Showing posts with label reason. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reason. Show all posts

Monday, August 26, 2013

GM plants: when the evolutionary issues trump all others

We discussed GM technology and some of the debate about it on Friday.  Today we're addressing some other aspects of the debate that may not be as clear even to many of the disputants over the issues. These are issues that are relevant to things we often talk about here on MT.

Flavr Savr tomatoes engineered to delay ripening; Wikipedia
Why not GM?
There are numerous reasonable objections to genetic modification, some of which we touch on below.  We ignore the ill-informed reactions -- such as that tomatoes with a fish gene inserted will taste fishy, or that orange trees with a spinach gene will produce green fruit.

One objection is economic.  It is a resistance to the greedy monopoly of economic control of farming, and the exploitation of domestic and (especially) developing-world farmers.  It offends a sense of equity. 

Another source of resistance is epidemiological.  It is the distrust of the produce itself, such as that it might trigger unexpected toxic or allergic reactions. We always eat foreign proteins (we're not corn or chickens, after all), and unless we're allergic, we readily digest them, and reap their nutritional benefits.  Still there are concerns that some GMOs may engender reactions.  There have been various claims, few if any strongly as yet substantiated, for other sorts of effects (such as on fertility). 

A third is sociological, involving resistance to the displacement of more putatively sustainable multicrop, multispecies, mixed, smaller scale farms by huge monocropping.  For long-term sustainability, mixed crops save soil from runoff, require less fertilizer, fewer pesticides and are more natural.  Small, mixed farms are run by communities of local farmers, not itinerant workers, and so on. 

And, there is the evolutionary objection, which is related to the sociological objection.  The latter is in some ways the most scientifically inflammatory, or so it would seem.  It is this that is most relevant to MT and our personal interests in evolutionary genetics. The idea is that if you make a crop inedible, or make it resistant to pesticide, you put heavy selection pressure on pests, animal and plant, eventually favoring those with resistance mutations--and then you've got a real problem on your hands. Wild crops may gain transgenes through cross pollination (see Friday's post), and crop diversity, a major evolutionary asset, will be reduced. Further, as with antibiotic resistance, every herbicide or pesticide that can no longer be used is an economic jolt to farmers practicing conventional agriculture.  Evolutionary biologists opposing the Monsantoizing of the world point this out, and have done, in quite strong terms--and their warnings have been born out repeatedly.

Still....
However, this objection is not always warranted; again, not all GM is alike. Many GM changes should not have particular evolutionary implications. Transgenes that keep fruit from spoiling, or that affect its taste or color seem like examples. While such changes dramatically affect the plant or animal's reproductive fitness through the intense artificial selection that is agriculture, it's harder to envision these transgenes conferring a fitness advantage for related species if they escaped into the wild, such as is seen with pesticide or herbicide resistance.

The transgene would perhaps be more likely to have negative implications (just because it's a random gene tossed into the genomic mix of the recipient wild species). But most likely it would be selectively neutral--that is, it would have no effect on the recipient species reproductive chances.  In this case, the most likely fate of the transgene is to be lost just by chance--because this is the typical fate of any mutational change in any species.  But even if it persisted, it would have no implications for agriculture.

This seems to be the story of golden rice, with the transgenic modification to make vitamin A in rice, a potential boon to many underdeveloped countries where vitamin A deficiency is highly prevalent and rice is heavily the staple food.  A Sunday NY Times commentary discusses the issues.  The article doesn't describe the transgenic engineering that was done, but it does note that it's not a particularly strange modification, even for plants, it's developed by a non-profit institution, and the farmers can replant seeds they've grown.  So many of the ethical objections would seem to be avoided.  Still, there appear to be many reflex objections of a generic type.

Could something go awry with this plant, densely used in very widespread and global areas?  Any new gene could, in principle, interact somehow with local pests from bacteria to insects, and it is plausible in principle that some allergic or other reactions could occur.  However, this seems far less likely compared to GM species engineered in relation to strong selection involved with agents like antibiotics, pesticide and herbicide resistance.  So such objections do, at this point, seem rather a stretch, unless one is just nostalgic for some supposed good old days in agriculture.  After all, artificial selection has been tinkering with all our domesticates' genomes for millennia.  On the other hand, if someone really is pining for older ways, that's a legitimate viewpoint (even if it may ignore the real-world plight of our heavily populated globe).

Whatever one feels about GM plants, a productive debate can only happen if people actually understand the issues.  It is perfectly legitimate to object to economic, epidemiological, sociological, or evolutionary aspects of GM foods.  But many have opposite views, and are unconcerned about the industrialization aspects, for example (after all, many have jobs related to industrial ag).  In any case, it is not legitimate to mix issues.  That can't move the debate forward.

Whether GM crops are here to stay or will be displaced for either scientific or political reasons, only time will tell.  That there are very serious evolutionary issues is by now very clear indeed.  To many, they trump all the other issues.  In any case, while the epidemiological and sociopolitical sides of GM technology's impact are absolutely suitable for the policy arena, they are largely separate from the issues stemming from the evolutionary problems.

If the evolutionary issues prove to be intractable--if agribusiness can't keep one step ahead of natural selection, then we will eventually, maybe even rapidly, revert to other means of maintaining high global agricultural output.  If the problems can be addressed by big-science methods, then the overall economics--whether you like it or not--may well leave them in the driver's seat of future agriculture.  However the issues play out, billions of peoples' lives will be affected.

Thursday, June 16, 2011

Oh, what a tangled web we weave

Walter Scott is responsible for the famous line:  Oh, what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive.

It sounds profound, but is it wise words, or just bollocks?

Here, at least is the latest in the 'evolution was just like this' department.   A study on reasoning  that is part of an issue on the subject in the Journal of Behavioral and Brain Sciences, concludes that reasoning evolved to be deceiving rather than to tell the truth.  At least, the authors of this new just-so story don't claim it's genetic: deceptive rhetoric evolved socially. 

As the NYTimes reports, it has long been assumed that reasoning evolved to enable us to search for and determine Truth.  But,
[n]ow some researchers are suggesting that reason evolved for a completely different purpose: to win arguments. Rationality, by this yardstick (and irrationality too, but we’ll get to that) is nothing more or less than a servant of the hard-wired compulsion to triumph in the debating arena. According to this view, bias, lack of logic and other supposed flaws that pollute the stream of reason are instead social adaptations that enable one group to persuade (and defeat) another. Certitude works, however sharply it may depart from the truth.
The idea, labeled the argumentative theory of reasoning, is the brainchild of French cognitive social scientists, and it has stirred excited discussion (and appalled dissent) among philosophers, political scientists, educators and psychologists, some of whom say it offers profound insight into the way people think and behave. 
Now whether this is true in all societies, a uniform cultural evolution or a parallel one (similar in, say Pacific Islanders and African Ashanti or San, but of independent social-evolutionary origin) is a valid question.  In fact, much as we hate to take sides with the genetic-evolutionary view (!), there have been numerous arguments that human language is basically an extension of eons-old display tactics that were designed to intimidate or deceive, as in mating competition.  Such things are not new to humans, or even primates, so if it is biological it predates our species and the explanation is more general.

However, let's ignore whether it's cultural or biological.  The same people who fervidly see competition-everywhere, the arch-darwinian view of life,  will love the idea that she dissembles to deceive.  If you're looking for a rival under every bed, you'll certainly go along with the idea that we use language (reasoning, persuasion, rhetoric) to distract, derail, or deceive potential competitors:  you really do, as the article says, want to win rather than to inform others.

This certainly is one way language is used (at least in cultures in nation-states, where we have daily evidence).  But is it 'the' truth?  Is it part of culture, or only of some cultures....or did cultures evolve reasoning 'for' deception per se?

It is easy to see a polar opposite to the latest assault of selectionism.  If you deceive, you can cause others to come to loss or grief.  Why should they not have a long memory, that they'll use to even the score later?  Why isn't truth good for the group, and deception a way to make everyone vulnerable?  Our ancestors--including primates--lived in very small local groups.  They might be very vulnerable to internal misinformation.  Why is telling the truth institutionalized in many if not most cultural norms--what children are taught, for example, even if we're not perfect at it?  Is that because if everyone is convinced you're truth-telling, it's easier for you to mislead?  Or is it because truth-telling really is what's important, and you mutually have to rely on it for your survival?

Further, what is truth and how do you know what people's motives are (whether they are even aware of them or not)?  Since 'truth' is what we think we perceive, and since we always have imperfect data, imperfect perception, and imperfect intelligence, why should we assume that 'reasoning' is false rather than flawed?  After all, even 'experts' in most fields related to behavior (to wit: economists, pundits) are grossly wrong presumably because of ignorance or bias rather than intentional deception.  One might suggest that the journal article's authors' interpretation of the intent in reasoning is more a reflection of their ideologies and biases, than it is of the underlying truth (or are we just saying that to make you believe us??).

Anyway, why should our ability to reason have evolved for only one purpose?  Did our hands evolve just to let us hunt?  Like most traits, reason is multi-purpose, and can be as useful for cooperation as well as competition -- and many other things. It's how we express how we assess our environment, our circumstances.  Often it is verbal expression, imperfectly representing our internal thoughts.  We can reason our way to figuring out from these footprints what kind of prey we're likely to find if we hang out long enough at the waterhole, or that that plant is poisonous, or to formulating a mathematical proof just as we can clap with our hands, help another across a creek, and caress a child's cheek. And, it's not just that the functions other than winning arguments are exaptations (purposes beyond the one the trait first evolved 'for') of the ability to reason, because ants and bees can reason. Or is deceptive reasoning limited, by social constraints, to certain but not all topics of conversation?

The choice of a single overriding purpose for our ability to reason says more about the those doing the choosing than it does about the trait.