probably add other facts, curious things about life that are not simply list-like and at the very least challenge the idea that we can understand genomic causation with current approaches.

Is there an analog of 'complementarity' or something equivalently important missing?
These facts are, to paraphrase Einstein about strange phenomena in quantum physics, 'spooky' if you think about them in terms of normal ideas about life or even just about genes.  They are far from the idea of DNA as a linear code or 'the' blueprint for life, or even as a source of 'information' read off like one reads a sentence in an email message.  Yet, generally, we explain biological causation with statistical descriptions of the above sorts of phenomena, based on sampling and enumeration studies, but even huge studies of hundreds of thousands of people, and millions of genomic loci aren't getting us very far.

We do, of course, have a huge array of experimental ways of using reductionist approaches to understand  many sorts of  processes--transcription, physiological reactions, translation, countless others.  We use animal and cell culture models with many fine results where reductionist approaches are in order or are suited to our objectives.  Each gives us something of a view of biological causation.  But often if not usually without asymptotic precision--more than just measurement error. 

Even in most of these instances, and especially at higher levels of observation, we currently have no theory  that is remotely comparable to fundamental theories in chemistry and physics.  There are general evolutionary and population genomic patterns that may even be widely observed, but the patterns are basically empirical rather than being predicted by some sort of 'laws' that compare to those of physics.  It's not even clear how deeply we understand how things work.  We can observe statistical patterns, but they are not of the rigorous kind of probabilistic processes found in physics or chemistry.  As with, say, relativity, you can ignore it unless you approach a critical point (the speed of light, say).  Then you must have a better theory of what's happening and a better way to assess it.  Perhaps we have reached such a point in our desire to make precise predictions about genomes, a kind of limit of utility of enumeration-based thinking.

If countless, ephemeral variants have individually minor, but overall substantial contribution to traits, enumeration and statistical significance criteria simply won't work even if the effects are real.  Similarly, the number of known interactions even in biologically simple reactions are typically (and obviously) vastly more than can be characterized or identified by sampling and standard statistical analysis.  Everyone knows this.  But we don't yet have anything comparable to 'entropy' or 'statistical mechanics' to deal with this adequately--for example, to make precise predictions. Yet the standard view, basically not based on any profound creativity, is that what we need is bigger enumerative studies--'Big Data'.

Is there something missing at a basic level?  The list above suggests that this may be so.  In many ways we may not even be asking well-posed questions.  Would a true conceptual change of some kind lead us to the kinds of predictive uses of genomic data that is being promised?  Will it lead to a serious new theory of genetics?  Is such a change even in the offing or will we just plow ahead with very expensive, sausage-grinding normal science indefinitely?

It is easy to think of the strange facts and argue that a transformative insight will put them all in place. And of course it is always possible that the majority view is simply correct, that we understand life well enough already, basically just needing more data, more computational power, and revised statistical tweaks.

Our personal feeling is that we are ripe for something radically new, that will make many facts that don't now fit the current paradigm fall into place. In reality, right now, most bets and almost all scientific momentum and the way science works, and careers are built, are in the business-as-usual, normal-science mode, but can deeper thinking change that? People aren't yet asking well-posed questions, and we think not enough even recognize that there's a problem.

What we've tried to do here is suggest reasons why we think a change in how we view the role of genes in biology may be overdue, and to trigger readers to think seriously about what that might be.

Friday, February 22, 2013

What we see is too often determined by what we expect to see

How we see is determined by a complex system of interacting eye parts, photoreceptors and brain functions, but what we see can be determined by what we expect to see.  Opsins are receptors bound to the membrane of photoreceptor cells of the retina of the eye that help organisms, including us, to see. They are involved in the conversion of light, photons, into an electrochemical signal that eventually gets translated into images.

Except when they aren't.  In a piece in last week's Science, "Opsins: Not just for eyes," Elizabeth Pennisi writes about opsins in sea urchins.  Sea urchins don't have eyes, so why do they have photoreceptors?

Adhesive tube feet: Janek Pfeifer, Wikimedia
Well, they may not have eyes, but they do have tube feet, and as it turns out, the photoreceptors, loaded with opsins, have been found on these tube feet, which are on the ends of their spines, and are used for feeding, moving, breathing. The photoreceptor cells in the tube feet aren't pigmented in the way that most opsin-containing photoreceptor cells are, which is why they had been overlooked.

But, opsins have been found in unexpected places before.  Pigment cells in amphibian skin, that react to light, dove brains, fish skin. So, photoreception is happening in all kinds of places.  And, sea urchins do tend to avoid light, which means they have to have a way of perceiving it so it does make sense that they have opsins.

Developmental biologist Maria Ina Arnone has been studying sea urchins for a long while.  As Pennisi writes,
Arnone proposed that the opsin photoreceptor cells in the sea urchin are positioned at the base of the tube feet such that they lie partially in the shadow of its calcite skeleton, allowing the skeleton to serve the same purpose as pigment in typical eyes—most opsins co-occur with pigment, which shields part of a photoreceptor cell so it can register the direction of incoming light. She has also shown that the photoreceptor cells connect to the five radial nerves in the brainless urchin, which may enable the input from the different photoreceptor cells to be compiled, much like an insect's compound eye does.
Arnone has found a second type of opsin, a "ciliary opsin," in different parts of the sea urchin, too, including the tube feet, the skin, perhaps muscle, and in the larvae.  She's not sure what this opsin does, and she can't say how one opsin became specialized for vision-related photoreception.

Arnone's work has led others to look for opsins in unexpected places, and they've now been found in the stinging cells of cnidaria, the phylum that includes hydra and jellyfish.  It turns out that the stinging cells are inhibited by light.  So, again, opsins are sensing light but for a purpose that has nothing to do with vision. 

And it's not just that opsins are doing their photoreception outside of eyes. It seems they also are sensing more than light -- e.g., in fruit flies they are involved in the mechanosensing required for hearing.  This is independent of light sensing.  The same group describing this role for opsins reports that they may also be involved in sensing temperature in these flies, and it's likely that opsins are involved in yet other kinds of sensory processes.

Pleiotropy, pleiotropy, pleiotropy everywhere!
And, opsins aren't the only molecules for which new roles were in the news last week. A paper in Nature Chemical Biology reports that tRNA synthetases, enzymes that have long been assumed to be specifically involved in translation of DNA into protein, have now been found to have nontranslational functions. "Although these new functions were thought to be 'moonlighting activities', many are as critical for cellular homeostasis as their activity in translation." And, apparently synthetases were recruited fairly early in evolution for their 'new' functions.
These new activities include but are not limited to (i) mediation of glucose and amino acid metabolism, (ii) regulation of the development of specific organs and tissues, (iii) control of the ying-yang balance of angiogenesis for the vasculature, (iv) triggering or silencing of inflammatory responses, (v) control of cell death and stress responses that may lead to tumorigenesis and (vi) amplification or inhibition of the immune response.
A new paper in PNAS reports that olfactory receptor genes, of which vertebrates have hundreds, were thought to be restricted to the nose and to function by detecting odorant molecules.  But some are now found to be expressed in other cells, including in kidney relating to blood pressure.  It was once suggested that they, so many and each so different, provided a kind of cell-type-specific 'address code' in the body.

There are many examples of newly understood functions for molecules that were once thought to do only one thing.  New functions for RNA itself are being discovered all the time, its role in gene expression only recently one of them.  We've seen RNA floating around in cells as long as it has been known about, and the extent of its function could have been described.  Except that no one thought of it.  Much of what used to be called "junk DNA" is now known to have function, and so on.

These are interesting cautionary tales about assumptions limiting what we see.  Opsins are for photoreception, tRNA synthetases are for translation of DNA to protein, olfactory receptors for smell.  Yes, scientists may stand on the shoulders of giants, but we also inherit the blinders of those who came before.

One reason why tunnel vision is a problem
If we understood what everything does, we wouldn't need science anymore.  Not knowing isn't the problem.  It's when assumptions block your view that it's a problem.  We've blogged before about the gene mapping study we've been involved in, looking at differences in head shape between inbred strains of large and small mice.  The mapping has, to date, identified 76 chromosomal regions that may contain a gene or genes that affect variation in head size and shape, a total of about 2500 possible candidate genes.

It turns out that function has been characterized for about 77% of the genes in these intervals, and information as to where they are expressed during at least one stage of embryonic development is available for about 60%.  So, not only are the data incomplete, but to add further difficulty, a not insignificant number of genes have been named for diseases they are associated with, or a single tissue in which they were first found, so that if they are in fact involved in the traits we are looking at, we won’t know it by name.  We might even be mislead.  

The gene called Brca1, Breast Cancer 1, for example, is associated with elevated risk of early onset breast cancer, but despite its name, it is not a gene for breast cancer.  It is a perfectly normal, functional DNA repair gene, expressed in a number of organs during different developmental stages and throughout life. The photo to the left, a figure from the expression database, GenePaint, shows BRCA1 expression at embryonic day 14.5 in a mouse.  The dark blue is where the gene is expressed: you can see that it's in the brain, the olfactory system, the tongue, the thymus, the liver, the lungs, and so forth doing, well, who knows what, really, at this stage of development.  It’s only when its function has been disrupted by mutation and the protein can no longer repair errors in DNA that it can be associated with cancer.

And, there are multiple genes identified as genes for a specific function – angiogenesis, or development of blood vessels, for example – but that are expressed in many different tissues.  So, gene names are often not reliable indicators of gene function, and all of a gene's functions generally are not known.  And in fact can't be known, since genes respond to environmental conditions, and gene function can't be assessed for every possible situation. 

We, and anyone doing GWAS or any other gene mapping studies, are faced with the task of poring over lists of genes for candidates for involvement in our trait of interest, be it facial shape and size or height or obesity or diabetes or schizophrenia, or anything else.  But, given the inconsistencies, vagaries, and incompleteness of the data, how are we supposed to choose?  We can’t rely on gene names or characterized function, and in our case we’ve found that about 95% of the genes in the map regions are expressed in the developing head, so we can’t pare down our list based on expression data either. And of course we can't do experiments with each of the 2500 genes in the map intervals.

We write all the time about the difficulties of predicting traits -- diseases, behaviors -- from genes.  There are many reasons why this is true.  Restricted vision is just one of them--whether in what opsins do or in what we 'see' them as doing!  But, few of us have the kind of vision that allows us to make sense of things in our data that are not what we expected to see.  Science progresses incrementally, in fits and starts, largely because that's true.  Thomas Kuhn wrote in his book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" about "paradigm shifts" which are leaps forward in our understanding.  They happen when someone finally understands the odd data that just didn't fit before.  Continental drift is probably the best example.  But, it doesn't always take, or make, a paradigm shift to really see what we're looking at rather than assume it's what we want it to be.