Showing posts with label cognition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cognition. Show all posts

Monday, September 14, 2015

Oh Koko!

We'll be sharing much more, in the coming months, about why Anne and I are a wee bit obsessed with Koko the gorilla. She's one of the stars of a project we've got going--a project that will likely diminish our chances of ever meeting the lovely and extraordinary creature.

It's because we've been stalking Koko that Anne and I were perplexed, but not surprised, by this recent piece in The Atlantic:



Click here for the article.

Our eyebrows arched just reading the headline.

It leads a reader to anticipate a conversation with Koko the gorilla, but instead it is mostly an interview with Koko's main human, Penny Patterson. So, I guess the headline is describing what that interview is about--a conversation about conversing. There's no other way to make sense of it. Yet, it's still problematic because gorillas don't converse. Not even Koko.

The piece begins with an anecdote about Koko describing herself with the "queen" sign. Morin, the article's author, follows it with this quote of explanation from Patterson:
Koko understands that she’s special because of all the attention she's had from professors, and caregivers, and the media.
And this is where, to my mind, any interviewer actually fascinated with Koko's mind asks: This is amazing...how could Koko understand that she receives more human attention than most other gorillas on the planet? And how does she make the connection between this concept, this existence of hers, and that of a queen? When you taught her "queen," what was the definition? 

Unfortunately, this isn't the direction the piece goes. That nugget was a foray into her backstory about her sign language training and her home in California.  And just because the written product of Morin's interview doesn't dive into questions like those italicized up there, it doesn't mean it didn't. But if he did go there, why on earth didn't that gold make it into the piece?

More to the point, why have I never read an interview about Koko that asks penetrating questions about the stories that Koko's humans tell about her mind? Is that nuts and bolts stuff merely uninteresting fodder for readers or is it off-limits to writers who are permitted access? There's an answer at the end of this blog post.

But first, I have more, seemingly infinite, questions... How does Koko's language ability, and let's add Kanzi's too, compare to a highly-trained border collie like Chaser?



Is it categorically different, indicating an actually different kind of cognition?
You might be thinking about this video of Kanzi and saying, yes, yes it's different:



But how is it different? Kanzi is just pairing up two things, which is not really all that different from Chaser getting one toy at a time. It might appear to be more extraordinary than it is because in pairing the two objects for which Kanzi knows the English words, he behaves with them in ways they're meant to be behaved with by people.

That was a sentence worthy of a tinier brain than mine.

What I'm trying to say, poorly, with my human language "abilities," is that grabbing two things, like a soap pumper and a ball, and behaving routinely with one of them (like pumping the soap, which is what one does with a soap pumper) doesn't necessarily require as much human-like comprehension of what Sue's saying as a we might assume--that is, without thinking it through more deeply, or perhaps without trying to think like a dog or like a bonobo, or like a toddler.

Or like a gorilla--a gorilla who's arguably not a gorilla, given she's not socialized like one and given how her humans have admitted that they've intentionally raised her as a human and consider her one:



As they've raised Koko, they've narrated her mind as if it works like ours.This is evident right from the beginning of the interview portion of Morin's article. Patterson is explaining how Koko generalized the sign for "food", saying:
She would perch on this high spot where she could watch people come and go and she would sign “food” to them. It might mean “Give me the treat you’ve got,” or it might mean “I want my toothbrush,” or even just, “Engage with me.” She understood that signs had power. That particular sign got her food, so she wondered, “What else can I do with it?
She did? She wondered? And it was about how to use a sign in different settings to get what she wants? It's not just simply that it's something she could produce and did, in various circumstances? I think describing such processes as "wondering" would be giving humans too much conscious credit most of the time. But it's how we talk about minds. It's how we narrate one another's behaviors, and that of our pets, and that of whatever Koko is.

Often this is lumped into "anthropomorphism" and it's not all bad, but one could argue that it's to be avoided like the plague. If the goal is to understand how an animal thinks, then anthropomorphism risks being more of an obstacle than a helpful metaphor.

Whether the Koko project is scientifically rigorous, I have absolutely no idea. But Patterson's fantasy description of wild gorilla communication rings more of science fiction:
The free-living gorillas might talk about simple things like “Where are we going to get our next meal?” but here [at the research facility] there is so much more to talk about.
Death is one of those things. Here's Patterson's evidence that Koko understands things about death:
The caregiver showed Koko a skeleton and asked, “Is this alive or dead?” Koko signed, “Dead, draped.” “Draped” means “covered up.” 
Again, this is where my dream interviewer asks, What is the connection between "dead" and "draped"? It's even harder to understand the connection between a skeleton and draped. Can you help us understand the logic of her language? 

But we're not given that in this piece.  Morin does follow with "How would Koko know about death?" but it's not demanding a response that gets at the crucial connection between her mind and her signs.

We need to know whether what Patterson says about Koko's mind is true or not and no one seems to be able to  help us learn this. As the piece continues, my desperation for such a person escalates.

Patterson describes how Koko was making a sign that her brother made just before jumping off a rock. It took Koko's people a while to understand what she was trying to say because they hadn't seen her brother do this, but once they saw a film, it was apparent that the sign...
...means “take off” in the sense of “jump off.” Koko wanted us to take off our lab coats.
How does Koko's mind connect "jump off" a rock with "take off" your lab coats? If Morin asked this, he neither published it nor the answer. If Morin asked this question, then he is hoarding the gold all to himself.

The rest of Morin's piece is fascinating, and in parts it's heart-warming, especially if you have a soft spot for gorillas and for people who have those soft spots too. But there's still no conversation with a gorilla, or a conversation about a conversation either.

Read far enough into the article and you'll see what happened to Morin as he prepared to meet Koko:
Patterson cautioned me earlier to refrain from asking Koko questions. I was to let the gorilla take the lead. “She has that royal air about her,” the researcher explained, “and she doesn't entertain questions. Just like you wouldn’t question the queen—Koko is the same way. She’ll disengage.”
So, no conversation is going to be had with an ape, conveniently, because that totally capable ape wouldn't like it if he tried. Hm.

But there would be some lovely and touching moments through the enclosure's fence.

After recounting those, Morin reflects on what I've been discussing:
There was no way to know how much of her behavior was intentional and how much was my own or Patterson’s projection. Allegations of selective interpretation have accompanied ape-language research from the beginning. Still, it was impossible to be there interacting with her, and not feel that I was in the presence of another self-conscious being.
I don't see anything wrong with describing her as self-conscious while also doubting that her mind works like ours.  I live with a one-year old. And even before I had this baby, before I lived with an alien mind, I didn't see anything wrong with this thinking. Morin's final thoughts compare Koko's mind to an alien's, but his piece paints that alien as just another Hollywood humanoid.

When you share the link to Morin's The Atlantic piece on Facebook, the headline in the feed reads: "What gorillas can teach us about being human"

Well, what can they?

I think it's obvious from the article, and from others like it, that Koko is teaching us about our limitations. She's teaching us that we wouldn't care as much about gorillas without her fairytales; that we wouldn't care as much about these truly magnificent animals if they weren't furry humans. And that would be less depressing if we were any good at caring about actual humans.

Wednesday, March 13, 2013

lolhumans

"This pelican looks like a urinal. 
Go home, evolution, you are drunk." 
(wtfevolution.tumblr) 
Urinalification is so lol.

But it's calling evolution drunk that really got you, isn't it?

Steven Pinker (as of the late 90s) might say that personifying evolution's funny because it juxtaposes or mixes up what are normally separate rules or domains of our intuition. Personification's funny the way slapstick comedy's funny: Without any warning (but with a well-placed banana peel) a guy goes from being a dad to being a bag of molecules.When we give nonhumans human potential, Pinker says that we’re marrying “our intuitive psychology to our intuitive biology.” [1]

Personification is the same sort of thinking that enables us to discover, to know, to understand how the world works. It’s story, analogy, metaphor, unseen imaginative b.s. that we misfire like crazy. And even though we've overcome much of our reliance on it, we tend to preserve the spirit of it anyway. 




The powers of life, death and destruction aren't the only things worthy of personification. We'll give agency to a triangle or square. Just shapes. Being two-dimensional and moving around is all it takes. We are constantly up to this and as Dawkins said, 

“The reason we personify things like cars and computers is that just as monkeys live in an arboreal world, and moles live in an underground world, and water striders live in a surface-tension dominated flatland, we live in a social world. We swim through a sea of people. … We are evolved to second guess the behavior of others by becoming brilliant intuitive psychologists. Treating people as machines may be scientifically and philosophically accurate, but it’s a cumbersome waste of time if you want to guess what this person is going to do next. The economically useful way to model a person is to treat him as a purposeful goal seeking agent with pleasures and pains, desires and intentions, guilt and blameworthiness. Personification and the imputing of intentional purpose is such a brilliantly successful way to model humans, it’s hardly surprising the same modeling software often seizes control when we’re trying to think about entities for which it’s not appropriate, …”[2]

Although many other animals have desires and pleasures and pains and generally have experiences—at least they do as long as we assume we do—we should extend Dawkins’ reflection to our personification of nonhuman animals. There's very good reason we do this as scientists. It's not a terrible null hypothesis that if you observe an animal behaving like a human could, then it might be thinking like a human could. This is the argument by analogy or as I call it doing demonstrates knowing. How else could you reverse engineer cognition? You're a human, you think like one, you know how humans think from a scientific perspective better than you know how any other animal thinks. This makes sense. It's a good default. But that's all it is. And scientists get that. They taught me all this after all. (Reading a lot of Shettleworth, Povinelli, and Tomasello lately.) But the rest of us who don't work on animal behavior and who have very little experience with real animals at all are taking this perspective literally without caution. For example, maybe we should perk our ears but cock our heads skeptically when the website for Dognition (a service rooted in good science that sells cognitive testing for your furry friends) says, “Learning who your dog is as a ‘person’ will help you make the most of the time you spend together.”

Sometimes anthropomorphism smells like money and sometimes it makes us angry for no good reason. For example. Ed Yong wrote a piece "Male frog extracts and fertilises eggs from dead female" about an Amazonian frog that bleeps to death and still procreates. (No survival necessary--take that, Darwin!) Yong didn't personify the frogs but that didn't stop a reader. 


I have a hunch that our habit of anthropomorphizing (combined with some empathic and also narcissistic tendencies) makes it much harder for us to understand reality, to understand scientific explanations for the universe, and to stumble onto new ones.

I wonder a lot about how our language encourages these mistaken habits. I've written before about how I don't use "force" to describe processes and mechanisms of evolutionary change. It's one of my f-words of evolution.

I've got similar concerns about our language that describes animal behavior. Take for example this fascinating paragraph written by the primatologist Toshisada Nishida about the chimpanzees he studied at Mahale, Tanzania:
“In an effort to maximize their reproductive output, males and females may cooperate when it is to their mutual advantage. However they may also control, manipulate, betray and even attack each other when they have conflicting interests. Chimpanzees maintain a promiscuous mating system, for which females develop a huge swelling of sexual skin and males large scrota. These morphological features make sperm competition the characteristic features of chimpanzee sexual activity. Males are expected to mate with as many females as possible, while female are expected to be more choosey because reproductive output over their lifetime is more limited. A powerful constraint on female chimpanzees is the need to consider males’ tendencies toward infanticide.”[3]
I added those italics to emphasize the language that could be interpreted to give chimpanzees more cognitive ability and more agency than the author intended or has evidence for. That paragraph, re-written to avoid any overstatement of chimpanzee cognition and any hint of calculated intention by chimps or by Mother Nature, could look like this:
In a system where higher reproductive output means more of whatever traits lead to it in future generations, males and females may behave cooperatively because it has been perpetuated by higher reproductive output in the past and will continue to do so until something changes. However, depending on the circumstance, they may also control, manipulate, betray and even attack each other if cooperation is supplanted by another behavior that is and has been perpetuated due to its increase of reproductive output, instead, in that sort of circumstance in the chimpanzee’s life. Chimpanzees maintain a promiscuous mating system and, because higher reproductive output of females with huge sex swellings and males with large scrota, females have huge sex swellings and males have large scrota. These morphological features exist, as hypothesized, because sperm competition has been occurring over chimpanzee evolutionary history. Males that mate with as many females as possible have, and have had, higher reproductive output, while females mate less frequently and have much more limited procreative potential over their lifetimes, so they appear to be choosier than males about their copulatory partners because doing so (assuming they are actually choosier than males) has and does increase reproductive output. A powerful influence on female chimpanzee mating behavior is males’ tendencies toward infanticide because females who have babies that are killed have lower reproductive outputs.
There. I managed to suck all the fun out of chimp sex. Not only that, but if you made it far enough you must be wondering how I could be so circumspect about female mate choice. That’s something for another day, but let’s just say that we should be circumspect about male choosiness too since they can’t decide which females (or males, or other circumstances) will give them erections.

Oh, hello! Now you’re awake! Why did my translation of Nishida’s paragraph fail to engage you? Here’s a try: Because it wasn’t a narrative and there were no interesting actors with calculating minds raging with intentions. There was nobody to figure out, to empathize with, to love, to fear, to root for. You just don’t tell stories without those kinds of characters.

But listen up close: that’s the true story of most of Earth’s evolutionary history. Agency evolved (maybe), but evolution itself did nothing purposefully, or even whimsically, to cause it.



Left to our naïve devices, how we talk and write about animal behavior affects how we think about their truths, their essences. The animals we put on the big screen are now just CGI manipulated reality--no cartoon drawings necessary for a pig like Babe to politely request sheep to scram, or for the pups in Space Buddies to bark interstellar commands. If only they had our mouths and throats these creatures could tell us about all the complex thoughts and feelings they experience! My mom has named this the Disney Syndrome. Some might blame the fertile “lolcats” and other such memes. We don’t just anthropomorphize animals, though, we personify oak trees, grandfather clocks, and toenail fungus.


Let's not pile all the blame our limited language, our love of agent-driven narrative, our teachers, scientists and Disney. Because how removed we are from “nature” probably affects our perceptions of animals too. Urban and suburban Americans might be the worst about this. In a piece about Joe Henrich's work, Watters writes,
“While studying children from the U.S., researchers have suggested a developmental timeline for what is called “folkbiological reasoning.” These studies posit that it is not until children are around 7 years old that they stop projecting human qualities onto animals and begin to understand that humans are one animal among many. Compared to Yucatec Maya communities in Mexico, however, Western urban children appear to be developmentally delayed in this regard. Children who grow up constantly interacting with the natural world are much less likely to anthropomorphize other living things into late childhood. Given that people living in WEIRD societies don’t routinely encounter or interact with animals other than humans or pets, it’s not surprising that they end up with a rather cartoonish understanding of the natural world.”
Nobody's saying to give it up completely. It's adorable.It's funny. It's lovely, actually. But if we coddle it like crazy in our children and if we don't check it once in a while in ourselves, this cultural phenomenon is going to continue to contribute handily to the scientific challenges that we face with increasing urgency.

Before submitting a scientific manuscript about animal behavior, evolution, climate, or any process that tempts us to infuse agency, make sure it's not drunk.



[1] From Pinker's lecture "How the mind works" published in the Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

[2] Richard Dawkins's TED talk at about 21:00 - http://www.ted.com/talks/richard_dawkins_on_our_queer_universe.html

[3] Nishida, T. (2012) Chimpanzees of the Lakeshore (Cambridge University Press), p. 201

Friday, August 26, 2011

Some ants are more equal than others

Individually coded ants (photo from JEB).
A study published in the September 15 issue of the Journal of Experimental Biology (and reported on the BBC web site) concludes that ants recognize the decision-makers in their midst.

Coordination of biological processes in groups that lack the ability to communicate globally among themselves, such as insect societies, has long been thought to be due to self-organization. That there is division of labor in these societies has long been known, but it has been thought that within strata, every individual must know the same rules, and be equally able to follow them.  And the general assumption has been that they are basically chemical automata in this respect--all molecular recognition rather than open cognition.  Indeed, human exceptionalism is so widespread in science that one often sees it viewed as surprising that any other species can think (much less has 'mind').  So, this experiment, while quite basic, is interesting.

It's starting to look as though ants not only learn, but recognize that some of their peers may have more knowledge than others.  That is, some may play more influential roles in key behaviors, including decision-making.  Stroeymeyt et al., at the University of Bristol, looked at this question in the house-hunting ant, Temnothorax albipennis.  These ants live in precarious places such as under tree bark or in rock crevices, and their homes are frequently destroyed, and they thus need to rebuild at a new site.

When it's time to move, scouts go out from the nest, or hive in the case of bees, to find new sites.  Behavior was always focused on the colony previously, not the individual, so it has always been thought that every scout had an equal chance of happening upon the best new site, and thus being followed by the rest of the group.  But Stroeymeyt et al. have discovered that Temnothorax ants seem to acknowledge that some scouts are more experienced than others, and thus should be allowed to make the decision as to where to move.

Temnothorax ants investigate their environment preemptively, collecting information about potential nest sites before they must move, which apparently increases their chances of choosing a good site (though it does sound as though none of their choices are all that good, or they wouldn't have to be moving all the time!).
Information about suitable sites is initially gathered by the workers that discover and explore the sites. It could then potentially be stored in two, non-exclusive forms: in a common repository of information, such as pheromones (social information) marking the nest itself or leading to it, or in the memories of informed workers and/or individual-specific chemical marking (private information), frequently used by Temnothorax ants. In the latter case, informed individuals accessing this information could play a key role during later emigrations.
To look at the role individuals play in this decision,  Stroeymeyt et al. painted tiny uniquely colored dots on the backs of all the workers in colonies they brought into the lab.  The idea was to determine "the role of specific individuals and the relative importance of private versus social information".

They brought 30 colonies into their lab, and moved them into nests consisting of 5 interconnected Petri dishes.  They were given a week to explore the area.  Their nest was then destroyed, inducing them to relocate.  They had the choice of a nest just like the one that had been destroyed, that some of their number had previously investigated, and an identical one none of them had ever seen before.  A new nest was considered chosen if all brood items were moved to that site, but not if items were split between two nests.

Exploration throughout the week was captured on webcams, so that it was known which individuals explored, and thus collected 'private' information about new nest sites.  These were considered 'informed' workers.  More informed workers were those that visited the site most, naive workers never visited it.

They also investigated "the relative importance of navigational memory and individual-specific chemical trails in the early discoveries of the familiar nest by informed workers".  They did this by laying sheets of acetate between two nests, then rotating them, thus changing the location of previously laid chemical trails. The idea was to test the relative importance of chemical versus visual orientation clues.

As it turned out, familiar nests were discovered first, and seemed to be preferred over unfamiliar nests.  Naive workers were as likely to find the unfamiliar nest as experienced workers, and took an equal amount of time to find either.  Informed workers, however, were much more likely to find the familiar nest quickly.  So, the researchers conclude that information collected by individual ants -- private information -- is important in leading them to new sites.

And they discovered that the ants do seem to follow chemical clues, since colonies emigrated significantly faster when the acetate under them, containing their chemical trail, was not moved, although they still preferred the familiar nest site over the unfamiliar, indicating that they were in fact following ants with private personal knowledge, which seems to include visual cues.  And, the existence of private knowledge seems to be recognized by other ants in the colony, which speeds emigration to the site preferred by the experienced workers.

So, yes, the choice of a new site seems to be a collective decision, but some individuals have more influence over that decision than do others.  We've blogged before about ants, and whether they think (we concluded that they do).  We noted then what Darwin said in Descent of Man (1871) about ants, and it's worth repeating:
...the wonderfully diversified instincts, mental powers, and affections of ants are notorious, yet their cerebral ganglia are not so large as the quarter of a pin's head. Under this view, the brain of an ant is one of the most marvelous atoms of matter in the world, perhaps more so than the brain of man.
The general idea about  cognition and consciousness (often implicitly equated) is that it's a phenomenon of large-scale interactions among synapsed neurons: you need zillions of these to have 'thoughts' or make cognitive, evaluative judgments that go beyond mecahnical responses to, say, odorant detection.  But if the pinheads of ants can do this, perhaps our ideas about what makes this possible has been too closely associated with our own high encephalization (big heads relative to body size) and egotism.  Maybe quality rather than quantity in neuronal function is more important than we've thought, or in ways we yet haven't thought of.

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Cognitive ability: use it or lose it?

A study just published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives tells us that if we want to retain our cognitive ability into old age we shouldn't retire.  The old 'use it or lose it' axiom.  But, as Gina Kolata points out in the NYT write up about the study, it could just be that people who are losing their cognitive skills retire earlier than those who aren't.  Does this study sort this out?

The authors analyzed the results of memory tests given to 22,000 Americans over age 50, administered by the National Institute on Aging every 2 years.  The test is a measure of how well people remember a list of 10 nouns immediately after hearing them, and then 5 or so minutes later, after having been asked other survey questions.  A perfect score would be 20.  Studies have been done in a number of countries in Europe and Asia, so that cross-cultural comparisons can be made.

As Kolata wrote,
People in the United States did best, with an average score of 11. Those in Denmark and England were close behind, with scores just above 10. In Italy, the average score was around 7, in France it was 8, and in Spain it was a little more than 6.
Examining the data from the various countries, Dr. Willis and his colleague Susann Rohwedder, associate director of the RAND Center for the Study of Aging in Santa Monica, Calif., noticed that there are large differences in the ages at which people retire.
In the United States, England and Denmark, where people retire later, 65 to 70 percent of men were still working when they were in their early 60s. In France and Italy, the figure is 10 to 20 percent, and in Spain it is 38 percent.
So, if it's true that retirement leads to cognitive decline, what is it about retirement that would do this?  It's hard to think of a single factor that all employment shares, other than a paycheck -- not everyone has a schedule, or punches a clock, or irons a shirt in the morning, or has to be at an office at 9, or socializes at the water cooler, or leaves their work behind when they go home at 5.  We can't even say that everyone must be competent at their job (see our post on the Ig Nobel prize winning paper about this very subject.)  And certainly not everyone is happy at work.  Similarly, not all retirements are equal.  So what's the common denominator?

The authors propose two possible answers.  One is the "unengaged lifestyle hypothesis", or mental retirement which accompanies actual retirement.  The other is that with the prospect of retirement, the soon-to-be-retiree slows down mentally in preparation, and stops "investing in human capital".  The "on the job" retirement effect.

Well, neither of these are very compelling explanations to us for a number of reasons including that a lot of people are busier in retirement than when they were employed, and we all know employed people who checked out long before they even gave retirement a thought.

Indeed, a number of further questions remain unanswered, in addition to Kolata's question of which came first, retirement or decline.  What would the slope of the line look like in 10 year olds cross culturally, for example?  Or  40 year olds?  That is, is the difference in ability (and, by the way, the top score, 11 words remembered correctly out of 20, doesn't strike us as all that good!) only apparent in older people?  Does the ability to remember 10 words actually indicate cognitive abilities such as reasoning or logic?

And, of course, there's the Bear Bryant phenomenon that we have to think about here at Penn State. Bear Bryant was the legendary coach of the University of Alabama football team.  At the tender age of 69, perhaps knowing that his best years were behind him, he decided to retire.  When a reporter asked him what he would do in retirement, he joked that in a week he'd be dead.  Four weeks later, he was!

Now this is relevant because our coach here at Penn State, the even more legendary Joe Paterno, is about to turn 84, with 2 years remaining on his contract.  That may be more games than his team will win the rest of the year, but the point here is that there have been quips that he doesn't want to end up like Bear Bryant.  So if he never retires.....he'll be immortal!
So the premonition spook could be a factor in peoples' retirement decisions, when, or perhaps if, they have a choice.

But before we decide to work til we drop, or work so we won't, we need to see the results of a more rigorous study.

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Smart dogs & dumb people

There was a story in the NY Times Week in Review section on Sunday about intelligence in dogs. They are increasingly being used in service to people with an ever widening range of conditions, such as epilepsy, phobias, panic disorder, autism, and so on. And, it's thought that they can detect some cancers before our technological methods can -- perhaps this has to do with their exquisitely sensitive odor detection. Several reports over the last few years have shown that dogs have the ability to learn the meaning of hundreds, if not thousands of words. As the story in the Times says:
By giving dogs language learning and other tests devised for infants and toddlers, Dr. Coren [psychology professor at the University of British Columbia] has come up with an intelligence ranking of 100 breeds, with border collies at No. 1. He says the most intelligent breeds (poodles, retrievers, Labradors and shepherds) can learn as many as 250 words, signs and signals, while the others can learn 165. The average dog is about as intellectually advanced as a 2- to 2-and-a-half-year-old child, he has concluded, with an ability to understand some abstract concepts. For example, the animal can get “the idea of being a dog” by differentiating photographs with dogs in them from photographs without dogs.
But this story makes some of the usual kinds of mistakes that we believe people should be wary of.

When it is said that a dog has the intelligence of a 2 year old child, this is misleading in several ways. It may -- may -- be accurate to say that a dog has the human-like cognitive abilities of a 2 year old human, but that is far from the way the statement is typically made or construed.

Why not say that a adult human has the dog-like cognitive abilities of a newborn pup? We wouldn't last more than a few minutes in the wild. It's hard to imagine anything dogs regularly do (even dumb breeds, not to mention fully-genomed wild dogs not protected by vets and Alpo) that even a super-intelligent human can do nearly as well. And it's arrogance of the worst kind to say that a dog is just hard-wired by its nose. Much of a dog's behavior is highly cognitive.

Dr Clive D. L. Wynne, associate professor of psychology at the University of Florida, a specialist in canine cognition, is reported in the Times story as believing that the brains of dogs and humans shouldn't be compared.
He argues that it is dogs’ deep sensitivity to the humans around them, their obedience under rigorous training, and their desire to please that can explain most of these capabilities. They may be deft at reading human cues — and teachable — but that doesn’t mean they are thinking like people, he says. A dog’s entire world revolves around its primary owner, and it will respond to that person to get what it wants, usually food, treats or affection.
But to say that dogs use their intelligence only to find food and favor, or mates, implies somehow a rudimentary or more hard-wired kind of behavior than that of us noble humans. Why do we go to work in the morning, or to the bar at night? Our species-hubris is extraordinary.

From an evolutionary point of view, of course we're not dogs. We're many millions of years separated from our common ancestor with dogs. But we are related and have very similar genomes and very similar neurobiology (indeed, flies have similar neurobiology in some ways, which is why some grant-seekers may stretch the point but relate their fly work to human psychiatric disorders).

We can invoke Darwin's nostrum that Natura non facit salum -- nature works slowly but doesn't make leaps, to make the obvious point that we and dogs are similar enough that certainly we must share much of our cognitive experience. To what extent that applies to our notion of conscious experience, which is really what people are talking about, we have no current way to know. But we can be sure there are rudiments of it at the very least, since our brains are so similar -- even if not identical.

After all, your mental 'age' and your cognitive experiences, are not the same as ours. For evolutionary reasons they are likely to be vastly more similar than your experience is to your poodle's, but there is almost certainly more continuity than those who would like university research ethics panels (IRB's) to approve the experiments they propose on the grounds that dogs are just animals; those are the same people who argue that fish don't experience pain or fear.

Dogs seem to have remarkable intelligence, even in human-like ways, more than had been expected (though any dog owner might argue that this has always been obvious). If we want to set ourselves as an arbitrary baseline, it is legitimate to ask about the mental age of dogs. But we might learn more if we study rather than dismiss the cognitive mechanisms by which dogs vastly exceed our abilities, and by doing more than just counting the number of smell-receptors dogs have.

From a dog's point of view, we humans are really rather incompetent.


Wednesday, August 26, 2009

Do ants think?

A paper in the August PLoS ONE (Ants, Cataglyphis cursor, Use Precisely Directed Rescue Behavior to Free Entrapped Relatives, Nowbarhari et al.) reports rescue behavior in ants. That is, they actively attempt to save an entrapped ant by digging around it and pulling on its limbs. Previous reports of ant digging behavior have been dismissed as an alarm response rather than rescue, but the authors of this paper beg to differ.

For this study, the researchers exposed study ants to six different situations, as described here.
Using a novel experimental technique that binds victims experimentally, we observed the behavior of separate, randomly chosen groups of 5 C. cursor nestmates under one of six conditions. In five of these conditions, a test stimulus (the “victim”) was ensnared with nylon thread and held partially beneath the sand. The test stimulus was either (1) an individual from the same colony; (2) an individual from a different colony of C cursor; (3) an ant from a different ant species; (4) a common prey item; or, (5) a motionless (chilled) nestmate. In the final condition, the test stimulus (6) consisted of the empty snare apparatus.
Only active nestmates, ants from the same colony, elicited rescue behavior. Others evoked aggression or no reaction. The authors conclude that a struggling nestmate emits a colony-specific pheromone to which rescuing ants respond.
Moreover, C. cursor ants are able to engage in highly precise behavior directed toward the inanimate object that has entrapped their nestmate. Thus, our findings show that rescuers somehow were able to recognize what, exactly, held their relative in place and direct their behavior to that object in particular, demonstrating that rescue behavior is far more exact, sophisticated and complexly organized than previously observed. That is, limb pulling and digging behavior could be released directly by a chemical call for help and thus result from a relatively simple mechanism. However, it's difficult to see how this same simple releasing mechanism could guide rescuers to the precise location of the nylon thread, and enable them to target their bites to the thread itself.
It's the last sentence of this paragraph that interests us. The thread is obviously not emitting any chemical signal, and the ants are not 'pre-programmed' to know that danger is connect to the thread, and that they could break it with their pincers. Anyone who has observed ants for any time at all, including Darwin, must surely be impressed by their sophisticated cognitive, decision-making abilities. They work together to move barriers from their trails, they figure out ways around barriers they can't move, they cooperate to bring prey back to the nest, and so on.

Darwin himself said it very well in Descent of Man (1871):
...the wonderfully diversified instincts, mental powers, and affections of ants are notorious, yet their cerebral ganglia are not so large as the quarter of a pin's head. Under this view, the brain of an ant is one of the most marvelous atoms of matter in the world, perhaps more so than the brain of man.

It's easy to dismiss the rescue behaviors described in this PLoS paper as 'only' biochemical. But cognition and sophisticated decision-making are evolutionarily ancient. And, what are they, really, but the interaction of complex surface molecules and their receptors? We tend to privilege human thought capabilities, but in fact our brains are just signals, ligands and surface receptors, too.

Sunday, March 22, 2009

Smart bacteria

Last week Ken was at a meeting at the Santa Fe Institute, which was discussing the problem of the traditional concept of the 'gene' in the face of all the new discoveries of DNA-based functions that are very different from simple protein codes. That could be the subject of a future posting, but at the meeting was a well-known microbiologist, Jim Shapiro from the University of Chicago. In the course of conversation, we learned of a recent paper of Jim's that points out how sophisticated even a single bacterial cell is (you can get this from his website: scroll to the bottom and click on the second to last paper, Bacteria are small but not stupid). Indeed, Jim refers to 'cognition' in single cells.

This paper points out how very complex a single cell is, in terms of its internal structure, its diverse ability to sense and evaluate the environment, and its repertoire of responses. He stresses that a cell is not a stupid automaton in that sense. This is wholly consistent with points we tried to make in our book, and is sobering for attempts to boil even more complex traits, like multicellular organisms, into simple genetic causation. Of course genomes contribute to behavior of cells and organisms, but not in ways that are always simple. An important question is how enumerable such genomic effects are, and how 'hard-wired' even single cells are. Like so many other terms one might use, 'cognition' is a word with social or human-specific meanings, but using it for bacteria it is probably an important challenge to our hubris about ourselves. Bacteria may be 'just' bags of chemicals....but so are our brains. Where automated responses end and evaluative, facultative ones begin is not an easy question to answer.