Showing posts with label Mendel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mendel. Show all posts

Monday, January 13, 2014

The rise and fall and rise again of Mendelism

One hundred and fifty years ago, Moravian monk Gregor Mendel brought the world Mendelian inheritance.  That is, the Law of Segregation and the Law of Independent Assortment, among other related principles.  We took from his work the idea that we (and our very distant pea-plant relatives) each carry two copies of every gene and each parent randomly passes a single copy to his or her offspring.  And, genes are transmitted roughly independently of each other in the formation of sperm and eggs (this isn't strictly true for genes that are close to each other on a chromosome, and the sex chromosomes are a bit different--but these exceptions are irrelevant for this post).

These principles were derived from Mendel's work with pea plants, a study of carefully chosen traits that behaved in a particular way that he felt would be useful for forming better agricultural hybrid plants -- when he crossed plants with different flower color or seed characteristics etc., the traits did not 'blend' in subsequent generations but instead remained discrete: the offspring had one flower color and one type of seed coat; green peas crossed with yellow ones didn't produce in-between colored peas.  But, Mendel knew very well that not all traits behaved in this way; he just felt they weren't of interest for his purposes.  And without actually saying so, he looked for simple patterns of inheritance that fit other 'hot' science of his time, the development of the atomic theory of matter.

In 1854, in preparation for his later work, Mendel acquired 34 varieties of pea seed, Pisum sativum, from local nurseries.  He spent the next 2 years growing them to determine which characters bred true; that is, which parental traits would appear, unblended, in the offspring. Not all did. He chose 7 that did to follow through multiple generations. He produced 7 crosses, each repeated twice, from a seed plant with a particular trait and the second time with that same trait from the pollen plant. In this way he determined that the male and female contribute equally to the offspring.

He bred his plants for the next 8 years, counting the occurrence of the 7 traits in nearly 30,000 peas. Because he was astutely brilliant and chose his traits well, he was able to document what became known as recessive and dominant inheritance, as well as the random segregation of alleles in offspring, and the independent inheritance of genes for traits using a sample size large enough to produce convincing results.  In essence he developed statistical rules for the apparent inheritance of his chosen traits.  But, he knew he wasn't explaining all of inheritance.  And later work on plants that didn't behave according to his laws further confirmed that he hadn't explained everything (sometimes to his frustration, or even despair, though he had moved on to monastery administration by then).

The story of how Mendel's work was largely ignored for 40 years, and rediscovered in 1900 is well-known (we blogged about it some time ago, too, here and here, e.g.).  As genetics got under way in earnest in the next few decades, to a sufficient extent, given the technology of the time, Mendelian rules, indeed, seemed rather like 'laws' of nature, although it was clear they didn't explain everything.

Thomas Morgan in the fly room;
Nobelprize.org

One of the most influential and productive geneticists of the early era was Thomas Morgan.  He and his students at Columbia created the first linkage maps in fruit flies, identifying chromosomal loci associated with traits in the 1910's, and so on. Even as they did so, Morgan was aware that most traits were due to many genes, and that it was likely that most genes do more than one thing. He wrote in 1917, e.g.:
A man may be tall because he has long legs, or because he has a long body, or both. Some of the genes may affect all parts, but other genes may affect one region more than another. The result is that the genetic situation is complex and, as yet, not unraveled. (The Theory of the Gene, p 294).
And, Morgan ended the paragraph above with this sentence: "Added to this is the probability that the environment may also to some extent affect the end-product."

Morgan also knew that the genetic effect -- the 'trait'-- that he was studying could be restricted to just some developmental stage of his flies, but his point was not the trait but tracing its behavior relative to the idea that they had causal effects that were localized to particular places on chromosomes.  The trait-complexity was something he explicitly said needed to wait for a later time when more was known.

A student of Morgan's, A.H. Sturtevant, in his A History of Genetics (1965), wrote:
With Johannsen [who introduced the words "gene", "genotype" and "phenotype" in the early 1900's] it became evident that inherited variations could be slight and environmentally produced ones could be large, and that only experiments could distinguish them.
And:
In 1902 Bateson pointed out that it should be expected that many genes would influence such a character as stature, since it is so obviously dependent on many diverse and separately varying elements. This point of view was implied by Morgan in 1903 (Evolution and Adaptation, p. 277), and by Pearson in 1904.
In the early 1900's extensive studies of even Mendel's traits showed variation not consistent with simple 2-factor control (Ken wrote an Evolutionary Anthropology piece discussing some of this).  So, chromosomal loci associated with traits were being found, but it was also recognized that traits were complex.

We bring all this up because an MT reader, André Comeau, plant geneticist and pathologist, recently wrote to Ken with some thoughts on Canadian plant breeder (and flutist) Charles Saunders, developer of Marquis wheat, the most important variety of wheat of the last century in Canada. Saunders developed this wheat after a lot of cross-breeding of different wheats from around the world. Marquis wheat became commercially available in 1909 and because it had a shorter growing season than other available wheat varieties, by 1920, 90% of the wheat grown in Canada was Marquis.

In 1902, Saunders attended the lecture at which William Bateson, one of Mendel's earliest and fiercest proponents, "introduced the terms ‘‘genetics’’, ‘‘homozygote’’, and ‘‘heterozygote’’ and emphasized that ‘‘fixity’’ of parental characteristics was of utmost importance in breeding. Bateson concluded that presentation by stating that ‘‘The period of confusion is passing away, and we have at length a basis from which to attack that mystery [heredity] such as we could scarcely have hoped two years ago would be discovered in our time." (This quote is from a 2008 tribute to Saunders.)  (However, we should note that Bateson and many others did not think that these Mendealian traits, which were by definition faithfully transmitted and hence invariable -- as they then thought -- could have anything to do with evolution, which has to do with things that do vary).

Apparently Saunders quickly adopted Mendel's ideas, but Dr Comeau notes that he may have believed there was something Mendel had missed.  Saunders wrote in 1910, "...I cannot help believing that the discovery of the supposed Mendelian units of inheritance may sometimes be due to the unfortunate combination of a lot of enthusiasm and of a very small number of factual observations."  So, even early adopters of the idea of Mendelian inheritance were aware that it didn't explain everything.

But skip forward 100 years.  Emphasis is still on Mendelian inheritance.  The idea of "genes for" traits and diseases is still firmly held -- indeed, direct-to-consumer gene testing companies bank on it.  Yes, there are Mendelian diseases, and thousands of causal genes have been identified but, in the intervening century, it seems that Mendelian traits have gotten more complex, while complex traits are still thought of as simple.  That is, multiple, sometimes thousands of alleles have been identified for many Mendelian diseases (cystic fibrosis is the most obvious example), while the hope lives on that single genes are still to be found for diseases that are difficult to define and pretty clearly polygenic, and/or have a large environmental component (heart disease or type 2 diabetes or autism are examples of these).

The history in broad brush
During the past century, there were basically two branches of genetics.  In one, Mendelian inheritance was used to find out much about genetic transmission and even to identify the nature of genes.  Much of genetics was Mendelian, involved in segregation analysis which was the statistical attempt to show whether a given trait (and its presumed causal gene) was inherited as a Dominant, Recessive, Sex-Linked etc. manner.  This formed the foundation of the very useful 'personalized' medicine called genetic counseling.

Fudge factors were introduced to accommodate the imperfect nature of the results -- uninherited instances were called 'phenocopies', and results that didn't fit the expected probabilities associated with diploid transmission (of one factor from a parent who carried two, as we do), and so on were introduced.  These allowed the models to be fitted to the theory, without forcing adherents to the theory to take the issues very seriously.  Partly, we didn't have the technical means to take it too seriously.  But the nuances were noted!

The other branch of genetics was called quantitative genetics, relating to traits caused by many genes.  Generally, these were quantitatively measured traits, like size, enzyme levels and so on.  Polygenic traits were understood even in the early 1900s to be caused by many genes, even if we had almost no way to find them.  Formal statistical theory, association and regression analysis basically, was developed by leading geneticists.  They knew actual genes were involved, but didn't have the technical means to find them.

We were also aware of traits that seemed to cluster in families but not to segregate with Mendel's probabilities.  So we compromised:  they were threshold traits, based on a quantitative polygenic basis.  Your genotype affected your blood pressure in a polygenic way, but if your blood pressure exceeded some limit, or threshold, you had a stroke.  So the threshold value somewhat represented a quasi-Mendelian trait.

Gene mapping from the dawn of its earliest methods about 25-30 years ago brought everything full circle.  The idea was that we could find the genes that 'caused' any old trait we were interested in.  Big early 'hits' included cystic fibrosis, and some cancer-related genes such as the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.  This led people to expect that everything could be predicted by identifying genes.

In turn, even when Mendelians themselves knew they had to introduce fudge factors, and quantitative geneticists knew that multiple genes contributed small effects, the public was sold on the idea that with Big Technology every trait would turn out to be enumerably 'genetic'.

Now in fact, these methods have shown that the 'simple' Mendelian traits' fudge factors reflected underlying complexity even at a single major causative gene.  People who have mutations that are associated in others with severe diseases can show no sign of disease, for example.  And polygenic traits turned out to be just that.  But it turns out that the confusion between inheritance of genetic material, and the inheritance of traits, persists even when (unlike in Mendel's garden) we know better.

Thus, it is the full recognition of these realities that is being resisted by the Big Data community, who cling to the idea of simple answers with high predictive power.  And that means, though Mendel should in a sense be consigned to a very honorable place in the history books of a science to which his work contributed so mightily, the tendency to exhume his ideas, to generate false promises, seems irresistible.

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

Conceptual inertia in science: what is simpler and more straightforward? A comment on 'Mendelism'

We now know enough about genetics to give up, as historical relics, terms like Mendelian, dominant, and recessive.  But their use lingers on. The habit of Mendelian terminology is one that we owe, of course, to Gregor Mendel and his work on pea-plant hybridization published in 1865, roughly contemporary with Darwin  The idea that a trait is inherited and could have two states, one of which had an over-riding effect relative to the other, clarified the nature of one kind of inheritance and led to a huge explosion of successful research that ultimately showed that inheritance involved particles of biological causation ('genes').  It provided a research strategy that led to the discovery of the nature and function of chromosomes, of DNA, its protein-coding nature, that causal elements were discrete segments of DNA, and it explained major aspects of inheritance.  In this sense, few discoveries in any science have had a greater impact on human knowledge than Mendel's work.

Mendel's 7 chosen traits

But Mendel was Mendel and times have moved on.  We now know that what is inherited is not traits but coding molecules that affect or produce traits are.  We know of many functional elements in DNA beyond direct protein-coding that affect gene expression, and we know that much if not most of the time, no single element produces a trait.  Further, variation (a central aspect of evolution and genomic function) usually has quantitative (taller, higher blood pressure, higher cholesterol) rather than qualitative (yes/no, green/yellow, sick/well) effects.  Indeed, Mendel knew this, too, and carefully selected traits that behaved themselves relative to his purpose of creating better, predictable strains of pea plants.  (Actually, more than DNA-based codes are inherited, because DNA depends on its cellular context, but that's another topic). 

Old terms past their utility
The problem with continuing to treat the basic model of genetic causation as one in which traits are due to inheritance of variants from a single gene, with one variant being 'dominant' over the other, is that it constrains our thinking.  A lot that we now know about genetics doesn't fit the model.  A lot that Mendel knew doesn't fit the model!  A lot of dichotomous traits that Mendel knew don't fit the model!

Sometimes the effects of both variants are seen, or the trait actually varies based on which variants a person has, or there are many variants in the population with differing effects, including none, and the variant we call 'dominant' sometimes doesn't manifest itself.  When we don't see effects, we say the variant has 'incomplete penetrance', or, for quantitative traits some 'dominance deviation', but that's misleading.  What is the information content of saying that the 'A' allele is dominant, except when it isn't?  Penetrance probability is a fudge factor that forces a model to fit when it actually doesn't.

When a fudge factor is invoked in science, it is a signal that something about the theory is wrong.

When are children old enough to learn the truth?
I've heard people acknowledge that, yes, the classical terms that we get from Mendel, like dominant and recessive, are misleading but then go on to argue that they are the simple and right way to introduce inheritance to students.  Let's introduce concepts slowly, adding complexities later when they're grown up enough to understand.

We disagree.  We think that such an approach entrenches simplistic and misleading thinking in students' understanding of genetics, where it hangs around in their mental background even when they become professionals who do or should know better.  So we don't like this approach. Indeed, it's based on an incorrect premise.

We think young minds can just as easily understand that we inherit a copy of each gene from each parent, and each confers some effect.  Call it a and b, and the result is a-and-b.  That's about as simple as an explanation can get.  Then we can note that sometimes one of the variants by itself has a huge effect that we can't miss, and those effects have often been discovered first, because they were easy to find. 

Here is an extract from the Wikipedia entry for the blood-clotting disease trait called Factor V Leiden:
Factor V Leiden is an autosomal dominant condition that exhibits incomplete dominance and results in a factor V variant that cannot be as easily degraded by aPC (activated Protein C).. . . .Up to 30 percent of patients who present with deep vein thrombosis (DVT) or pulmonary embolism have this condition. The risk of developing a clot in a blood vessel depends on whether a person inherits one or two copies of the factor V Leiden mutation. Inheriting one copy of the mutation from a parent (heterozygous) increases by fourfold to eightfold the chance of developing a clot. People who inherit two copies of the mutation (homozygous), one from each parent, may have up to 80 times the usual risk of developing this type of blood clot.[9] Considering that the risk of developing an abnormal blood clot averages about 1 in 1,000 per year in the general population, the presence of one copy of the factor V Leiden mutation increases that risk to between 4 in 1,000 to 8 in 1,000. Having two copies of the mutation may raise the risk as high as 80 in 1,000. It is unclear whether these individuals are at increased risk for recurrent venous thrombosis. 
Now, we happen to think that while this may be technically correct description, it is burdened by a concept that it tries to assert and yet then to deny in the same initial phrase--Factor V Leiden is "autosomal dominant", and yet exhibits "incomplete dominance".  The trait would be called both Mendelian and dominant by most people.  But it is neither.  What it is, is a trait whose measure (severity or frequency of attack or relevance to experiences such as taking birth control pills in women) depends on the genotype and is both quantitative and probabilistic.

Why not just say that "The risk of blood clotting is affected by a person's specific genotype in the F5 gene, which determines the strength of the gene's effect"?  That is a true, accurate, and direct statement.

There is no need to call it 'Mendelian' in the sense that the trait itself is inherited (the gene certainly is!) nor 'dominant', and then take it back in the same breath. That obfuscates by jargon that sounds knowledgeable but conveys essentially no information and indeed by conveying less information than our statement in the prior paragraph.  The harm is that by oversimplifying it distracts attention from the search for the causal truth, making a problem seem solved when it hasn't been.

Teach the truth
If we follow the kind of approach we suggest here, the truth is actually simpler and just as easy to digest as a 19th century first-look at a problem--simpler, that is, for new students not already acculturated to obsolete thinking.  Teach the truth and we'd have fewer inaccuracies to have to un-teach later.  Since most genetic diseases are not simple, we go on to say that the 'penetrance' of each genotype is complex and depends on life and environmental (and other unknown) factors that probably include modifying effects of the genotype in each person at other unidentified genome locations.

We could then go on to say that, as a matter of history, Mendel chose special cases that were clear and this is how he understood diploid genotype-phenotype relationships.  He found situations where there were only two variants in a gene, one with much stronger effects than the other, and this allowed him to track inheritance across generations and understand the situation.  Etc.

And we can go on to say (yes, now to more advanced students), that variation in F5 is the most common single genetic risk factor for 'thrombophilia' (above average tendency to form blood clots) in Europeans, but not the only one, and many non-genetic factors can also be involved.  So F5 is a cause of clotting, with high penetrance, but not the cause, in the same way that speeding affects risk of car crashes but is not the only risk factor.

We use penetrance properly as the term that connects genotypes and phenotypes, and we don't need to refer to 'Mendelian' traits etc.  We could avoid terms like 'dominance' completely, or at least when we introduce them make it clear that they are complex subtle terms with variable meanings.  In so doing, the next generation could be freed of the conceptual inertia of the Victorian era.

Tuesday, October 29, 2013

This just in: genes 'for' disease might be an outdated concept!

By Anne Buchanan and Ken Weiss

Science writer David Dobbs has a nice piece over at Slate this week, wrapping up the American Society of Human Genetics meetings that just took place in Boston.  Yes, he writes, the field of Human Genetics can report successes finding genes for rare diseases, and sequencing genomes has gotten fast and (relatively) cheap.  But the overall story is one of "struggle and confusion."  Reports of genes for [fill-in-the-blank] can't be replicated, some sequencing methods are missing causal mutations, and indeed, "[t]here's a real possibility that "the majority of cancer predisposition genes in databases are wrong.""  This is a time of growing humility, Dobbs writes, as geneticists recognize that the promise of the human genome as portrayed by Francis Collins and Craig Venter et al. in 2000 has not panned out.

At the same time, a new paper in Trends in Genetics ("A century after Fisher: time for a new paradigm in quantitative genetics", Nelson, Pettersson and Carlborg, 23 Oct, 2013), tweeted and retweeted on Oct 28, argues that, well, biology is complex. 
Despite easy access to commercial personal genetics services, our knowledge of the genetic architecture of common diseases is still very limited and has not yet fulfilled the promise of accurately predicting most people at risk. This is partly because of the complexity of the mapping relationship between genotype and phenotype that is a consequence of epistasis (gene-gene interaction) and other phenomena such as gene-environment interaction and locus heterogeneity. Unfortunately, these aspects of genetic architecture have not been addressed in most of the genetic association studies that provide the knowledge base for interpreting large-scale genetic association results. 
This is not new news!
But, we ask, why is any of this news??  In response to Dobbs's tweets on Oct 28 about his Slate piece, Jason Moore reminded Dobbs about a paper he and and Scott Williams published in 2009 in which they argued, "based on the emerging data and analyses, that elucidating the genetic architecture of breast cancer and comparable diseases must focus on underlying complexity." Another paper about epistasis.

It's perhaps self-serving of us to point this out, but there have been plenty more, and much earlier warnings about complexity.  If it seems strictly like vanity, we have pointed out that these publications noted that the basic theoretical understanding, and data to support it, had been known for close on a century.

For example, in the days when sequencing a single gene was still news, we were involved in one of the first projects to document variation, the extent of which was surprising at the time -- but shouldn't be any longer.  That was a cardiovascular disease project and here's just one of the papers that resulted, documenting variation in the human lipoprotein lipase (LPL) gene.  This was one of the first publications to alert the human genetics community that the genetics of disease was going to be more complex than people were expecting.  Published in Nature Genetics, the news was not hidden.  

In 2000, Weiss and Terwilliger argued in a commentary, again in Nature Genetics ("How many diseases does it take to map a gene with SNPs?"), that the common disease/common variant model then current was based on faulty understanding of population genetics and biology. It was, they said,
...fuelled by a faith that the genetic determinants of complex traits are tractable, and that knowledge of genetic variation will materially improve the diagnosis, treatment or prevention of a substantial fraction of cases of the diseases that constitute the major public health burden of industrialized nations. Much of the enthusiasm is based on the hope that the marginal effects of common allelic variants account for a substantial proportion of the population risk for such diseases in a usefully predictive way. A main area of effort has been to develop better molecular and statistical technologies, often evaluated by the question: how many SNPs (or other markers) do we need to map genes for complex diseases? We think the question is inappropriately posed, as the problem may be one primarily of biology rather than technology.
Note that this paper was published 13 years ago.  Terwilliger has said numerous times that it could be published again today, without changing a word.  In fact, we'll post the conclusion from the paper here, as it's still entirely a propos. 
Resistance to genetic reductionism is not new, and we know that, by expressing these views (some might describe them as heresies), we risk being seen as stereotypic nay-sayers. However,ours is not an argument against genetics, but for a revised genetics that interfaces more intimately with biology. Biological traitshave evolved by noise-tolerant evolutionary mechanisms, and atrait that doesn't manifest until long after the reproductive lifespan of most humans throughout history is unlikely to be genetic in the traditional, deterministic sense of the term. Most genetic studies that focus on humans are designed, in effect, to mimic Mendel’s choice of experimental system, with only two or three frequent states with strongly different effects. That certainly enables us to characterize some of the high-penetrance tail of distribution of the allelic effects, but as noted above these may usually be rather rare. But inflated claims based on this approach can divert attention from the critical issue of how to deal with complexity on its own terms, and fuel false hopes for simple answers to complex questions. The problems faced in treating complex diseases as if they were Mendel's peas show, without invoking theterm in its faddish sense, that 'complexity' is a subject that needs its own operating framework, a new twenty-first rather than nineteenth or even twentieth century genetics.
Here's a figure from that paper, showing the logic of causation, and gene mapping strategy.

From Weiss and Terwilliger, Nat Genet, 2000
Schematic model of trait aetiology. The phenotype under study, Ph, is influenced by diverse genetic, environmental and cultural factors (with interactions indicated in simplified form). Genetic factors may include many loci of small or large effect, GPi, and polygenic background. Marker genotypes, Gx, are near to (and hopefully correlated with) genetic factor, Gp, that affects the phenotype. Genetic epidemiology tries to correlate Gx with Ph to localize Gp. Above the diagram, the horizontal lines represent different copies of a chromosome; vertical hash marks show marker loci in and around the gene, Gp, affecting the trait. The red Pi are the chromosomal locations of aetiologically relevant variants, relative to Ph.
That commentary wasn't hidden either, published as it was in Nature Genetics.   And a paper by Weiss and Clark a few years later ("Linkage disequilibrium and the mapping of complex human traits", Trends in Genetics, 1 Jan, 2002), argued that the then-current idea of common variants/common disease was not based on "sound population genetic principles".  They showed that there were good, long-known reasons why the idea was simplistic and wouldn't pan out as a way to find genes for many common diseases, as it proved not to.

Indeed, in Ken's own Cambridge Press book published in 1993 Genetic Variation and Human Disease, the situation was also rather clearly laid out, even at the beginning of the mapping era.  Of course, we weren't the only people writing about this, but the important point is that the issue is not new, and the reasons for expecting things to be more or less as we have found them were stated for the right reasons---reasons that go back to the early 1900s and are often attributed to RA Fisher's famous 1918 paper on polygenic inheritance that in many ways laid the foundation for the modern evolutionary synthesis that united Mendelian inheritance and Darwinian evolution.  Others, less routinely credited, were just as clearly pointing out the multilocus causation of complex traits.

We've published in print and on this blog a number of commentaries on complexity, the perils of genetic reductionism, and the need to move beyond Mendel.  So why is it taking so long for the profession to learn, or to recognize, the situation?

Why the deaf ear?
The answer is complex and we've described the influence of Mendelian thinking (of single gene causation, among other things), the hope for simple, easy success with dramatic effects, the way this played into the grant system, the lobbying for funding, and (importantly) the evolving tractability of experimental approaches.  Humans, even purportedly objective scientists, hear what they are attuned to hear, and reject or dismiss or mention only in passing things that are inconvenient.

If you do sequencing or genotyping and you know how to collect piles of genetic data and analyze it, and you get your grants by doing that (and, directly or subtly promising cures), and have a staff whose jobs you want to protect (including your own medical school salary), and the media reward bold announcements, or you're an NIH project officer with a grant portfolio to protect, then you won't hear the music of the spheres.  In many ways, the dog (state-of-the-art technology) is wagging the tail (questions and interpretation).

Also, and to be at least somewhat fair, you will retrospectively cite the successes that clearly do arise from this approach, even if they may mainly be only partial.  You will justify business as usual by the argument that serendipity has led to many major scientific advances so if we keep pouring resources into this particular approach, until the next generation of fancy equipment is available etc., that some lucky discoveries will be made (you don't point out that if we instead focused resources on what really is 'genetic', we would also make serendipitous discoveries).

So you manufacture exciting! news.  We have this or that mystery!  It's the hidden heritability, for example, and the solution is that it's all copy number variation!, or rare not common variants!, or will be found in whole genome sequencing!, or it's epigenomics!, or proteomics, or the microbiome!, or you-name-it. 

More of the same can be predicted
Science usually works in this way, especially in our industrial-scale business-model world. The hunger for the secret key is quite understandable. No one will or perhaps no one can, slow down and think first, and lobby only afterwords.
 
As is usually the case in human society, our profession will move towards some new set of claims, when like a school of fish something comes along and it's where the funding will lie.  Meanwhile, we have a long list of known causes that could have major public health benefits if they were as aggressively pursued (e.g., the fact that most diseases being mapped are more environmentally than genomically caused, the fact that we have hundreds of single-locus traits for which real concentrated effort might lead to cures or prevention, etc.).

But can there be something better? 
From the meeting: 

Dobbs writes, "If the field is currently a bit lost in the fog, whoever clears the air could become to Watson and Crick as Watson and Crick were to Darwin."  But to a great extent, the air has been cleared!  While genes 'for' most common complex diseases aren't being found, and we still can't predict who'll get what sometime down the road, we've learned a tremendous amount in the last several decades -- some, mostly rare, mostly pediatric diseases are caused by single genes, but most traits are complex, polygenic, caused by no one pathway, and most likely involve gene by environment causation.

Is rethinking just a word, in an area that really will simply yield to an increase in the scale of operations?  Or is some truly new conceptualization in order, and if it is, what might it be?

We'll comment on this and make some suggestions next time.

Friday, May 11, 2012

More on Mendel

We blogged about Gregor Mendel's insights in a recent post, and we mentioned various questions about what he did and what he thought he did and wanted to do.  There is no question, however, that his work was used to produce one of the most powerful research methods in the history of science.  Combined with the methodology that resulted from Darwin's ideas (that is, the understanding that life has diverged from common ancestry, and the traits that have evolved had to be viable in their respective environments), biology made great progress in understanding development and evolution.

Mendel
The  so-called 'Modern Synthesis' of the 1930s and 40s united patterns of inheritance with understanding of how inherited variation accumulated over time in diverging species, making a consistent underlying framework for understanding much of the nature of life.  The result today can be called the 'Darwinian' method (we blogged about this earlier in a series of posts starting here).

However, Mendel's work also led to the often unstated expectation of clear-cut 'phenogenetic' connections--that is, between genes and traits.  More specifically, his work led to the idea that genes 'cause' traits and that natural selection only works on genetic effects.  That's because non-inherited effects, which certainly do exist, disappear with the individuals bearing them,while genetic effects are 'written' in genetic posterity until modified by further genetic change.  This is over-simplified, but still a powerful and valid way to view life.

But the truth is that phenogenetic connections are not all that precise.  When traits are controlled by many genes, each varying in a population, then each individual with the 'same' trait may have it for different genetic reasons.  The expectation of strong phenogenetic connections is the problem limiting GWAS and other genome-based attempts to explain, much less to predict,  disease or other traits. Overall, the problem can be seen in the common confusing of inheritance of genes, which does happen, with the inheritance of traits which doesn't (except for those present in a fertilized seed or egg).  Traits arise from genes, at least in part, and may resemble those in ancestors, but it is inaccurate if not misleading to think of traits as inherited directly.

Seen another way, when traits are the result of many different contributing genes that can each vary, as is so common, then even the same trait in an offspring and its parent (e.g., how tall they are), are affected by genes but are not due to the same genotype.  There are many traits in which variation really is largely due to single genes, but these are the luscious hooks that have addicted us to Mendelian principles when they don't really apply.

Furthermore, from an evolutionary viewpoint, genetic (reproductive) success is a relative concept among individuals in a population, and hence does not lie in genes alone, but in the environment in which they find themselves, and that is always changeable.  Even the future genetic environment is not entirely predictable, nor are the non-genetic aspects of environment (like our lifestyles).

Also, Mendel's rules are about the transmission of elements--genetic variants--from parent to offspring when the parents are dipoid, that is, when there is sexual reproduction and each of two parents carries two copies of each gene.  Bacteria and many other species (which means most species!) are haploid (only one copy of their genome) and don't transmit in a Mendelian way which is to choose between two copies.  This is what got Mendel into trouble when he began to experiment with hawkweed.

This means that the Modern synthesis was about diploid evolution, not evolution per se.  The evolutionary principles don't require Mendelian 'laws'.  This shows, in perhaps another way, that what Mendel did was provide a method for understanding variable transmission, that was used to discover what genes are and where they are in cells.

These issues make practical differences in science.  Today, GWAS and direct genome sequence comparisons used to look for causal genetic variation (say, of diabetes or autism) compare individuals sampled not from families as was necessary before we could really identify specific gene sequences, but sampled by their trait (cases vs controls, for example), with the genes searched directly to find variation preferentially associated with some specific trait value.  We can see this in the fact that new mutations arise all the time, that may have causal effect but were not transmitted from the person's parents.

In a sense, the properly lauded Modern Synthesis arose by the rejection of Mendelian causation, in the sense that clear-cut trait-inheritance was not required either for biological traits or for their evolution, if genetic variants, no matter how small or even statistically undetectable their effects, was transmitted in Mendelian fashion.  Rejecting the idea that traits were largely inherited as distinct effects made things consistent with gradual evolution of complex traits, and that made the synthesis possible.

But mixing Mendelian genetic transmission principles with genetic causal principles has led, we think, to expecting too  much of specific genes.

Tuesday, May 8, 2012

What do we know about Gregor Mendel and his work?


Gregor Mendel: public domain
What 'everyone knows' about Mendel
Ken and I were asked to compile an annotated bibliography on Gregor Mendel for Oxford University Press's new bibliography initiative, Oxford Bibliographies Online (OBO).  Our contribution will be in their new and growing Anthropology section.  The Press is investing a lot in this, and they hope it will be widely used.  Access is subscription-based, however, so presumably it's intended to be primarily for students and academics, whose university libraries subscribe.

Anyway, we agreed to do it, thinking it would be a good reason to explore more about Mendel.  And it was.  We thought we knew pretty much enough about him to do this, since we knew what everyone knows about Mendel -- he was the Father of Modern Genetics, he was a Moravian monk who experimented on peas, which led him to propose his Laws of Inheritance.

But, as it turns out only some of the things that "everyone knows" about Mendel are unassailable, while the rest of his legacy continues to be debated.  Why did he do his experiments?  Was he interested in understanding hybridization or heredity?  What did he think he discovered?  Did he actually propose his laws?  Did he fudge his results?  Was he brilliant and innovative, or did he do ordinary science, producing results that everyone already knew?  And, why was his work ignored for 34 years after it was published?

These questions have been written about extensively, to say the least.  Mostly, of course, authors laud Mendel, reinforcing his status as an icon of foundational brilliance in biology.  But while some scholars suggest that the answers are clear in his 1866 paper, this isn't enough for others.  Not long after Mendel's work was rediscovered in 1900, the statistician RA Fisher accused Mendel of cooking the books, since for statistical evidence his results were so close to what was expected by his theory.  In particular they were too close to a mistaken expectation based on his theory.  That debate has been ongoing, although most scholars believe Fisher misinterpreted Mendel's explanations of what he had done, and that Fisher's accusations were unwarranted.  (Ken wrote one of his first columns for Evolutionary Anthropology on this, in 2002, coming down firmly in favor of Mendel's integrity and the importance of his work.  Another fine contribution to this debate is a 2001 paper by Daniel Fairbanks and Bryce Rytting, in the American Journal of Botany, in which they address these issues.)

Mendel's life and work
Mendel was born in 1822, into a farming family in Austrian Silesia, a province of the Austrian Empire,  now the Czech Republic.  His parents sent him to school, but hoped, as their only son, that he would one day take over the farm.  He studied with a teacher interested in horticulture, who recognized him as a student with promise, and encouraged him to go to university.  Mendel was determined to further his education, but due to difficulties at home, including that his father had a serious accident which meant he couldn't farm, at least for some time, Mendel was unable to finance his way.  He seems to have been a sensitive soul, and describes this difficult time in a short autobiography he wrote when he was 28 as a part of his application for a teacher's examination.
Four years later, due to several successive disasters, his parents were completely unable to meet the expenses necessary to continue his studies, and it therefore happened that the respectfully undersigned, then only sixteen years old, was in the sad position of having to provide for himself entirely. For this reason, he attended the course for "School Candidates [applicants] and Private Teachers" at the district Teacher's Seminary in Troppau. Since, following his examination, he was highly recommended in the qualification report (enclosure B), he succeeded by private tutoring during the time of his humanities studies in earning a scanty livelihood. 
When he graduated from the Gymnasium in the year 1840, his first care was to secure for himself the necessary means for the continuation of his studies. Because of this, he made repeated attempts in Olmiitz, to offer his services as a private teacher, but all his efforts remained unsuccessful because of lack of friends and recommendations. The sorrow over these disappointed hopes and the anxious, sad outlook which the future offered him, affected him so powerfully at that time, that he fell sick and was compelled to spend a year with his parents to recover.
Pisum sativum: painting by Otto Wilhelm
The entire autobiography, only two pages long, is well worth reading, even if somewhat melodramatic.  Because his parents could not afford to send him to university, his best remaining option was to enter a monastery, which he did at age 21, joining the Augustinian Abbey in Brno.  Because he was so sensitive, he was unable to perform priestly duties such as visiting the ill, so the abbot, a scholarly man himself, with interest in horticulture, sent him to the University of Vienna instead, where he studied physics, meteorology, botany, and mathematics.  He left after three years and returned to the abbey where he resumed teaching.

And, he began his experiments with peas. In 1854 he acquired 34 varieties of pea seed, Pisum sativum, from local nurseries and spent the next 2 years growing them to determine which characters bred true. Of these he chose 7 traits to follow through multiple generations--plant height, blossom color, pea characteristics, and so on. He produced 7 crosses, each repeated twice, from a seed plant with a particular trait and the second time with that same trait from the pollen plant, thus demonstrating that the male and female contribute equally to the offspring.


The traits of interest to Mendel: public domain image
He carried on his experiments for 8 years, counting the occurrence of these traits in nearly 30,000 peas. Because he chose his traits well, intentionally avoiding traits that did not breed true, he was able to document what became known as recessive and dominant inheritance, as well as the random segregation of alleles in offspring, and the independent inheritance of genes for traits using a sample size large enough to produce robust results.

Mendel described his findings in two lectures, which he gave to the Brünn Society for Natural Science in 1865. It is said that no one in the audience understood the importance of what they heard that night. The lectures were subsequently published as Versuche über Pflanzenhybriden, or, in English, Experiments on Plant Hybridization in the Proceedings of the Natural History Society of Brünn, but his work met a muted reception and was long ignored.

Among others, Mendel sent his paper to renowned Swiss botanist, Karl Wilhelm von Nägeli, for review but even Nägeli seems not to have understood its importance, and recommended that Mendel verify his findings with further experiments, this time on Hieracium, or hawkweed. Unfortunately, these are plants with unusual modes of inheritance, and the experiments did not give Mendel the results he would have expected, given what he knew about peas.

Mendel died in 1884, either believing his work would be recognized one day, or discouraged, and believing he really hadn't found anything of importance, depending on who you read. Because he was not a person of note when he died, all of his personal papers, letters, notes from his experiments, were burned not long after his death. For this reason, it's difficult to reconstruct his experiments, his thoughts about his motivation and what he believed he found -- the aspects of his life and work that are still debated.

Among the few documents written by Mendel that survived his death were the letters he wrote to Nägeli. He also wrote a paper describing his work on hawkweed, which was published, after which he did no further work with plants. Whether this was because he was discouraged or because he was distracted by work, as he had become abbot by then, is not known. He had a lifelong interest in meteorology, as well as horticulture, and published a paper in 1871 suggesting the cause of tornadoes. His reasoning was largely correct, but this paper, too, was long ignored.

His legacy

These are the bare bones of Mendel's life and work. A handful of excellent biographies have been written, as well of hundreds of papers asking and addressing the questions of the legitimacy and motivation of his work. The most measured of these (a 1992 paper by Orel and Hartl is among the best) suggest that if people would simply read his paper, they'd see that he explained what he did and why, and what he thought he had discovered. Indeed, he wrote to Nägeli that he was sure his work would be understood in the fullness of time.

Mendel did not formulate what have come to be known as his Laws, although he did understand about independent assortment and segregation of whatever it was that caused his traits, he didn't discover genes, although he understood there were Anlage, or 'elements' that were inherited and caused his traits, he didn't discover dominant and recessive alleles, although he understood that pairs of elements were inherited, but only one trait was seen in the first generation, while two were seen in subsequent generations, nor were his experiments muddied by genetic linkage, two genes close together on a chromosome that were inherited together rather than independently.

Mendel did many things for science, regardless of how he felt about his work. He laid out the foundations for the understanding of genetics. But that was because of the methodological path his work opened. Genes became real, discoverable causal entities fundamental to life. His 'cheating' was totally minor as far as this goes.

But Mendel misled us in important ways, as well. By making his points with highly selected, simple traits, he provided an expectation of strong single-element causation as the basis of biology. That helped find genes when they were closely connected to traits, as in his peas. But most biological causation--relationship between genes and traits, is far from simple in that way. So he also misled us, in ways Ken tried to outline a few years ago. We'll note some of the implications of his work in a forthcoming post.

Meanwhile, Mendel is properly honored for laying the groundwork for the time when enough was known about genes and heredity that his results could be understood in context, and built upon. As such, he was indeed the Father of Modern Genetics.

Thursday, August 11, 2011

Mendelian inheritance: conclusion

Where does having the right theory make a difference?  Why can't we just assume that a major 'dominant' effect evolves because of its effect?  Why can't we continue to just give genetic counseling risk estimates in Mendelian theoretical terms?

The reason is that these usages are inaccurate at best, and in today's world  not needed.  We have better computational tools than we did when these things began in the mid 1900s.  Instead, for example, of the expected 1/2 for segregation proportions (for traits, not alleles) we can develop estimates of the actual probability of the trait in an offspring of an affected parent.  It would be something like the probability of inheritance of the major parental allele, times the probability of a given effect size (trait measure, for example) plus or times something about environmental effects where known plus  a similar term for the other parent.

Mendel was accused of cheating because his results were too close to his expectations to be due just to chance (there's more to the story since in his case the expectations he was too close to were wrong! see my article in 2002 Evolutionary Anthropology "Goings on in Mendel's garden").  But that is just what genetic risk estimators are doing!  They are using 1/2 for the expected risk of the trait, rather than whatever the empirical evidence, properly studied, shows the risk is.

And similarly, by digesting the message, no longer confounding inheritance of traits with inheritance of genetic elements, we can go beyond rigid statistical 'significance' in GWAS, which is of the same kind as false expectations, and consider all the bits of information that we have.

These are seriously erroneous concepts that misdirect science on a large scale.  They waste funds and lead to false expectations.  It is one thing to pursue ideas that seem, at the time, to be correct even if they eventually prove to be inaccurate--indeed, all ideas are probably of that sort.  But it is quite another to pursue ideas that one knows to be wrong, because that's a way to build a career or you are in a hurry and can't think of better ideas.

Many scientists accept, absorb, and repeat oversimplified dogma.  They teach 'the scientific method', 'survival of the fittest',  classical Mendelism, and the 'modern synthesis'.  They repeat that "nothing in biology makes sense except in light of evolution" (even though most have only a caricature idea of evolution, or what most life scientists actually do on a daily basis).

Maybe they are aware of the inaccuracies, or maybe when teaching they scorn their students' abilities to know the difference.  We think this is  not good for science.  But there is something else, that you might think is even worse.  That is that many if not the vast majority of scientists basically don't bother to think about these things and, like Rhett Butler, simply don't give a damn.

They (we) do our work regardless.  We push ahead to prove our favorite point of view, claiming to follow some principles when it suits us, ignoring them when it doesn't.  It is strictly pragmatic.  There is a lot of dissembling done on a daily basis. Careers have to be made, grants to be garnered, magazines to publish.

All of this is poor practice, but understandable.  Nature is complicated, scientists fallible, experiments and technology often imprecise, and so on.  We stumble, bumble, and bluff our way through.  Things don't go as smoothly as perhaps they might if we were more rigorous relative to theory.  Grants pay for work that they shouldn't.  But, being fallible and having to make a living, we plow ahead and in the end, here and there, there is progress.

In retrospect,  the heroes are remembered and recognized by historians and the media.  Laws of Nature are named after them.  Statues erected, biographies written.  The chaff and blind alleys, and most of us scientists, are  forgotten except by historians.  Philosophers revise their philosophy of science, and science revises its theories.  Life goes on.

That may be the blunt reality, and like other Utopian ideals, our theories of how we act fall short.  In the daily, perhaps rather smug and dismissive, hurly-burly of science, the theoretical fineries are ignored if not actually sneered at.

But shouldn't we do better?  Shouldn't we strive to train students better and to have a better idea of the nature of Nature, so we can be more efficient or effective?  If we are so willing to denigrate alchemy, phrenology,  humoral medicine and phlebotomy, as wrong and wasteful....and to criticize the illusions of religious dogma, should we accept dogmatic ignorance in today's science?  We think not.

Mendelism is we think a good example of something held too rigidly too long past its sell date.  It's taken by rote as a basic core fact of biology, in ways that impede progress and wastes large amounts of funds that service the professions but not the population paying the bill.  We can do better.

Wednesday, August 10, 2011

Mendelian inheritance and evolution. Part III

We've discussed some problems with the idea of Mendelian inheritance as a misleading legacy from the kinds of work that Mendel had to do, that has persisted deeply into modern thinking in ways that we think are misleading at best, or even plain wrong for several reasons.

First, because genetic units, not traits are what is inherited.  A fertilized egg doesn't have legs or a brain nor pollenated pea seed have color, wrinkles, or plant-height.  What is inherited are genetic variants that affect these traits in the adult organism.

Mendelism was wrong because most variation, the variation that enabled the modern synthesis to unite discrete Mendelian genetic inheritance with gradual Darwinian evolution, was generally minor relative to Mendel's purposes.  Clear discrete states and dominance are not the general ground state of biology.  In a population individual genes have many more than 2 alleles (variant sequences) and the effects of their paired combinations in individuals (plants and animals) is associated with more than two trait states (yellow or green).  Even at single loci, even when some alleles are in the traditional sense dominant relative to others, the dominance is usually not complete or invariate.

Mendelism was wrong in that the key to uniting discrete genetic inheritance with gradual variation in traits and their evolution, was that many different genotypes--combinations of alleles--yield the same trait.  When many genes co-contribute, as is widely the case, the trait can be called complex or 'polygenic'.   This is because the individual effects are generally small relative to the variation in the trait.  Small basically 'additive' effects predominate, rather than strongly determinative ones.  We had to give up on notions of Mendelian inheritance were then (and still widely are today) widespread.  But that this was the key to the modern synthesis was not widely perceived in these terms.

One could object that oh, yes what we say applies to multigenic traits, but not to single-gene traits.  Aren't there hundreds of these on the books, in human disease and in other species as well?  We'd respond that in real life most clear dominance or single-locus traits are much less dichotomous or simple that in general perception or in the textbooks, and  adaptation and complex function are demonstrably cooperative and multigenic rather than singe-factor competitive.  Complex organisms couldn't really function or evolve if they were just a bag of individual dominant, Mendelianly inherited traits.  And not only are most traits multi-genic, but genes, no matter how our definitions what a gene is change, are multi-allelic in natural populations.

Once we realize this, we have to accept that in general, statistical dominance, which we explained in an early post in these series, is a population rather than biologically inherent property of individuals.  It is the exception, and only a partial exception that is classically Mendelian: partial, because often even in these cases we overlook variation because it may not be great relative to our pragmatic purposes (such as diagnosing the presence of a disease).  But pragmatic considerations like this often turn out to be wrong and science is about understanding nature.

The problems mainly follow from falsely confounding inheritance of genes and with inheritance of traits, and from using the extreme of a distribution--the few nearly-dominant examples--to characterize the whole distribution of the effects of individual genetic variants. 

At the time of the synthesis, not enough was known about genes (or, at least, seriously and widely enough accepted) to recognize the implications of polygenic inheritance.  But now there is no excuse for clinging to theoretical concepts that are misleading and, at best, inaccurate ways to understand life. Doing so has led us down the paths that we imagine will promise simple answers of immediate clinical or commercial value. Each approximate 'hit' entices us to go deeper into the woods of our dreams.

Tuesday, August 9, 2011

Mendelian inheritance and evolution. Part II

The modern evolutionary synthesis reconciled what Mendel had showed about the discrete nature of inheritance (or so it was thought), and what Darwin had insisted on was the major gradual, more or less continuous, nature of the variation in traits and their evolution.

A lot of things contributed to this reconciliation.  Many experiments, largely stimulated by the 1900 rediscovery of Mendel's 1866 work, began to find mutations that were not grotesque, but had small effects, and were perfectly viable for the organism.  Big bad mutations did still arise and had been obvious and easy to see, but now the majority of mutations seemed to be of the lesser type.

Quantitative traits like stature varied gradually rather than by discrete jumps (such as between yellow and green peas).  Darwin's distant cousin Francis Galton had shown formally what had been obvious, that even for quantitative traits relatives resembled each other--indeed, they did so more than they might for traits with strong dominance (yellow peas did not resemble their green-pea ancestors in that trait).  A variety of investigators, most notably the statistical geneticist RA Fisher (in 1918) recognized how the two types of inheritance could be brought under the same umbrella.  If complex or quantitative traits were caused by the effects of many different genes, each making a small contribution, then the resemblance among relatives, the quantitative variation, and Mendelian inheritance were all consistent.

If that was so, then Darwinian gradual evolution was possible even with Mendelian inheritance as the basic fact of life.  That's what the modern synthesis showed.  It seemed wholly legitimate, indeed perhaps strikingly insightful, and it became the core theory of biology (and in many eyes, we think somewhat erroneously in ways similar to the adherence to Mendelism as the ground-state of inheritance, it still is).  The formal theory of evolution or, to many, of life was the mathematical theory called population genetics.  Well, Isaac Newton said something to the effect that if it can't be expressed mathematically it can't be a law of Nature, so we needed something real, not soft for biology!

It is strange for a central theory in a serious science to say nothing whatever about actual traits of the entities--organisms--that it purports to explain, but that's what population genetics does.  It says only that variation is comprised of discrete Mendelian (that is, discretely transmitted) units of inheritance ('genes' has been the word for them), and that by chance and mainly by the systematic force of natural selection, changes in the frequency of genetic variants were responsible for variation among organisms and among species.  Surprisingly, this theory became accepted even before there was any real theory of what a 'gene' is!  That means it was such a blanket view, so mathematically rigorous, that it could be universally applied to entities that hadn't even been discovered.  Reconciling this theory with actual traits has only come in recent decades under rubrics like EvoDevo (the evolution of development).  Our book, Mermaid's Tale, deals with these issues extensively, and we try to show that there has been far too much stress in biology that rested on the Competition-among-clearcut-units-is-almost-everything worldview of the modern synthesis.

The dogma became that Mendelism and Darwinism are compatible.

But in a real sense, we think, this is fundamentally wrong.  The modern synthesis essentially was possible only because Mendelian inheritance was itself wrong!

Thursday, August 4, 2011

Mendelian Inheritance and evolution. Part I

We recently discussed problems with the idea of Mendelian inheritance, and the way that assuming that was a mode of trait inheritance has been so misleading and, we think for that reason incorrect.  (Here's the first of the five posts in that series.)  We'd now like to consider some of the implications of our point of view, when it comes to evolution.  We think this in fact reinforces that point of view, as we'll try to show.

Some traits do seem clearly to 'segregate' (be distributed) among family members in a present or absent mode, associated with a single allele (variant) at a gene, and if one allele is more likely to prevail that is called 'dominant'.

We pointed out that Mendel chose traits that 'worked'--that provided clear-cut material that allowed him to understand the nature of 'inheritance.'  That word is actually somewhat off, because Mendel was interested in the nature of hybridization (inheritance in a mixed cross between strains), and there was the confusion that still widely reigns, between inheritance of traits and inheritance of genes.  By pragmatically equating the two, because that wasn't too far off in his chosen model situation, Mendel got his result.  Even he knew that most traits didn't work that way (and even some traits that should, in some species he later studied, didn't).

For many decades after Mendel, it was thought that such traits had two important properties:  they were stable, and they made clear-cut qualitative trait differences.  If either wasn't true, then Mendel's rules wouldn't work, hybridization wouldn't work as expected, and how inheritance worked would remain obscure.

And, when Darwin's and Wallace's ideas came along, it was clear that evolution wouldn't work, either!  The most one might expect would be that one of the alleles would replace the other over time, by natural selection.   But this was not satisfactory, because evolution clearly involved smaller, gradual changes more than big dramatic ones.  And evolution, even by Darwin's mistaken genetic ideas, would continually generate new variation for selection to screen.  That was a big problem, because the observed new alleles, traits in offspring that were not present in their ancestors, seemed mainly to be grotesquely harmful, not material that selection could work with to adapt to changing circumstances.

Darwin was aware of much of this, too, in fact.  He could not see how immutable traits, like the dominant/recessive ones, could evolve and also he felt that evolution simply had to be gradual and more or less continuous. Among his reasons were his erroneous largely Lamarckian notion of the physical basis of inheritance, and the fear that without gradualism traits or species might arise suddenly....requiring explanations for their origin.

As a result, for decades leading biologists, realizing that Darwin's gradual inheritance theory (that he called 'pangenesis') was fundamentally wrong, were not convinced that natural selection could account for adaptive evolution or, in particular, that this had anything to do with the known mechanisms of inheritance.

The solution that was widely accepted and prevails (not always accurately) to today, was worked out in the 1930s and later, based on some theory and data from earlier in the 1900s.  This solution was known by names like the 'modern evolutionary synthesis.'   It reconciled Mendelian inheritance with gradual evolution in ways that were consistent with variation within and between species, and with the fossil record.

There are many things to dispute about the modern synthesis, and we'll point them out (and have mentioned them before here on MT).  But one thing that is important, but so far as we know hardly if at all recognized, was that the modern synthesis was possible only if Mendel was wrong, in ways we tried to outline in our recent previous series.

We'll elaborate on these thoughts in the next installment.....so stay tuned!

Friday, July 29, 2011

Mendelian Inheritance: Basic Genetics or Basic Mistake? Part V.

This series of posts has been about the illusion of simple Mendelian inheritance, that has been an enormously powerful tool in understanding how genes are inherited, working through carefully chosen experimental situations in which traits were so closely tied to specific alleles (variant states of a single gene) that it seemed as if the trait itself were being inherited.  But it's only genes that are inherited (except for the goop that's in the fertilized egg or other cell that starts a new organism on its way).

We've been saying that the effect of  alleles on a trait varies with the alleles' contexts.  We can call this variation a 'spectrum' of effects, just as a rainbow is a spectrum of color: most variants have very small average effects, but a few, usually rare ones, can have such large effects that it seems that whenever you inherit one of those alleles you're nearly sure to have the trait.  Just as in the classical pattern of occurrence in families represented in this figure that we've grabbed from the web--almost.  We used the original in earlier posts in this series, because it is that which is in all the textbooks.  But this is more like reality and illustrates a main point.  The Aa's in the middle are not exactly as 'dominant' as the true-red Aa individuals.  And the light orange aa in the grandchild could easily be classified as unaffected, or affected....depending on what theory you were trying to confirm:


But we've said that the more clear-cut (or argued to be clear-cut) version is what one sees for a selection of variants in a selection of genes, and it grabbed scientific attention because it fit our expectations of  how inheritance works, based on Mendel's results with carefully chosen traits in peas, and similar trait-selection for the following century.  Even  then candid acknowledgment will be typically made that there is variation in the actual traits that people in the same family have: not all the red dots are equally solid or red, as in the figure.  And we know that as a rule, since most effects of individual variants are very small, and many variants contribute to most traits, even the basic idea of Mendelian inheritance makes little sense as a rigorous theory of inheritance--and we should realize that, accept that, even if we wish things were simpler.  The real world doesn't have to fulfill our wishes!

In fact, fine classical papers from around 1960 showed that the appearance--the illusion--of Mendelism can arise in another way unrelated to the extreme, usually rare ends of the allelic effects distributions.  If a presence/absence trait, like hyptertension vs normotension, stroke vs non-stroke, cancer vs non-cancer, arises when a threshold is exceeded on some underlying quantitative trait (e.g., if your blood pressure rises above some agreed-on cutoff level for calling it hypertension), and if many different genes contribute to it, the trait can occur in families in a way that appears clearly 'Mendelian', that is, as if only a single allele were responsible.

We know that even with complex inheritance, children will resemble their parents, and we know the average extent to which that should happen.  Generally, you're half-way between your parents' trait levels, such as stature.  But the usual idea is that this doesn't apply to discrete (yes/no) traits that follow Mendel's rules: you're either this or that, but not a half-way blend of your parents for such traits.  As Darwin would say, the traits do not 'blend'.

Nonetheless, as was shown in the '60s, the probability of a qualitative trait (yes/no, like hypertension of diabetes) can be similar enough between close relatives that it appears to follow Mendel's rules.
This is because if you have a combination of genetic variants, across your genome, that makes your blood pressure high, your children will inherit half of those (on average) plus whatever similar risk effects your spouse may have, and for a generation or two it can have a net result of around half of children of an affected parent also being affected with hypertension, which is what you'd expect if there were just one Hypertension gene with two states, normal and hypertensive.  The illusion can arise under a broad set of circumstances, and can fuel hopes of simple situations----or hopes that GWAS will, after all, really work.

This means that, in addition to all the other things discussed in this series, and not even considering shared environmental effects which can often be by far the most important, multi-gene causation can reinforce the ideas of someone assuming that Mendelian inheritance of the trait is true.   

We can relate all of this to GWAS findings in another way as well.  If a given allele is common enough in cases for its effects to be found and reach statistical significance, relative to its frequency in controls, then it has a chance to be detected in a GWAS study.  But this depends on its penetrance, that is, on the strength of its effects, on their own, on a trait measure like stature or blood pressure, or on the presence of a disease.  Highly penetrant alleles will be found more frequently in cases than controls because they have a higher chance of 'causing' the trait.  The greater the effect, the more likely if you have the allele you have the disease.

This is a kind of 'dominance', because the allele is being detected against the other allele at that gene in individuals, plus whatever other relevant variants they have in their genome. That typically only a few genes are identified in this way shows how relatively rare real dominance is--how far it is from being the baseline, basic nature of inheritance!  In fact, most variants that contribute contribute so little--have so little 'dominance' in this context--that we simply cannot detect their individual effects (or those effects are not enough to generate a statistically 'significant' association with the trait).

Put another way, these various considerations show how, if we assume a theory, we can make the data fit the theory and also assume we understand the data.  But if that theory is wrong or very inaccurate, it can lead us far astray.....as Mendelian theory has indeed been doing for more than 150 years.

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Mendelian Inheritance: Basic Genetics or Basic Mistake? Part IV

So, if we are right that 'Mendelian' inheritance is fundamentally mistaken--or, at best, generally inaccurate and misleading--then what kinds of conclusions can we draw and how can some of the basic attributes of life be accounted for?  We have to assume that life evolved and that to a great extent means genes, broadly defined.  Indeed, we may be worse off than we think if, as we tried to show in an earlier post, even what a gene is, is elusive with current knowledge.

Waterhouse, A Mermaid
In our book after which this blog is eponymously named, we argued that there has been too much attention placed on evolution (and a competition-centered view of life at that), relative to the more ubiquitous properties found at life's other time scales--of development and maintenance of an organism, and of the interaction of factors on the ecological scale.

The idea of Mendelian inheritance, which is widely extended to the vast majority of gene-trait relationships that clearly are not following the monk's principles, is of discrete states one of which dominates in their various combinations.  This was (and is) extended to evolution, with our grossly inadequate 'winner take all', 'survival of the fittest' notion of one best -- fitness-wise dominant -- variant that natural selection favored into success just as surely as a dominant allele was favored ineluctably into manifestation in the organism.

But if you think of the other properties of life, which we center our book around and will briefly name here, you might ask how Mendelian thinking, which only by deep contortions can be related to those principles, could ever have taken hold, unless it's by what amounts to an ideology, a takeover of a certain highly deterministic, simplistic view of the living world--a view that simply, for decades, wrote off into alleged irrelevance the actual way in which organisms work.

Sequestration and modularity
From DNA on up, life is organized as hierarchically nested partially sequestered units.  DNA has functional sequence elements arranged  together along chromosomes, but partially isolated in that they can serve their individual functions.  The units (such as amino acid codons) are repeated many times.  Proteins have partly separated functional units, too.  Cells are packaged units that have many different partially isolated subunits within them, such as organelles like mitochodria, isolated areas like the nucleus, and local differences in what is present in the cell membrane (e.g., a cell may have a front and back end, so to speak).

An organism (or even collections of organisms as in bacterial biofilms) is made of large numbers of cells.  These are repeated units that communicate with each other via combinations of signaling and other molecules, and this is what leads them to express particular, context-dependent sets of genes.  So that they are repeated, but different.  This process occurs hierarchically during development, and in response to environmental changes during life.  An organism is divided into organs and organ systems, like brain, heart and vessels, digestive organs, and so on.

Organs are made of nested, repeated units.  Intestines are segmented along their length, and their surface is littered with repeated structures called 'villi'.  Skeletons are made of repeated, partially different but interaction bones.  Trees are made of leaves and so on.  Plants and animals alike are constructed by repetition and branching.

Yet, importantly, each organism has only the one genome that it inherited from its parents!  So the same genome makes brains and braincases, that are as different from each other as any two things in all of life.

These processes are both qualitative: each leaf or bone is a separate structure; and quantitative: each such structure is somewhat different.  This is the natural variation that is the material on which evolution can work.

If you just think about this, you would have to wonder how it could be brought about by Mendelian inheritance.  How could just two states at a single gene be responsible for such complexity and quantitative internal organization?

It is perhaps easier to see how breaking a gene could cause a major state change, and thus a normal and dead alternative at a gene could be manifest in Mendelian inheritance terms.  Or if the trait is very close to a protein coded by a single gene, two major alleles (variants) at that gene could have big differences (yellow vs green peas, for example).  But as a rule, Mendelian inheritance makes little sense.  Partly that's because, as mentioned in earlier parts of this series, we confuse inheritance of traits with inheritance of genes.  Genes--specific stretches of DNA--are clearly inherited in a Mendelian way (with some exceptions that don't matter in this context here).  But traits generally are not.

The reason for all of this is that the basic principles of life, that include the above descriptions (see our book for detailed discussion in this context), involve cooperation--that is, co-operation or contemporary interaction--among many different elements, each of them variable in a population.  What an individual inherits are sets of genomic variants from its parents.  The traits an individual manifests are the net results of these variants acting in the particular environments in which they find themselves.

Wednesday, July 27, 2011

Mendelian Inheritance: Basic Genetics or Basic Mistake? Part III.

Mendel
In his experiments, published in 1866, Gregor Mendel crossed two strains of domestic peas.  'Crossing' means that one parent was from each strain, and because the strains were inbred, this meant that there was little variation in the genomic backgrounds within each strain.  Mendel used different pairs of strains for the different traits he studied.  Further, he found that his chosen traits (seven of them, like round vs wrinkled or green vs yellow exhibited what he called 'dominance' (as we translate the term today).  That means that the effect of the allele (genetic variant) from one of the two strains was always manifest as its corresponding trait.  To revisit what we said earlier in this series, in the first generation of a cross, every parental pea plant was either GG or YY genotype (green or yellow) at a given test gene so every offspring plant inherited a G allele from one parent and a Y from the other, meaning they had the GY genotype and the peas and pods were yellow (in which case we say Yellow is dominant over Green).

But things are more complicated in the generation produced by crossing these plants, because then a specified fraction of each offspring type would be expected (as we noted in Part I, for GY x GY, the famous 1GG, 2GY, 1GG ratios were expected.  Mendel went a few generations beyond that,  and the ratios became more subtle, but the point is the same.  However, each generation allowed some scrambling of the genomic background of the strains, that is, at the rest of the genome, due to what is known as 'recombination' among the two parental strains' chromosomes.

It was in the context of those backgrounds with their limited variation, that the plants seem to breed 'true'.  Of course, there was statistical variation in the frequency of the relative offspring types (and Mendel was accused of fudging some figures to make his story come out closer to what he expected).  He did not get exactly the expected proportions.   But this variation, which is observed in every 'Mendelian' situation in any species, has always been attributed solely to chance allele transmission from parent to offspring (or to data fudging by tossing plants that didn't fit).  The fudging accusation is highly debated (see my paper, Goings on in Mendel's Garden, Evol. Anthropol., 11:40-44, 2002). But there may be a more serious issue, hidden in the statistics.

That issue is the assumption, from Mendel's day to today, of the expected proportions of plant types (green vs yellow, smooth vs wrinkled).  That expectation was based on pure, 100% dominance, that is on the inherently dominant physiological effect of the two alleles in any of one of his test crosses.  The assumption is that there is no genomic background variation that causes deviation from these 'pure' expected proportions.  We don't know to what extent there were 'greenish' or 'yellowish' peas, or peas with nondescript or mottled nature in Mendel's experiments, that would have been tossed out on the grounds of foreign pollination or whatever.  We know however that the variation was small enough that the assumption of dominance was good enough--for Mendel's purposes. 

At least one of his traits, plant height, was largely quantitative and less clear to judge (this was written up in the early 1900s, especially by OE White in a series of thorough papers).  We know that genes in the wild have many different variant states, not just two. And these have variable effects.  And this is true for Mendel's traits.  This is the same story, consistently, with variation at alleles related to human diseases (like cystic fibrosis, or PKU, etc.), and variation and genetic control in essentially any species carefully studied.  For these reasons, Mendel probably could not have done what he did with random samples of wild plants--anymore than we can do it with GWAS and complex diseases today.  Indeed, we must say that the above-cited paper raised all of these points, before the mountain of confirming data that subsequent studies generated and that we have today was available.  Of course, these are inconvenient facts if you hunger, naturally perhaps, for simple answers to fond dreams of perfect crops, and immortality through genetics.


In that sense, Mendelian traits are an artifact or illusion of his simple experimental set up, one he intentionally chose because the traits 'worked' the way he wanted them to. But there are further reasons than natural variation in the test genes themselves, for thinking that Mendelian inheritance has been, from the beginning, a very misleading notion.

This is the fundamentally mistaken notion that a gene is the same as the trait it contributes to.  It is the assumption of causal inherency.  Instead, what we know very, very clearly is that with a few kinds of exceptions (such as many lethal dysfunctional mutations in genes), the effect of an allele is contextual:  it depends on the environment and, in this case more importantly, on the genomic background.  That is, the variants at the many other genes in the same plant or animal affect how the allele of interest is manifest.  This is because no gene is an island, despite our clinging to Mendelian concepts of inherent causation for the last 150 years.

The degree of this contextual dependence varies from gene to gene, trait to trait, population to population, and species to species.  There is no single biological theory (other than, perhaps, this generalization) that predicts what we will find.  Some alleles in some situations act in a way that would make Mendel smile.  But few traits are, overall, like that.  10% or so of known devastating mutations in humans, that typically are called 'Mendelian', are the normal allele in other species!

To a great extent Mendelian inheritance of traits, that has become the sacred icon of modern genetics, is simply wrong!  Certainly, in any species one can find traits that segregate in the expected fashion to a degree satisfactory for the purposes at hand.  There is a spectrum of effects, and some are of this simple-enough causation.  But from a point of view of an actual theory of biology, it is the specturm not its extreme, that is important.

In this sense, genetic effects are as relative to each other as motion of objects is to Einstein.  This means that a subtle but centrally important point,  that there is really little if any difference between 'physiological' and 'statistical' dominance!  These terms were introduced earlier in this series of posts.  The idea of inherent dominance has been a misleading oversimplification from the beginning.  Dominance is just a sometimes-observed approximate correlation between alleles and traits that applies to a particular population.  Inherent biological dominance is an experimental illusion.

Traits in Nature, like diseases, that appear to be Mendelian, are those that in current circumstances, chosen among countless traits that have been studied, seem to appear in families in the classical way.  We know this very well, but it's not in most peoples' perceived self-interest to face up to it.  Even the more devastating mutations in 'Mendelian' single-gene diseases typically have variable effects.  The same mutations in mice are very often strain-specific.  And many alleles at the gene have less, and even more, variable effects.

For example, most individuals with 'recessive' diseases are not homozygotes for 'the bad' allele: they are heterozygotes for various alleles that compromise the trait to various degrees away from 'normalcy'.  
To account for this, but still to cling to our Mendelian paradigm, we introduce fudge factors to account for incomplete dominance and the like, that must be introduced in genetic (family) counseling risk estimates.

To the extent these statements are true, the idea of Mendelian inheritance (of traits) has been a stunningly misperceived, mistaken theory that continues to cost huge amounts of money for chasing genes 'for' particular traits, as if such genes have inherent causal, and hence inherent predictive properties.